Garabet Moumdjian's Publications

CNN International Explores the Secrets of Armenia's Stone Henge

2010-11-09T12:36:00.000-08:00

ARAM ANDONIAN’S INFAMOUS NAIM BEY’S REAL ‎IDENTITY IS NOW CONSIDERED REVEALED‎

2008-05-15T18:44:00.000-07:00

IS A LONG OVERDUE CONTROVERSY FINALLY SETTLED?

ACCORDING TO DR. HILMAR KAISER:

ARAM ANDONIAN’S INFAMOUS NAIM BEY’S REAL IDENTITY IS NOW CONSIDERED REVEALED

Interview conducted by: Prof. Garabet K Moumdjian

Armenian Genocide historian Dr. Hilmar Kaiser has set himself as an authority of the Armenian Genocide during the past decade. The bulk of his research is conducted in primary archival material. As of 2005, Kaiser is meticulously conducting research at the Directorate of Ottoman Archives [Türk Cumhuriyyeti: Başbakanlık Devlet (Osmanli) Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğüü] in Istanbul (This interviewer also has been conducting research there since 2005), Turkey, which is now open to historians worldwide, after a 10 year hiatus. When he emailed me regarding his findings about the identity of the infamous Naim Bey, I was more than compelled to conduct this interview with him. Naim Bey was the source of the telegrams that presented proof of the intentional genocidal policies of the Young Turk government and especially that of Talaat Pasha, then Minister of Interior of the Ottoman Empire. Andonian, a journalist and himself a survivor of the Armenian Genocide, published his famous “Naim Bey’s Memoirs”[1] in 1920. Since the 1980’s The Turkish side has devoted much time and effort to undermine the authenticity of Naim Bey’s telegrams. Moreover, Turkish scholars have gone as far as to proclaim that Naim Bey himself is nothing more than a fictitious character and perhaps a figment of Andonian’s imagination.

Let’s start with the quintessential question: Who was Naim Bey?

According to Aram Andonian, Naim Bey was an Ottoman official who had been involved in the Armenian deportations from Aleppo to Der Zor. After the war, he supplied confidential information and a series of documents and renditions of documents to Aram Andonian. The information and the materials were later published by Andonian together with a part of his own memoirs in 1920.

And who was Aram Andonian?

Aram Andonian was a well-known journalist in Constantinople. On April 24, 1915, he was arrested together with other Armenian intellectuals, politicians, clergy, businessmen, and Armenians who had been taken due to a confusion of names. Luckily for Andonian, he belonged to the group that was detained at Tchankiri. This group had better chances of survival than those at Ayash, who were almost all killed. Andonian escaped from deportation and spent time in hiding in Aleppo. He was one of the first Armenians to secure evidence on the genocide. His papers are kept at the Nubarian library in Paris and are of supreme importance for research on the Armenian Genocide.

Why is the identity of Naim Bey so important?

Evidently it is critical to identify all officials that were involved in the Armenian Genocide, particularly those who were responsible for the execution of the deportations. This holds truer for Naim Bey as he was Aram Andonian’s informant and the data provided by him stands today at the core of an important debate.

What is this debate about?

For decades, Naim’s information and the documents he supplied were seen as the principle proof for the Armenian Genocide. In 1983, Turkish authors published a book doubting the veracity of the documents and Naim Bey’s existence.[2]

What were their arguments?

The two authors brought forward a number of technical aspects. For instance, they claimed that Talaat’s signature on the documents were fake. And, indeed, the signatures were not Talaat’s. But this fact was misunderstood by many. After all, the materials carrying Talaat’s “signature” were supposedly telegrams received by officials in Aleppo. They were not faxes or letters, so it was impossible to have Talaat’s original signature on the papers. The authors also compared the style of central authority documents with the work of provincial scribes.

Was all criticism answered?

Not really. The two authors rightly pointed out that we do not have access to any of the originals. They were either lost or misplaced. This fact severely limits the value of the material for historians. I, for my own part, use Aram Andonian’s own memoirs in my work but do not engage the documents. The Turkish authors also claimed that Naim Bey never existed as they had not found a personnel file for him.

Did you find Naim Bey’s file?

No. The two Turkish authors seem to have thought that Naim must have been an official of the central authorities. But recent research in the Ottoman archives showed that many, if not most, of the Ottoman officials working around Aleppo and along the Euphrates had been locally hired, even as part-timers, and they were temporary employed for the deportation work. I did not find a personnel file. We have hardly any evidence from the Ottoman provincial authorities at all. In other words, we depend on incidents were local evidence made its way into the files of the central authorities. In the case of Naim we were lucky that such a case exists.

Then, who was Naim Bey?

Naim Bey was a relatively young man in 1916. He was 25 or 26 years old, born in Silifke. In 1916, he worked in Meskene as a deportation official responsible for the dispatch of Armenians to Der Zor. At the time a scandal erupted. Some Armenians had succeeded in bribing officials and managed to escape with the latter’s help to Aleppo or avoid further deportation towards Der Zor. The authorities in Aleppo got wind of the affair and ordered an inquiry. Naim Bey managed to keep out of trouble but we know from Aram Andonian that he had taken bribes as well.

What is the importance of this discovery?

The new Ottoman documentation confirms the information Andonian gave to a surprising high degree. This adds considerably to Andonian’s credibility even though we still have no originals of the materials supplied by Naim Bey. Moreover, the new evidence confirms that the deportation officials were locally hired. Equally important is to show that the Turkish writers’ information is flawed and their research is not the last word on the topic. With the identification of Naim Bey an important stone missing from the mosaic has been uncovered and must be put back in place.

Do you expect to find the original documents any time soon?

The identification of Naim happened some 25 years after the publication of the Turkish book. This alone shows you how slow progress is. However, it happened 17 years after the start in the Ottoman archives and only three years after the archives became available again, following a 10 year interruption. You, Mr. Moumdjian, have been at the archives and have conducted research there. You know how time consuming the process is. We are able to get only 25 documents per day after ordering them a day in advance. It’s a tedious process that has to be done anyways.

Are you hopeful to find the documents in the future?

Today, the Andonian material is not as important for historians as it had been decades ago. The documentation obtained from the Ottoman and other archives has replaced Andonian’s publication in current debates. Certainly, Andonian’s material could be a ‘smoking gun’ if proven to be true. But that is not the focus of current research. The Armenian Genocide is not validated or understood through a single or a few documents. The crime was highly complex and we need to process large volumes of evidence from a variety of sources. This takes time and is a slow process given the lack of available funding. The identification of Naim Bey is an important step in the right direction but it won’t be the last important new finding. It strongly underlines the importance of Ottoman documentation and work in Turkish archives.

Lastly, since you identified Naim Bey, can we at least know his real name? Did Aram Andonian use a pseudonym in order to keep his real identity a secret?

Garabet, I know why you ask that question? I will elucidate Naim Bey’s identity issue through a special lecture with document presentation on my next visit to the Los Angeles area. But for now let me answer by this: It gets even better than you think. Andonian's Naim Bey's name is NAIM BEY.

Interviewr’s Note:
The following footnotes are extracted from online sources to explain a couple of points that were very briefly mentioned in the interview and needed some clarification. The first is from “Wikipedia,” while the second is from the web-site of the “Assembly of American Turkish Associations.”
Endnotes:
[1] The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportation and the Massacres of Armenians also known as "Talaat Pasha Telegrams" written by Aram Andonian and published in London by Hodder & Stoughton, in 1920, originally in English, and later in a French version. This was the first book publication by Aram Andonian. The book lists several documents, the telegrams, which are purported to constitute evidence that the Armenian Genocide was formally implemented as Ottoman Empire policy. [Wikipedia]

[2] The Andonian "Documents" Attributed to Talaat Pasha are Forgeries! By Prof. Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv: A most recent (1983) publication by the Turkish Historical Society and written by Sinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, as a scholarly evaluation of the so-called "Talaat Pasha telegrams" is most important for the proper assessment of the "Armenian issue". This momentous book of unusually competent erudition critically examines all of the documents produced in the English and French editions of the Aram Andonian book, which hitherto served as the basis of many arguments of some Armenians and like-minded foreign writers. This impressive new Turkish volume sheds light on a most important aspect of the topic in question. No commentator can now stand on solid grounds without reading it and giving it due attention. I do not think that previous arguments, set forth by a group of Armenian publicists for the last sixty-three years, can be repeated. One judges it as a moral obligation to inform all concerned that it will no longer be possible to continue appraising the "Talaat Pasha telegrams" in the same manner that they have been assessed before, without first seeing weighty evidence offered in this volume of 344 pages. Without going into minute but nevertheless meaningful details, I may summarize the evidence as pointing to the assertion that the Andonian "documents" are fake. The "documents", first printed as early as 1920, have been utilized by certain circles as "proof" of deep Ottoman Government involvement in the loss of life of Armenians in 1915. Aram Andonian was a hitherto-unknown Armenian who allegedly received those manuscripts (including the assumed orders of Talaat Pasha) from a minor Ottoman official called Naim Bey, working in the Rehabilitation Office in Aleppo, Syria. The work based on them was published in Paris, London and Boston. The recent Turkish publication treats each and every so-called "document" painstakingly in terms of both form and content and offers the suggestion that they are counterfeit. The fabrication of fraudulent documents is not uncommon in history. The falsity of "Hitler diaries" was lately proven within a matter of weeks. The so called "Zinoviev telegram”-- that had created a public stir in England in the early 1920’s-- is now accepted as a forgery. [http://www.ataa.org/reference/andonian-ataov.html]

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, 1918-1921‎

2008-05-15T18:25:00.000-07:00

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, 1918-1921:
DOMESTIC POLITICS

By GARABET K. MOUMDJIAN

To provide the reader (even the general one) with a short essay that simplifies the intricate web of domestic politics characterizing inter-party relations in the Republic of Armenia between 1918 and 1921 is not an easy task. The limits of a short essay, is, very simply put, inadequate, if one wants to make an in-depth analysis of the topic under discussion.

Therefore, I will try to approach the issue from another perspective. I will first present brief sketches of the major participant political organizations. Then, I will identify and explain some of the important issues relating to inter-party relations during the period under discussion. Finally, I will try to draw some conclusions, which might bare educational value for current Armenian endeavors towards democracy and national unity.

During its two and one half years of existence, The Republic of Armenia was a fledgling country proudly taking great strides towards building permanent democratic institutions. The Western orientation of the government had its profound effect on the internal political atmosphere.

It was in an effort to emulate the West and be considered its worthy ally that the ruling Armenian political organization, the ARF (Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF hereafter), committed itself to moderate, republican principles, which, had it not been for the abrupt Sovietization of the Republic, would have undoubtedly paved the way for the realization of democratic governmental institutions.

On the other hand, the short lived experience of some two and a half years was not enough to quite the bickering between the various political organizations with their contradicting ideologies and political agendas.

At the core of the disagreements were some fundamental socio- political beliefs related to the shaping of the future democratic state. Add to this the strong atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty that existed between the various political parties that had not yet worked within a single governmental entity and you would have a perfect example of a political quagmire in the making.

The political-ideological spectrum in the Republic extended from the far right to the extreme left. The Bourgeoisie, represented by the Eastern Armenian Populists, or Popular Democrats) Zhoghovrtagan, and the Western Armenian Constitutional Democrats (Ramgavar) occupied the right spectrum, while the socialists, ranging from the Social Revolutionaries (SR's) to Marxist Social Democrat (SD's) and splinter groups dotted the left spectrum. The ruling party, The ARF, still adhering to a socialist ideology, pragmatically assumed a centrist position.

1. - THE RIGHT SPECTRUM

a- THE CONSTITUTINAL DEMOCRATS

The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the government of Ittihadist Turkey, incapacitated the mainly urban, Western Armenian Constitutional Democrats). The party was formed in the wake of the Ittihadist (Young Turks) coup d'etat of 1908. The restoration of the Ottoman Constitution gave impetus to the party's platform of free enterprise, and the pursuing of Armenian reforms through non-violent, legal means. It should be noted, however, that the absorption of the more militant Armenakans and a faction of the Reformed Henchakian (Veragazmial) into its ranks made the party more susceptible to notions of defensive armed struggle.

With its strength in the Republic diminished by its Eastern Populist counterpart, the Ramkavars tried to overshadow the ruling party, the Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, by extending their activities among diasporan Armenian communities. Leaders such as poet Vahan Tekeyan, and academician Arshag Chobanian, worked closely with Boghos Nubar Pasha and his National Delegation in Paris, in an effort to strengthen the position of the latter within Allied circles vis-à-vis the government of the Republic of Armenia.

In the day to day affairs of the Republic, however, The Ramkavars managed to keep only a bare semblance of party organization. Their presence was due mainly to some Western Armenian refugees from Van (former Armenakans). Although they published the semi-weekly Tsayn Hayastani (Voice of Armenia) in Yerevan, and in mid 1919 reached as far as negotiating with the ruling party for participation in the government (about which more is to be said later), their active political role in the Republic was negligible.

b- THE POPULIST DEMOCRATS

It was with the Eastern Armenian populist democrat party that the Ruling party in Armenia, the ARF entered into a coalition government from November 1918 to June 1919. It was the dictates of its Western orientation and the set aim of attracting Armenian and other capitalist circles towards the newly established Republic, rather than its social ideology, that persuaded the A.R.F. into willingly entering this uneasy partnership with the Eastern Armenian antirevolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Populist Party was a newcomer into Armenian political life. Tsarist imperial-colonial policies didn't provide fertile grounds for the creation of liberal democratic parties. Only after the demise of the Russian imperial regime in 1917, did Armenian commercial and professional circles in Tiflis, Baku and Elisavetbol provide the grass-root support for such a party to materialize. The main catalyst in this formation was members of the Russian Constitutional Democrat (Cadet) party, who were advocates of Armenian cultural autonomy within a Russian democratic, liberal federation.

The geographical distribution of its grass roots support suggests that the party was more influential in all parts of Trans-Caucasia except in the predominantly agrarian Armenian Republic.

It was during the second Populist party congress-- held in Yerevan on the wake of the collapse of the coalition government, and the party's boycotting of parliamentary elections during the preceding months—that the representatives of the Eastern Armenian Bourgeoisie displayed, for the first time, "an emphatic western orientation by expressing deep admiration for the Allied Powers." It was during this congress too, that
party delegates put aside their previous advocacy of cultural autonomy, and endorsed national independence. It was in this euphoric mood that the populists called upon all anti-socialist elements to coalesce to oust the ARF from the government and form a new one based on the principles of free, capitalistic enterprise.

2. - THE LEFT SPECTRUM

a- The Social Revolutionaries

The adherents of the Russian Social Revolutionary Movement also had a nominal presence in the Republic. Like the populists, their grass root support was based on student and intellectual circles in Tiflis and Baku. Many of its members were former Tashnakists who had abandoned the party in 1907 because of its absorption of and adherence to the movement to liberate “Turkish-Armenia,” which led the party to assume a somewhat shallow position within the Russian opposition movement of the day.

A decade later, in 1917, Armenian SR’s joined the Georgian Mensheviks and fought hard to exclude the ARF from the revolutionary councils, which were shaped as a result of the political vacuum created by the toppling of the Tsarist regime.

Contrary to their lack of a strong support group within the republic, and in spite of their feeble membership, Armenian SR's campaigned vigorously in parliamentary elections. Although they attained meager results, they continued to advocate a single Caucasian entity within an all-Russian federative democracy.

Their failure was a direct result of their disbelief in the concept of national independence. Even when the majority of its delegates, perhaps out of expediency, voted in favor of working within separate Caucasian republics during the party's conference held in Tiflis in August of 1919, the party could not formulate a working strategy out of their demand. The party organ, Sotsial Heghapokhagan (The Socialist Revolutionary), continued to publish contradicting views about issues relating to self determination and national independence, thus furthering the gap between the party and the general populace.

b- The Social Democrats

The collapse of empire, partition of Trans-Caucasus, end of Baku Commune, disagreement over tactics, and the final schism between Bolshevik and Menshevik factions had weakened the Social Democrats and scattered them into five rival groups.-

1) The Armenian Section of the Georgian SD (Menshevik) Party that had a
negligible role in the Republic,

2) Adherents of the International Russian SD (Menshevik) Party,

3) Adherents to Russian SD (Bolshevik) Party, who were advocates of Trans-Caucasian Soviet Republics, and National Communist Parties as affiliates of the Russian Communist Party. There was some resistance from Armenian and Georgian Bolshevik circles to this separatist agenda, but it was finally agreed upon by all Bolsheviks in the region, especially when Lenin and the Central Committee in Moscow advocated it.

The Bolsheviks had lots of disagreement over tactics. Some, like Arshavir Melikian advocated educating the public through legal means rather than revolutionary agitation, because the Republic was in shambles. Young extremists opposed this view. The Bolshevik boycotting of parliamentary elections in summer of 1919 suggests that extremists were in control of the party.

In the summer of 1919 there were not more than 500 Bolsheviks in Armenia.
Yet they were on the rise because of their agitation and because of other factors such as.-

- Unresolved condition of the Armenian Question.

- Radical Bolshevik “proletar”s from Baku and other parts of the Caucasus
Were purring into Armenia.

- Bolsheviks expelled from Georgia coming to Armenia.

- Moscow sending agitators and propagandists into Armenia.

- Armenian government inactive at first (Bolsheviks on government
payroll in ministries, they were permitted to deliver lectures,
engage in political debates, address public rallies, and even criticize
government and ruling party. Therefore, Bolsheviks found a haven in
Armenia.

The Government started taking severe measures only after Bolshevik led uprisings in May 1920.

September 1919 saw the first underground party conference in Yerevan. Only
twelve delegates were present. There was a conflict between Melikian’s mild views and KRIAKOM members Azkanaz Mravian and Sarkis Gasian. Decision taken to
start subversive actions against the existing government.

Thus ARMENKOM was created. However, the party remained underground.

c- The Social Democratic Specifists

Those were intellectuals who adhered to the principle that Armenians had the right to choose their own unique approach to SOCIALISM. They advocated distinct national Marxist parties.

After the formation of the Republic Armenian SD specifists such as Tavit Ananun, Bashki Ishkhanian, and Sdepan Zorian moved to Yerevan to work within governmental institutions and legal structures. in January 1920 they founded The Social Democratic Labor Party of Armenia as a legal organization. They hailed the restoration of national independence and proclaimed that they will participate in
the process of state building. They ridiculed the Ramkavars assertion that Western Armenia should be the nucleus around which the Armenian state is to be formed. They
also criticized other SD factions for their subversive and intrusive agitation and thus attracted the animosity of the Marxists and bourgeoisie alike.

d- The Social Democratic Henchakian Party

Last but not least Social Democratic Henchakian Party. This was the oldest established Armenian SD group and the only one which had Eastern and Western Armenian members. The party reached its peak in 1894-96 during the emancipatory movement in Western Armenia. Then came a period of fragmentation. In 1919 many Henchakists left the party to join Mensheviks or Bolsheviks. Traditional strongholds in Cilicia and Balkans. Publication The Proletar in Tiflis, through which they.-

- Criticized A.R.F. for pseudo socialism, honeymoon with bourgeoisie,
pretension of leadership.

- Criticized all parties that boycotted parliamentary elections.

- Criticized Populists for opportunism (first working with ARF
(then coming out of coalition)

- Criticize intellectuals (SD's specially) because they could not
differentiate between state and government, while the first is
permanent and the other transitory. So, if government is now held y
incompetents that should not mean abandoning the state or
undermining it, but rather aid it by providing new leadership.

- opposed the presence of two delegations in Paris because that was
contrary to the notion of one nation-one struggle.

3. - THE CENTER

a. - The ARF

Although crippled by the Armenian Genocide which shattered its network
in the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Civil war, which battered its organizational machine in the Tsarist Empire, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation was, in 1918, still considered to be the dominant Armenian political organization upon whose shoulders the task of ruling the fledgling Republic rested.

For three decades since its formation, the ARF had acted as a catharsis through which conservative Western and progressive Eastern Armenian ideological fermentations and political aspirations could be funneled into a cohesive working agenda for the realization of the ultimate goal of Free and independent Armenia. Now that the nucleus of that state was accomplished, the old party program with its
revolutionary zeal was inadequate to meet the challenges of a governmental apparatus. Add to this the almost inevitable popular discontent towards the ruling party of a newly established state, and the internal differences within the rank-and-file, and it was obvious that the A.R.F. had to undergo some radical changes in order to meet the challenges of the new situation.

There were three distinct groupings within the party. The largest was that of Western Armenian members who advocated an evolutionary social reform program. On the other extreme stood Internationalist socialist intellectuals, mostly Eastern Armenian, who pushed for radical social and political change. In the middle stood the old leadership, the members of the party's highest executive body, the A.R.F. Bureau which,
out of pragmatic considerations, put aside its revolutionary character, and tilted towards moderation, thus weakening the position of the party's Left. The adoption of a moderate stance by the party's leadership was also evident in the Bureau's organ "Heartache", which stressed gradualism instead of radical social and political reform.

The clash between the first two groups was inevitable during the sessions of the party's 9th congress in September 1919 (the only one held in Armenia's capital Yerevan). Issues ranging from the ideological framework of the party to the relationship between party and government were hotly debated under the watchful eyes of Allied intelligence services which followed the sessions with keen interest. After several weeks of deliberations, the Congress formulated its decisions. It was
evident that the moderates had been successful. The Congress upheld the principles of moderate, democratic government and also instructed the newly elected Bureau that it should have an indirect control of government, that it should not interfere in the affairs of the government, but would rather stay in its shadow and extend a supportive
hand to it.

Later events, however, such as the Bolshevik agitated uprisings in May
1920 terminated the principle of indirect control of government, when the ARF Bureau came out of the shadows and assumed the government itself. These were, it seems, tiring and critical days where raison d'etat became the raison d'etre of the ruling party's leadership.

4. - PARTISAN POLITICS

After reviewing the participants, let us now ponder on some of the processes of inter-party politics. Because of time limitations, I will present each very briefly.

Perhaps one of the most important processes of partisan politics in the Republic was that of the coalition government between the ruling party and the populist Democrats, the Populist Party which lasted from November 1918 to June 1919. Headed first by Hovannes Kachaznuni and then by Alexander Khatisian, The coalition was not a complete semblance of national unity, since the left wing parties (i.e. SR's,
SD's) were against participation in a government where right wing parties were represented. The coalition government provided the opportunity for the Eastern Armenian Bourgeoisie to participate in the state-building process, Many of their Tiflis based cadres relocated themselves to Yerevan or alternated between the two cities, in an effort to plan and implement projects in the spheres of economy, social welfare, education, the judiciary, etc... The coalition government came to an abrupt end because of the act of United Armenia in May 1919. Even though all populist ministers in the government had signed the act and participated in its official declaration, the Populist Central Committee in Tiflis, at the time, it seems, in cohort with Boghos Nubar's camp in
Paris, which insisted that such an act was the prerogative of a constitutional congress where all segments of Armenians must be represented, protested the act and called upon its ministers to withdraw from the government and boycotted the parliamentary elections to be held in the coming weeks. The Populist Center's unexplainable position spread confusion within the party's rank and file. many cadres questioned the validity of the center's decision. Although the populist center's erroneous decisions were rectified during the party conference held several months later, the collapse of the coalition government just before the general parliamentary elections did damage the efforts of a unity between the two most influential political segments. The experiment was never repeated.

In explaining the populist center’s stance one should take into
consideration the negotiations conducted at the time between the Zhoghovrtagan (populist democrats) and the Ramkavars (Constitutional Democrats) regarding the merger of the two. It might be deduced that the Zhoghovertagan’s center's position regarding the Act of United Armenia was a result of Ramgavar influences on its leadership.

The Act of United Armenia also created confusion within circles adhering
to the newly established Hay Azkayin Azadagan Miyutiun (Armenian National Liberal Union) whose aim was the creation of a joint Constitutional Democrats- Populist Democrats-Reformed Henchakian coalition as a counterforce against the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Stressed by the prospect that the Act of united Armenia would rally Armenians worldwide around the Ararat Republic -- the term with which Ramkavars and other Western Armenian circles used to undermine and ridicule the Armenian Republic and its ruling party -- and also worried about The recognition that
the said republic was gaining in Allied circles, architects of the above mentioned Union poet Vahan Tekeyan and Dr. Nshan Der Sdepanian traveled first to Tiflis, where they were joined by Populist Central Committee chairman Samson Harutiunian, and from there to Yerevan to negotiate the Union's participation in the government. The
plenary sessions of the negotiations coincided with the convening of the 9th ARF Congress. Simon Vratsian represented the ruling party. Proposals and counter proposals led to compromises on both sides, but the end result was that the negotiations created more confusion and distrust.

On the other hand, the single event which solicited unanimous Armenian
unity was the Armeno-Georgian border conflict during the period of coalition government. Armenian parties represented in the Azkayin Khorhurt (National Council; Parliament), unconditionally protested the Georgian militant stance and backed the
government in its efforts to resist the aggressor. Due to time limitations I am unable to speak about the 1919 parliamentary elections and their results. What is to be underlined here, however, is the fact that the election process was yet another
indication of the democratic character of the fledgling republic.

5. - CONCLUSION

Burdened with numerous external and internal hardships, The Armenian
Republic in between 1918-1920 was a country in shambles. War, famine, and thousands upon thousands of bewildered refugees threatened the very fabric of Armenian existence and, in the words of Armenia's first prime minister, Hovannes Kachaznuni, rendered the country into a “Chaos without Form" (Antsev Kaos). Yet despite these painful birth bangs, the Armenian quest for freedom and independence was on the march. In this chaotic situation internal partisan divisions were inevitable. Yet the high politicization level of the parties and the populace at large was a promising factor for the future democracy. It was on the principles and the broader issues -- and not secondary or tertiary details -- that Armenian political organizations had differences of opinion. The Republic was not the monopoly of a single party. Even though the ruling party influenced the shaping of government, an outspoken opposition did materialize and a multi-party pluralistic system was working.

If one thing should be stressed here, it would be the fact that the national interest was clearly defined and all of the major participant political organizations were in agreement regarding the elements of the national interest. Governmental decisions were tailored according to national interest, rather than predicated by external influences and pressures.

It is said that History repeats itself. We are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past if we do not learn from our experiences. The period of the Republic did not lack those mistakes. On the contrary, mistakes were numerous and lots of efforts were made to rectify them. It is precisely because of this that the 1918-1920 experience must be of importance to us today.

Armenian Kurdish Relations in the Era‎ Of Kurdish Nationalism

2008-05-15T18:22:00.000-07:00

Armenian Kurdish Relations in the Era
of Kurdish National Movements
(1830-1930)

Garabet K. Moumdjian

PRELUDE

Kurdistan has always been a problem for European powers that have colonial zed and then instituted their mandates in the Middle East. Although constituting the 4th major ethnicity in the Middle East after the Arabs, Turks, and Iranians (Persians) the Kurds were always denied their rightfully owned independent country. With the American invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the major geopolitical shifts that the invasion brought to the area, an autonomous Kurdistan is now a reality. Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Iraqi central government vehemently defy the idea of the creation of an independent Kurdistan. They are even against the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in a federative Iraq.

INTRODUCTION

Forcibly settled in some select communities in Western Turkey and several Middle Eastern countries, and partially concentrated in the eastern districts of Anatolia, there lives an atypical ethnic group whom Turks label as "Mountain Turks". Yet this unique ethnic group is totally unrelated to the Turks and possesses a distinct culture, history, and social background. Historical data collected during the last 2 centuries indicates that these people are the original inhabitants of southeastern Anatolia. History names them the Kurds and their homeland, Kurdistan.
The modern day Turkish Republic was built on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. During their expansion, the Ottomans conquered and occupied the lands of many peoples. They built a large, yet diverse empire, whose borders extended from southeastern Europe (the Balkans) to the Caucasus including the Middle East, Arabia, and North Africa. Asia Minor and Anatolia became the nexus of this vast state.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, unprecedented luxury, opulence, and indolence corrupted the Ottoman imperial power. Weakness and incapacity in the face of European powers became a permanent feature of the power elite. By the nineteenth century, the whole empire was reduced to "the sick man of Europe."
During these two centuries of weakness, the Ottomans encountered an increasing number of nationalistic and freedom movements. An already strong Europe interfered in the internal politics of the empire. However, European powers were never able to reach a compromising agreement or a final decision on how to divide the Ottoman Empire between them. Thus, Ottoman territorial integrity became a permanent element of the European peace process. The totality of the empire was restored for almost a century, until the outbreak of World War I.
Most of the nationalistic movements that the Ottomans encountered during the nineteenth century were staged in their European territories. These were backed by different European powers, especially Russia, which for political reasons regarded the Slavic freedom fighting peoples of the Balkans a continuation of its own people. Moreover, Russia used the Slavic population of the Balkans to implement its strategic plans of "descending to the hot waters" that is, the Mediterranean. Unable to suppress all these freedom movements at the same time, the Ottomans retreated. Consequently, most of the Balkans regained its freedom.
At about the same time (i.e. the middle of the 19th century), peoples in the eastern parts of Anatolia, namely the Kurds and the Armenians, awoke from their centuries long torpor and embarked in nationalistic movements seeking freedom and equality. Yet the remoteness of those peoples and their lands from Europe brought them a fate that was totally different from their European counterparts. Armenian and Kurdish national liberation struggles were handled with an iron fist. All that Ottoman Sultans were deprived of achieving in their European territories they forced in the eastern parts of their empire. Later, under the cover of the first global war, The Ittihadist Turkish government exceeded even its predecessors when it staged and executed THE FIRST GENOCIDE OF MODERN HISTORY [G.M.] by massacring the Armenian population of Ottoman, i.e. Western Armenia.
After the war, in 1918, Armenians garnered their feeble forces in a tiny republic in the Caucasus. This fledgling state was unable to endure for long. After only two and one half years of independence, it was crushed under a "Blitzkrieg" between Kemalist Turkey and Communist Russia. It was eventually absorbed by the latter. Today, about one half of all Armenians live in this republic that was an integrated part of what came to be known as the Soviet Union. It regained its independence in 1990 after the demise of communism. The other half of Armenians is scattered around the world. It constitutes the communities that comprise the Armenian Diaspora.
As for the Kurds, they also were the victims of assimilating Turkish policies. Unlike Armenians, Kurds never achieved sovereignty. Today, their homeland is divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. All four governments suppress any nationalistic insurgence within their Kurdish population.
Numerically, the Kurds comprise the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. However, they are forced to accept the identity of the country in which they live. In Turkey and elsewhere, a planned policy of forced assimilation and military action is wiping out all forms of ethnicity and Kurdish national belongingness.
The events of the last two decades in Turkish Kurdistan are valid indications of this.
This narrative strives to shed some light on the history of the Kurds. It deals with almost a century of events (1830-1930) which covers the most active chapter in the history of the Kurdish freedom movements. As an important supplement, Armenian-Kurdish relations are also studied. Noteworthy is the fact that Kurds and Armenians were close neighbors for centuries. Thus, their histories are closely interrelated. Even a cursory analysis of the relations between these two people show that a close, mutual, and trustworthy collaboration was never realized during their struggle for freedom. This, of course, eventually harmed both peoples. Nevertheless, the turbulent situation that the Middle East encounters in modern times and the numerous wars and conflicts that are staged on its soil are motivating reasons to have a better understanding of the region and its peoples. The Kurds are one such example. They are scattered in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria with ghetto type enclaves in the other Middle Eastern countries.
Iraqi Kurds seem to be the most active. During the past three or four decades, they staged more than one rebellion under the leadership of the Barzani (Barzanji) family. The Iraqi government, with the aid and the military help of the Turkish Republic, crushed those Kurdish insurrections. Some of the Kurdish rebel leaders were murdered. Others were thrown into prison after being charged as traitors to their "host" countries.
In 1945 Kurds in Iran staged an insurrection and for a period of a year established what is historically referred to as "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," which was crushed by the armies of the Pahlavi Shah. More recently, Kurds in Iran grasped the opportunity offered by the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini to extract an autonomous existence for themselves. Although they failed, the Kurds remain a nagging and thorny issue for Iran.
Today, in all the countries in which they live, Kurds are considered to be in a very low socioeconomic level. This is observed especially in the Turkish parts of Kurdistan, where severe limitations on education, dissemination of ethnic culture, and economic opportunities are imposed, the Kurdish language (or languages) and literature is banned, hundreds of villages have been destroyed.
The "Mountain Turks" are yet another case of lost national identities that swim in the murky waters of the Middle Eastern swamp.

I. FROM TIMES IMMEMORIAL TO THE EIGHTEEN HUNDREDS

"No people are so closely related to Armenians by history and creed as the Kurds. Since legendary times, when people used cuneiform to express their magnificence and melancholy, those two neighbors have lived together. Many nations and peoples, ancient Rome, Macedonia, the Parthians, the Arabs from the south, Russians from the north, Genghis Khan and Tamer lane from the far east and Central Asia have conquered the lands of Kurds and Armenians, but they have all gone away. Like winter snow, they have sat on peoples breasts, oppressed and tortured them, but they have eventually melted away, once again giving rise to Kurdish and Armenian existence. As different in their beliefs and character - one mobile and pastoral, the other settled and agricultural - these two people have often become enemies of each other. Instead of protecting each other and living in harmony, they have fought against each other. Sometimes one had ruled over the other."

Ruben Ter Minasian, from whom the paragraph above is quoted, was a patriot who lived for years in the Western Armenian regions of Van and Sasun. Ter Minasian was destined to become a prominent figure in the Armenian National Movement. As a leader of the Armenian gorilla fighting units in Sasun, the fedayeen, he established relations with the Kurds, and negotiated with their numerous tribal chieftains. Ter Minasian's words are a clear illustration of the actual history and affiliation of the two contiguous peoples. If chance had played a different game by making their relationship a more positive one, then many things might have been different today for these two peoples.
It is indeed very difficult to trace the origins of the Kurdish people or to give an exact date of their "entrance" into southeastern Anatolia. A.V. Dolmayik, extracting his information from one of the few Kurdish historians, Sharaf Ul Din, in his book titled “Sasun,” states that:

'Their [the Kurd's, G.M.] origin is very dark. It is possible that these Kurds had entered the region since ancient times. It is also possible that they are the descendants of a race of people which lived in the southern mountains of Lake Van, which Armenians called Mardastan [Land of the Mards, G.M.].[1]

Whatever ambiguities shroud the origins of the Kurds, the important thing to note is that they lived in this region immediately neighboring Historical Armenia. It follows, that they lived in the southeastern districts of Anatolia; induced several conquerors; sometimes even overlapped lands inhabited by Armenians. At the end of the fifteenth century -- i.e. seventy five years before the rule of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I-- Armenian and Kurds were still living close to each other. In the mountainous regions, they were governed by their princes who defended their lands against all outside enemies. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans, after conquering most of southern Europe (Greece and the Balkans), ventured east towards Asia Minor and Eastern Anatolia in an attempt to unite the scattered Turkish and Turcoman tribes and principalities under the banners of their fledgling state.
One of the most important historical developments of those times was the federation of 1459 that was signed by the Muslim and Christian rulers of the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. It was formed with the purpose of blocking Ottoman expansion, Key figures such as 1) Uzun Hassan, leader of the Ak-Koyunlu Turcoman tribes of Diarbekir, 2) David, the emperor of Trepizond, the last remnant of the Byzantines,
3) Kevork Pakratian, Prince of Georgia, and 4) Armenian princes of Sasun participated in this federation.
Conscious of the danger of lightning Ottoman expansion, the federation sent envoys to Europe and tried to harness Western attention. However, Europe was not supportive, and this was to be expected, since after the last and disastrous Crusade to liberate Constantinople, it had encountered numerous internal conflicts, which were the result of the fermenting process of its new nation-states. in fact, internal European clashes were the reason behind the momentum of Ottoman armies and their success on the European battlefronts.
The federation had to face the oncoming Ottoman armies. Soon, Sultan Mehmed II started his offensive towards Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. Ottoman forces gave decisive blows to the federation's armies. Eastern Anatolia was now open for them.
Meanwhile, another force was fermenting in the East. This was the Shiite state of Shah Ismail in Persia (Iran). This Safavid state was in turn interested in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasian provinces. It also tried to bring them under its rule.
The Ottomans expanded rapidly. Muslim and Christian principalities of the "federation" fell under Ottoman rule. Safavid Iran also sent its armies there. This was a dangerous game, especially because the two rivals fanned the centuries old Sunni vs. Shiite enmity of Islam.
War was inevitable. Sultan Selim's armies crushed the forces of Shah Ismail. In 1514 the Sultan placed Armenian and Kurdistan under Ottoman rule.
By the religious principles of Islam, Christians were rendered second degree citizens entitled to pay costly taxes to their Muslim rulers. Selim burdened Armenians with heavy taxes, yet was more lenient and friendly towards Kurds. He even signed a treaty of friendship with their princes, according to which.-

a- All participating princes were to reclaim their sovereignty over their realms.
b- The rule in these Kurdish principalities will continue based on the primo-
geniture system of the past, on condition that the appointment of new princes
be confirmed by a Ferman (Imperial order) from the Ottoman Sultan.
c- During wars, Kurdish princes and their tribes must help the Sultan with sipahi
(feudal) forces and supplies.
d- The Ottoman Sultan promises to protect these principalities against outside
aggression.
e- The Kurdish feudal lords are obliged to pay tribute to the Sultan in the form of
yearly presents. [2]

With this treaty most of Armenia came under direct Ottoman rule. However, there remained some regions, like Hazzo in Kharazan, and Sasun, which kept their ancient sovereign status and did not even pay the yearly tribute demanded by the Ottoman
rulers.[3]
The freedom of those remote pockets was not something Ottomans willingly tolerated. Military campaigns and expeditions were sent with the objective of oppressing these Kurdish and Armenian mountain dwellings. Unable to accomplish their primary objective, the Ottoman regiments diverted their attention to the Kezelbash Kurdish tribes of Sepastia (Sivaz) and Kharpert (Kharput). Ottomans regarded Kezelbash Kurds as heretics --Devil worshippers was and still is a misleading denunciation that Kezelbash Kurds encounter. -- who, "according to Ottoman policy, coveted the spread of Shiism within the Ottoman Empire." Armed with this religious intolerance, the Ottoman armies massacred thousands of Kezelbash Kurds during these campaigns.
In Western Armenia, except for the mountainous areas like Sasun, Armenians came under direct Ottomans rule. Since Ottomans were lenient towards the Kurds, the previously existing balance of power changed. As a result, all former Armenian-Kurdish links were severed. Kurdistan was internally divided between several princes who all wanted to be the first in the eyes of the sultans. Eventually, they all became tools in the hands of the Ottoman rulers, who often used on Kurdish prince or tribe against another, thus keeping them in perfect chaos. Ottomans played this "divide and rule" game for a very specific reason. Until 1683 they were busy with their campaigns in southeastern Europe. This consumed a great percentage of their military and economic resources. Therefore, they had to create a policy of divide and rule in Kurdistan in order to secure their posterior. It was not easy to reach the gates of Vienna and return empty-handed. When those soldiers fighting in the European front returned to Istanbul, they were immediately sent eastward to rob the people. This policy was quite successful. It submerged Armenians and Kurds in the quagmire of fighting marauding Ottoman Yenicheris. From the Ottoman point of view, this kept their [Armenians’, Kurds’] subjugation permanently confirmed.
Against this background of continuous campaigns and pillage Kurds and Armenians continued to live until the end of the eighteenth century. Things started to change only at the beginning of the new century. The year 1806 is a turning point in the history of the Kurdish people. From this date on, several freedom movements and rebellions echoed in different parts of Kurdistan. Some of those movements remained within the confines of the Kurdish noble houses. They did not possess the popular tribal basis so vital for such ventures. The insurrections were put down by canny Ottoman policies which aimed first at belittling the princes in the eyes of the Kurdish tribes and then at suppressing the headless tribes and strangling their desires for freedom.
One must admit however, that some of these movements were able to consolidate several Kurdish tribes and motivate them towards the cause of freedom. This was a hardship for the Ottomans, because those movements had the covert blessing of Tsarist Russia and/or Shiite Iran. This obliged Ottomans to take strict measured to crush rebel Kurds and quell their movements in their initial stages.
Armenian participation was minimal in those Kurdish Movements. Cooperation occurred only in such principalities where some Armenian villages were under the rule of a Kurdish prince. As his menials, Armenians were obliged to aid the Amir (prince) in his quest for freedom. Sasuni states that:-

"This historical era demanded heroism, united forces, and united endeavors for the sake of freedom. The two neighbors had to realize the importance of depending on each other during their common struggle. If one of them broke this rule, the other was to carry the consequences. The wheels of history were to turn in such a way as to crush the first and then the other. Past history is rich with such instances. This also indicates that if Armenian-Kurdish unity was accomplished, the two neighbors would have had established their freedom long ago." [4]
A comprehensive Armenian-Kurdish unification never materialized in those important days. Later, when some measure of mutual understanding and cooperation did transpire, it was already too late to be of any significance.
Events that followed 1830 proved that Armenian-Kurdish unity was impossibility.

II. A REBELLIOUS CENTURY

"If a throne was established, than we would have a future. We were not to be torn to pieces, and without any doubt were to flourish. These Turks were not to be victorious over us. Our homeland was not to be ruined by those owls."

Ahmed Hani
17th Century Kurdish Poet

The first Kurdish rebellion of the nineteenth century broke out in 1806 in the Baban district of Ottoman Kurdistan, under the leadership of Abdul Rahman Pasha. Today, the Baban district is located within Iraqi territory. However, during the nineteenth century it enjoyed a rich and flourishing Kurdish cultural and economic life. Its leader, Abdul Rahman, was able to expand his territory by bringing under his rule minor principalities that were paying tribute to Ottoman and Persian rulers.
Abdul Rahman’s movements were viewed negatively by the Ottomans. The sultan appointed one of his followers, Khalid Pasha, as the new Amir (prince) of the Baban district. This was done to ridicule Abdul Rahman's influence and to belittle him in the eyes of the Kurdish tribes he ruled. Yet Abdul Rahman proved to be an experienced leader and a seasoned politician. He understood Ottoman intentions quite clearly. He advanced with his army against Khalid Pasha, defeated him in a momentous battle in the Sanjak (county) of Khoy, and reinstated himself as the Amir of Baban.
After Khalid's defeat Kurdish princes and tribal chieftains joined Abdul Rahman. The Kurdish prince soon declared himself sovereign. However, Abdul Rahman was unable to endure. He was defeated by new Ottoman armies sent to Baban. In 1808 he was forced to flee from his principality and take refuge with the Kurdish tribes of Persia.
The Ottomans brought massive forces to the eastern vilayets (states) stationing most of them in Kurdistan, This was done to secure the border from Abdul Rahman. Rumors were circling that the rebel Kurdish Amir was gathering new forces in his exile. The Ottomans had yet another reason for stationing armies on their Eastern borders. Times were sensitive. The fear of a Russian offensive was ever-present. Nevertheless, the Ottoman armies stationed in Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan did much harm to the villages and their peasants. They were viewed suspiciously by the inhabitants, who, being tired of their cruelty and oppression, staged a number of minor rebellions in the different parts of Kurdistan. According to Kendal "many Armenians participated in these uprisings, because they were attempts by the population mainly to defend itself." [5]

A. Amir Mohammed and the Unification of Kurdistan

The mountainous region of Southern Kurdistan continued to be the nexus of Kurdish rebellious movements. After the defeat of Abdul Rahman, Amir Mohammed of the Soran territory -- whose principality extended from the Great Zap River to the Iranian border -- benefited from the difficulties that the Ottomans encountered in Greece and Egypt in the 1830's. He too tried his luck in creating a free and sovereign Kurdistan.
Times seemed to be right for such a venture. The Ottomans were badly defeated by the advancing Russian armies from the north. In the south, the viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, grew in power and tried to expand his realm on behalf of his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan. Moreover, the Greeks were in a stage of rebellion which resulted in the severance of Greece from the Ottoman Empire and the creation of an independent Hellenic State. Encouraged by the example of Mohammed Ali, Mohammed, the Amir of Soran, began preparations and established several military factories and arsenals in his capital city, Rewanduz. Those military plants soon supplied his army with vast amounts of ammunition, rifles, and primitive types of cannons.[6] By 1833 Amir Mohammed brought all of southern Kurdistan under his rule. The Kurdish chieftain's army was comprised of ten thousand cavalry and twice as many infantry. With the new territorial gains, his borders stretched to those of the Bohtan Emirate whose prince, Bedir Khan; himself entertained ambitious dreams of unifying Kurdistan.
Amir Mohammed realized the benefits of joining forces with Bedir Khan. For this reason, he approached the prince of Bohtan with a request to form a Kurdish federation against the Sublime Porte. Bedir Khan totally rejected Amir Mohammed's offer, since it meant that he and his forces would come under the command of the mighty prince of Soran. Bedir Khan's refusal was in fact a decisive blow to the cause of Kurdish unification envisioned by the Amir of Rewanduz. [7]
Once the Ottomans had settled their problems, Amir Mohammed became the primary target of the Ottoman Sultan, who sent Rashid Pasha with an army against him. Rashid also received reinforcement from the Ottoman valis (governor) of Musul and Baghdad. He declared war against the Amir of Soran, and he fought him during the summer months of 1834. Von Moltke, who at the time was a German lieutenant serving in the Ottoman army, writes in his memories that the battles were furious. Kurds fought heroically to defend their motherland. The Ottomans had many casualties. They often fought thirty to forty days to occupy just one Kurdish stronghold.[8]
However, Kurdish resistance was destined to fail. Partisan Kurdish irregular soldiers were unable to resist the advances of regular Ottoman regiments that were rejuvenated with fresh recruits. Amir Mohammed relived the fate of his predecessor, Abdul Rahman. He took refuge amongst the Kurdish tribes of Iran, from where he returned in 1836 to continue his struggle. This time, the Ottoman Sultan used his religious authority as the Khalifa [literally the successor to the prophet, religious leader, G.M.] and encouraged Kurdish religious sheiks to rebel against their Lord. Prince Mohammed was outcast by his own people. He was handed over to the Ottomans, who took him and his family to Istanbul. The Sultan's plan worked quite well. Depriving the Soran district from its ruler and protector, he ruled there with an iron fist.
After living in Istanbul for some years, prince Mohammed was granted permission to return to his country. However, he was mysteriously murdered on his way home (most probably by the assassins of the Ottoman Sultan).
Amir Mohammed's movement was different from all previous Kurdish attempts at freedom. It was for once a huge endeavor with a broad popular basis (at least in its initial stages). It is normal to conclude that this movement was the forerunner of Kurdish national movements. However, one problem which severely damaged the Amir's cause was the social culture of the Kurdish people itself. Based on tribal and clan organization, unity and national belongingness were still strange, not to say altogether incomprehensible, to the Kurdish character. Amir Mohammed placed his bet on this sensitive issue. He lost because he did not realize that more time was needed in order to unify a tribal-pastoral society. Kurdistan was not yet ready to accept freedom and national sovereignty under the leadership of a single ruler.
The Soran district was a remote area in southern Kurdistan. Amir Mohammed was not able to establish ties with the Armenian vilayets. The only Christians who might have helped the Amir were Armenian and Nestorian villagers who had migrated long ago to these remote areas of Kurdistan. However, as will be related, Christian and Armenian aid was more readily available during the next Kurdish rebellion. The originator of the new movement was non other than Bedir Khan. The nexus of his revolt was his capital city, Jezireh.

B. Bedir Khan's Rebellion

Bedir Khan, the Amir of Bohtan, was born in 1802. he was the son of the most prominent feudal lord of Bohtan, whose family enjoyed the leadership of the principality since the fourteenth century. Bedir Khan was destined to play an important role in the history of the Kurdish liberation movement.
Most of southern Kurdistan had by now suffered dearly at the hands of the Ottoman armies. Kurds had no doubts about the intentions of the Sultan. An apparent hatred toward the Ottoman regime was gaining momentum. On the other hand, Ottomans encountered a great defeat in Syria where their armies were defeated against the forces of Egypt's viceroy, Mohammed Ali, at Nazib, in June 1839.[9] Bedir Khan acted quickly, and by 1840 he brought almost all of Ottoman Kurdistan under his rule. The prince of Bohtan also signed a treaty of friendship with the Kurdish leaders of Iran and the district of Kars.
According to Safrastian, Bedir Khan was a just ruler. Within his territories justice prevailed to all Kurds, Armenians, Nestorians, or Khaldians. Christians enjoyed unlimited religious freedom under his jurisdiction. They were encouraged to build their churches and worship in them. Bedir Khan protected his Christian subjects and allowed no harm to be done to them.[10] This tolerance toward Christians was something different than Ottoman or Persian policies towards "infidel" Christians, which were based on religious discrimination.
This humanistic character of Bedir Khan acknowledged him as a respectable leader. As a consequence, his popularity grew tremendously in the different parts of Kurdistan. The Amir was now able to rely on his popular base to accomplish his goal of liberating and unifying Kurdistan. Yet like other Kurdish leaders before him, Bedir Khan was confronted with the centuries old problem of Kurdish tribal disunity and rivalry which proved to be a major obstacle.
Kendal mentions yet another problem that is of prime importance, but whose accuracy is yet to be determined. He exerts the idea that missionary movements, British and American, operating in southern Kurdistan preached Christians into obedience to the Ottomans, and total neglect to the cause of their actual leader, Bedir Khan. Kendal continues by saying that the missionaries were quite successful in their attempts. They encouraged people and Armenians in particular, not to participate in battles against the Ottomans or to pay taxes and dues for the military aims of Bedir Khan.
Kendal's arguments in this regard are interesting. The fact that missionary movements are by nature against violence, and, by this token, not encouraging towards war is well known. On the other hand, however, other authors insist that those missionary movements "did enlighten" Christians in those remote areas, and thus "generated the development of national consciousness amongst them."[11]
Nevertheless, it turned out that Bedir khan possessed a political acumen and became experiences and seasoned leader who enjoyed the devotion and admiration of all his followers. Moreover his movement transcended the limited, sectoral understandings of Kurdish tribal thinking. Quoting from Hagop Shahbazian's book titled “Armenian-Kurdish History,” Sasuni states that:

"Bedir Khan's plan of action contained within it the eastern vilayets of Van, Mush, Bitlis and Diarbekir, reaching the Sea of Urmia (rather Lake Urmia). Moreover, Bedir Khan's plan demanded that those territories be defended against all outside enemies. For this reason, the Amir assumed direct negotiations with the Shah of Iran and asked for his help against the Ottomans. As for the Armenians, they had to provide help from Russia and Georgia. This could be a contrived as a ripe plan according to the developments of those days, since in it the seeds of an Armenian-Kurdish federation against Ottoman rule are detectable."[12]

In fact, Armenians living within Bedir Khan’s rule did provide help for the Kurdish prince in his struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Some Armenians even fought in his army, Yet history was to provide a decisive blow to Bedir Khan's cause.
Concerned with the fate of the Ottomans Empire, the "Concert of Europe" acted quickly and settled the question of Egypt's Viceroy, Mohammed Ali, by bestowing him with hereditary rule over Egypt, in 1840. This presented the Sultan with a real opportunity. Rescued from his primary rival, he momentarily sent an army under the command of Osman Pasha against Bedir Khan. Osman's objective was to restore Ottoman rule in Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan.
The war continued for three full years, 1844-1847. However, by the end of 1847, Bedir Khan had exhausted almost all his forces and supplies. Moreover, a dissension occurred within his camp. Osman Pasha bribed Bedir Khan's nephew, Yezdansher, who was the commander of the eastern wing of Bedir Khan's army. With Yezdansher's defection the remaining Kurdish forces fell apart and the doors of the Kurdish capital, Jezireh, were wide open to Osman Pasha. Bedir Khan's final battle took place in the Eruhi castle. He was defeated, captured and exiled first to Varna in Ottoman Bulgaria, then to Crete, and finally to Damascus where he died in 1868.
After about forty years of warfare, the Ottoman government thought that it had finally brought rebellious Kurdistan to its knees. It was mistaken, because after only few years the movement reemerged, this time under the leadership of Yezdansher, who benefited from the Crimean War of 1853 and took upon himself the call of arms.

C. Yezdansher's Movement

The Russian-Turkish conflict of 1853 was reason enough for Turkish armies to leave their bases in Kurdistan and to hurry to the battlefield in an effort to stop the Russian offensive from the north.
With the newly created vacuum, Yezdansher took the cause of his uncle upon himself. He endeavored to recreate the Kurdish spirit of freedom, which had died for almost a decade due to the massive presence of Turkish armies in the Bohtan Principality.
Early in 1855, with a small army comprised of two thousand cavalrymen, Yezdansher took Bitlis and drove away its Ottoman governor. This act brought the new Kurdish chieftain an immense popularity within the Kurdish tribes of southeastern Anatolia. Soon hundreds and thousands of Kurdish warriors came from all over the terrain to join his army and fight for his cause. Still in 1855, Yezdansher crushed the joined forces of the valis of Musul and Baghdad near the city of Siirt and obliged Kenkam Pasha, the commander of the Turkish army, to flee away.
In four months, Yezdansher brought the whole territory from Van to Baghdad under his rule (including Diarbekir).[13] By this time, Yezdansher's army swelled to over one hundred thousand soldiers.
Parallel to Yezdansher's advance, the Russian offensive had a partial success. Yezdansher tried in vain to establish communications with the advancing Russian armies. His numerous letters to the Russian command in this regard remained unanswered, since most of the advancing Russian armies operated far to the northeast and away from Yezdansher's field of action.
On the other hand, the European powers were once again in panic, since the unity and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were in danger by the Russian armies in the north and Yezdansher's rebellion in the south. France and Great Britain joined the Ottoman Empire against Russia.[14] They viewed Yezdansher's movement in the utmost negative sense. After all, a free and sovereign Kurdistan under Yezdansher's rule would become a Russian puppet and thus endanger European interests in the Ottoman Empire.
Something was to be done. The British did find a way with which to silence the Kurdish chieftain:-

"The British emissary, Nimrod Rassam, set of from Musul in 1855 with plenty of cash in his coffers and demanded to be received as a mediator at the headquarters of the Kurdish movement. After visiting the tribal chieftains one by one, and offering bribes of guns, gifts and money, he set about persuading Yezdansher to settle the question of Kurdish independence from the Ottoman Empire by negotiating [with it] with the British acting as mediators."[15]

Yezdansher was mistaken in accepting the British terms. He trusted English diplomacy and accompanied Rassam to Istanbul where he was immediately imprisoned. His army was left without a leader. Soon it was defeated by Ottoman forces.
With Yezdansher, the rebellious movements originated by the Kurdish feudal families during the first half of the nineteenth century came to an end. These uprisings represented a real threat to the Ottomans, since they had to supply costly armies to control the situation.
Yezdansher was the last Kurdish Amir to lead a rebellion. With him the rule of the Kurdish princes perished. Soon religious leaders known as sheiks assumed the role of the feudal lords. With their fanatic religious zeal, the sheiks changed the policies of the secular princes. They started to discriminate against the Christian minorities who lived within their territories, and thus defeated all hopes of future cooperation. Once motivated by their religious leaders, Kurds started to realize their difference as Muslims from Christian Armenians, Assyrians, Nestorians, Khaldians, etc…They gradually developed hatred and enmity towards their Christians neighbors, something which proved to be disastrous for the future of both parties.
During the following decades, nationalistic feelings started to ferment within the Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire. However, there seemed to be no way or means by which the two ethnic groups could join forces.
During the rule of the religious sheiks, the major movement that originated in Kurdistan was the rebellion of Sheik Obeidullah in 1880. Like its predecessors it was strangled in a bloodbath. After this defeat the status quo changed completely. Armenian-Kurdish enmity escalated and reached its peak after 1880, specially during the reign of the “Red Sultan,” Abdul Hamid II.

III. THE ERA OF HE RELIGIOUS SHEIKS

If until 1855-60 Armenian-Kurdish relations had a more or less friendly character, this trend did not continue unabashed. The scene changed dramatically after 1860. This was due mostly to the absence of Kurdish princes like Mohammed or Bedir Khan, who were true advocates of Armenian-Kurdish cooperation.
Ottoman authorities were greatly pleased with the newly established status quo, especially because with the demise of the Kurdish princes, the Kurdish tribes and clans were left in a state of anarchy. It was the religious sheiks who assumed the leadership of the tribes. The sheiks were not only unable to unify the Kurdish tribes under their rule, but, with time, themselves became the “ears and eyes” of the Ottoman Sultans.
One exception did occur, however. This took place in 1880, under the leadership of Sheik Obeidullah. In reality, this movement was different from the traditional movements of the previous Kurdish Amirs. Moreover, it was the first time that the Kurdish tribes of Iran took part in it. On the other hand, Sheik Obeidullah’s rebellion did not possess the potential and force of Bedir Khan’s or Yezdan Shers movement. Last but not least, it had a distinct religious overtone.
It was the Ottomans who tried to stir the religious pot. They constricted this policy with the perspective of achieving enmity between the Kurds and Christian Armenians. It is worthy to note here that until 1860 all across the Ottoman Empire, and especially in the Armenian vilayets of Eastern Anatolia, Armenians in general were considered a friendly element to the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, the consecutive sultans did not fear this “Milleti Sadika” (friendly people)” which paid its taxes and conducted all its responsibilities towards the “benevolent” state. Instead, Ottomans purred their anger on the troublesome Kurdish tribes in their attempt to crush their various rebellions.
However, the rubrics of “peaceful Armenians” and the “friendly people” soon came out of circulation. Nationalist ideas had found fertile ground within the Armenian communities of the empire whose members were treated as second degree citizens in their own homeland for almost five centuries. In 1862, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire accomplished a major sociopolitical triumph, when they convinced the sultan to ratify their national constitution, Azgayin Sahmanadrutiun. The document enabled Armenians to bring some sort of organization to their communal life within the empire. In another words, with this constitution the Armenian Patriarch (Milletbashi) became the religious as well as the political leader of the Armenian Gregorian Millet (religious community) within the Ottoman Empire. The constitution capacitated Istanbul Armenians to establish ties and lines of communication with the Armenian communities of the Eastern Armenian vilayets. With the communication, the sad reality of Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia reached the Ottoman capital. A new network of Prelacies was soon established with a bishop appointed at the head of each prelacy. Thus, after centuries of seclusion and isolation, the different Armenian communities of the empire started to communicate with one another under the umbrella of this religious network. Armenians in Istanbul became active in projects involving remote Armenian societies. Schools soon started to operate with the intention of bringing education to the illiterate masses. With education enlightenment and notions of national belongingness started to flourish. Thus a new Armenian image emerged.
The Kurds viewed Armenian accomplishments negatively. The already developed enmity between them and the Armenians escalated to new hights, simply because they were deprived of such an organization. This was due to their lack of unity and especially their competitive tribal pattern of life.
After 1864, however, the Turkish government developed a more lenient policy in governing the Kurdish tribes. Ottoman armies were still kept stationed in Kurdistan, yet their effectiveness was greatly reduced. But Kurds had already lost a great proportion of their freedom loving spirit, and by this time they had reassumed their internal conflicts, vendettas, and booty raids.
During the rule of the Kurdish Amirs, each Armenian country was under the protection of a Kurdish prince to whom it paid tribute. By paying taxes, Armenian town and villages were spared the cruel raids of Kurdish tribes. When the religious sheiks came to power and stressed the religious difference between Armenians and Kurds, the latter started pointing their guns towards peaceful Armenian peasants and targeted them for their “traditional” booty raids.
The network of Armenian prelacies brought organization to the Armenian communities scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire. Soon primates started to send reports to the Patriarchate in Istanbul describing the difficulties and atrocities that Armenians encountered at the hands of Kurdish tribal bands. In their letters, the primates asked the Armenian patriarch to bring the matter to the attention of the Sublime Porte and to demand Protection for Armenians in the remote eastern vilayets. However, most of these reports were literally kept in the Patriarchate’s drawers, mainly because conservative and well to do Armenians, Amiras and Sarrafs, whose effectiveness had been diminished by the National Constitution, but who in reality were still able to exert great pressure on the Patriarch, made him keep his silence so as not to endanger their, i.e. the Amiras’ positions and fortunes. The Sublime Porte not only pretended not to hear the Armenian demands, on the contrary, it approached the Kurds and tried to gain them to its side. It even encouraged them to increase their raids on Armenian towns and villages.
In 1877 a new Russo-Turkish war started. The Russians launched an offensive to erase the shame and humility that they encountered in their defeat in the Crimean War. This time the Ottomans were unable to depend on Europe’s help. Actually, most of the European powers were at odds with the Sublime Porte. Some of them even joined Russia against the Ottoman Empire.
By this time Armenians and Kurds had swapped their historical roles. The formers were now regarded as enemies of the empire while the latter were the obedient followers of the Ottomans. Kurds actually helped the Ottoman in their war effort. By not attacking the flanks of the Ottoman armies they eased security in the Ottoman backyard, thus gaining the government’s trust.
On the Northern front, the Russians planned and executed quick and decisive offensives and occupied all of Northern Anatolia. A second Russian army marched in a northwest and then Southern direction and after several victorious battles reached the gates of Istanbul. “The sick man of Europe” was once again rescued because of contradicting European politics, which now worked desperately to stop the Russian advance and to make Russia reach an agreement with sultan.
As a result of the 1877 Russo-Turkish conflicts, the “Armenian Question” came into existence as part and parcel of the broader Eastern Question. The war ended with the Treaty of San Stefano. Article sixteen of this treaty stated that the Sublime Porte was under obligation to bring about much needed reforms in the Eastern vilayets that were inhabited by Armenians, and that Russian troops were to be stationed in those areas until such reforms were met. The article also demanded that the Sublime Porte had to protect Armenians against Kurdish and Cherkez aggression.[16]
Evidently, the Russian victory could have secured a major victory to Armenian dreams of autonomy within a federative state. But the Turks used all of their canny diplomatic means and European ties to extinguish such Armenian hopes as formulated by article sixteen of the Treaty of San Stefano. Turkish diplomatic endeavors paid their dividends. After only one year the Armenian cause suffered a great defeat at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, which was called upon by the European powers, on the request of Ottoman Turkey, which aimed at nulling and voiding the terms of San Stefano. Article sixty-one of the Congress of Berlin dealt with the Armenian Question. It was milder in context than article sixteen of the San Stefano Treaty. According to this new article, the concept of an autonomous Armenian state was altered. Russian Armies were not to remain in the eastern vilayets. The sultan was to initiate reforms as he saw fit.[17]
For Turks, Armenians could no longer be trusted as the “Milleti Sadika”, the subordinate element. They were preparing themselves for the cause of freedom. Realizing that the cultural, social, and economic advantages of the Armenian communities were diametrically opposed to the pastoral status of the highly nomadic Kurdish tribes, the Ottoman government saw it necessary to develop a strictly negative policy towards Armenians. In this regard, the Ottomans used Kurdish hatred towards Armenians as a means to carry out their policies. By having the Kurds dangling as a “Tamoglian Sword” over their heads, Armenians would be busy dealing with it and lose precious time that would otherwise be dedicated for their cause of freedom.
Ironically, a new Kurdish threat developed during this period. Thinking that they were finally able to control the Kurdish population and their rebellious spirit, the Ottomans had almost no armies in Kurdistan. In fact, the Russian offensive had demanded the utilization of all of the Ottoman military might. Therefore, the evacuation of Turkish troops from Kurdistan was a necessity. With no Ottoman threat in sight, a new rebellion started to take shape in Kurdistan, which also engulfed Kurdish territories in Iran. It originated under the leadership of Sheik Obeidullah who was the son of Sheik Taha, the highest religious authority in Kurdistan.

A. - Sheik Obeidullah and the Rebellion of 1880

The last Kurdish rebellion of the nineteenth century broke out in 1880. For the first time Kurds from Iran participated in it.
In December 1872, the Iranian government demanded the Kurds living in Khoy and the regions of the Sea of Urmia to pay taxes for previous years. Kurdish leaders objected by saying that they had already paid their duties to Sheik Obeidullah whose family enjoyed this privilege since 1836.
Not willing to tolerate such a Kurdish objection, the Shah sent an army to Khoy to punish the Kurds and to collect the proper taxes. Seeing the immediate Iranian danger, Sheik Obeidullah asked the Sublime Porte to interfere on his behalf and stop the Shah from destroying the Kurdish territory of Khoy. The Ottoman government sent the vali of Erzurum as an envoy to Iran. The vali was unable to accomplish his mission because the Shah rejected all of Sheik Obeidullah’s peace proposals.[18]
During the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War some Ottoman regiments acted cruelly against Kurds in the regions of Dersim, Hakkiari, Mardin, and Bohtan. Sheik Obeidullah asked the sultan to pull his forces back and bring an end to the atrocities. Realizing that the Sublime Porte was intentionally ignoring his requests, the sheik established secret ties with the Khedive of Egypt, the Sherif of Mecca and the Russian consuls of Van and Erzurum. He wanted to bring their attention on the Kurdish problem. Russia had newly signed a treaty with the Ottomans. It was not prepared to undertake a new venture. Having received no guarantees from the Tsar, Obeidullah dropped Russia from his plans and started to make preparations alone.
Yet what was the position of Europe and specially Great Britain towards the sheik and his activities? Of course England had almost always been a defender of Ottoman integrity. This policy was kept not because of love or admiration of the Ottoman Empire but for two other reasons: first, because Europe was not able to divide “the Sick man of Europe” peacefully among its states. Therefore, preserving it and the status quo it represented was the best way o secure England’s route to her Far Eastern colonies. Second, to have the Ottoman Empire as an enemy was to invite Muslim animosity against the British, since the sultan was after all the Khalifa, the successor to the line of the Prophet Mohammed. The British were really sensitive in this regard because of their Muslim colonies in India and elsewhere. They were not ready to confront the wrath of some three hundred million Muslim over whom they held sway.
Beside all these considerations, a free and independent Kurdistan would first harm the territorial integrity and the unity of the Ottoman Empire and also endanger England’s land route to its Indian colonies. So it was evident why England was never in favor of the creation of a free and independent Kurdistan. Sheik Obeidullah knew this, and he also knew that England was another power on the list of his enemies. But a power, which needed close surveillance, since, it could do much harm with all its military and diplomatic might.
Nevertheless, the English were quick to act as before with Yezdan Sher, they used not military but diplomatic means, since that was more likely to work again in such situations. Soon the British Consul of Van undertook the long journey and appeared at the sheik’s palace in Shamsdinan. The Consul told Obeidullah that Britain stood with the totality of the Ottoman State, but at the same time it wanted to encourage reforms for Kurds, Armenians, and Nestorian Assyrians living in Kurdistan. The Sheik assured the consul that all Sunni Kurds are faithful to the Ottoman Sultan. It seems that the British consul fell prey to the sheik’s words and returned to Van thinking that he accomplished his mission and gained the Sheik’s confidence. After his visit, the Sheik’s forces received weapons and ammunition from the British. These arrived under the cover of relief
aid.[19]
It seems that Obeidullah was himself a gifted politician besides being a religious leader. He was ambitious, and he worked for several goals simultaneously. He also wanted to establish his rule over Kurdistan. On the other hand, Sultan Abdul Hamid II wanted to use the Sheik and manipulate him for his own purposes. The sultan had developed a Pan-Islamic ideology, which aimed at using of religious authority to unify the weakened empire and restore its greatness. Obeidullah and his alikes seemed to be important in carrying out such a plan. So the sheik’s part was to block Armenian resistance and thus help the sultan to destroy reform projects which European powers pressured him for. As for the question that such a part would increase the strength of the Kurdish sheik, Abdul Hamid was clever enough not to let the balance be disturbed. His politics worked in the direction of strengthening the various religious leaders, but on condition that none of them exceeded others in power and became a threat to the central government. Sultan Abdul Hamid did let the Kurdish Sheik grow strong, but he always balanced that strength and made sure that the sheik was under his control.[20]
Makhumtov views Sheik Obeidullah’s movement as strictly nationalistic. Such feelings are understood even if not shared, since historical research shows a different perspective. Makhmutov bases his opinion on one of Obeidullah’s speeches during which he is supposed to have said that:

“Ottoman rule was established five hundred and fifty years ago. Ottoman achieved their ruling positions by using all of the illegal avenues that they could think of. As long as the Shariah (Muslim religious code of law, derived from the writings and the Hafizes of the prophet-G.M.) demands that the sultan [sick, Khalifa-G.M.] must be of the Prophet’s lineage, Ottoman rule on the Islamic world is accordingly null and unlawful.”[21]

Being a religious leader, Sheik Obeidullah had to use religious overtones in order to strengthen his position. Even if the authenticity of the speech is put under question, its wording indicates no nationalistic feeling but rather a definite religious content. The mention of the Shariah alone is reason enough in this respect. Therefore, the nationalistic outlook with which Makhnutov tries to color Obeidullah’s movement does not seem to fit the historical record. Anyway, this could be proven by the fact that the Kurdish Sheik became the victim of his highly ambitious character. In the end he and his people came under the duel fire of the Ottoman and Iranian armies.[22]
How did this downfall happen? In February 1880 (July, according to Makhumutov), Obeidullah invited the Kurdish tribal chieftains to a meeting in his capital city of Shamsdinan. During the discussions, the sheik spoke out that he had abandoned the idea of fighting the sultan and the shah simultaneously, and that instead he had decided to attack Iran first (an indication of his pro-ottoman position perhaps). Warfare started in October of the same year. Obeidullah, with an army of eighty thousand, first occupied Sudjbulak (Mahabad), then Maraghi, and then the strategic city of Tabiz. The disorganized Kurdish army soon diverted from its real objectives and Obeidullah was unable to manage and lead an army comprised mainly of undisciplined tribal warriors. Soon booty raids became so frequent that Tabriz and its defense was totally neglected. The whole movement was endangered.
Frightened, the shah asked for Ottoman intervention in order to stop Obeidullah’s offensive. The sultan had helped the Kurdish sheik in his campaign, but now he was worried that the sheik had exceeded his limits. Soon Ottoman armies appeared on the scene. Obeidullah was now caught between the Ottoman and Iranian forces. He abandoned his newly conquered territories and fled to Shamsdinan.
The Ottoman government did not punish Obeidullah, because the sheik and his forces could still be of use to secure the Southern flank of the Iranian-Turkish border. Yet the sheik’s campaign had made him a hero. Eventually, his authority had grown too much. Abdul Hamid used politics and diplomacy to solve this problem. He sent valuable gifts to the various Kurdish sheiks and tribal chieftains. He invited Obeidullah to Istanbul. The sheik was not in favor of such an invitation, but he was encouraged to travel by the other Kurdish leaders. He finally accepted the invitation and traveled to the Ottoman capital, where he was welcomed by a special parade in his honor, contrary to the protests of the Iranian ambassador to the Sublime Porte.
Obeidullah returned to Shamsdinan. Yet as soon as he reached there, the sultan exiled him to Mecca. Obeidullah did not stay long in Mecca. He returned to Shamsdinan from where he was once again taken to Istanbul. After living there for a while, he was exiled once again because of his “liberal ideas”. With the declaration of the constitution in 1908, Obeidullah was allowed to return to Istanbul.
In 1925, Obeidullah was apprehended because of his participation in the rebellion of Sheik Said Ali of Dersim. The military court of Diarbekir (which was assembled for the purpose of convicting the Kurdish rebel elements) judged him. He was found guilty and was hanged with Sheik Said and his followers. Sheik Obeidullah’s movement was the last Kurdish insurrection of the nineteenth century. Abdul Hamid’s canny diplomacy was capable of changing the Kurdish character.
In 1885, the first Armenian political part, the Armenakan Party, was formed in Van, the heart of Ottoman Armenia. During the following five years, the Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Caucasus were in rapid change. In 1887, the Social Democratic Henchakian Party was formed, and two years later the first attempts towards uniting all Armenian nationalists in a single entity was achieved in Tbilisi (Tiflis), Georgia, where the Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries (Hay Heghabokhakanneri Dashnaksutiun) was formed. Two years later the federation of all Armenian revolutionaries seemed to be a futile experiment. Many abandoned it; the remaining members formed a new party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Dashnaksutium, A.R.F hereafter). As a result, the Armenian Question entered a period of dramatic escalation. Abdul Hamid and his government fought with all their might to surpress this new movement for autonomy. And what could have been more useful than the Kurdish tribes with which to accomplish this goal…

IV. SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II AND HIS PAN-ISLAMIC POLICIES

“We Armenians must try to share our enthusiasm with them. For this, we do not have any other means except out motivation, with which we could strengthen ourselves and become live models, and show that we Armenians are capable of defending our and our neighbor’s rights as well. If we create this vigor, then we will have the Kurdish ally. Otherwise, Armenians will remain as raiding and robbing targets for the Kurds, and at no time will they accept us as partners in the struggle against the common enemy.”

Kristapor Mikayelian
(Founding member, A.R.F)

After the major Kurdish rebellions of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire changed its policies towards the Kurds. The sultan tried to establish a common denominator between the government and the Kurdish ruling class. This way, the Ottoman government expected to gain the Kurds on its side. By offering them a partnership in the ruling process, the government was to gain unconditional Kurdish cooperation in exchange.
The protagonist of this new policy was sultan Abdul Hamid II himself. He needed the Kurds as allies to disseminate and advocate his Pan-Islamic ideology within the Kurdish communities. Abdul Hamid aimed at restoring the sultanate and the empire and to bring back the glory of the old days, after decades of weakness and corruption. When Kurdish leaders sensed that the sultan was ready to meet their demands, they willingly offered their services to him.
Before proceeding any further, a brief analysis of the Pan-Islamic ideology that Sultan Abdul Hamid II advocated will suffice.
When this capricious sultan occupied the Ottoman throne, the country was already on the verge of decline. Consecutive wars had weakened the government and had emptied its coffers. Several vassal territories in the European part of the empire had by then regained their freedom. On the other hand, Europe grew so strong that it controlled the foreign and even the domestic politics of the Ottoman Empire. European powers brought the Ottoman economy under their supervision. Its representatives demanded the sultan to carry out reforms for the minorities (Armenians, Greeks, etc.). Europe insisted that this was necessary to secure the empire’s internal tranquility and save it from further disintegration.
Against this enormous European pressure, Abdul Hamid devised his own political agenda. Through the teachings of Jamal Ul Din Al Afghani (a Muslim ideologue) and his direct tutelage, he emphasized the importance of Islam as a cohesive force which was destined to amalgamate the empire’s mostly Muslim peoples. Abdul Hamid intended to recreate a strong central government. This could only be achieved by the unification of the ethnically diverse yet religiously homogeneous Muslim population of the empire. The sultan’s contention was that if he could accumulate this religious power in his hands, he would be able to restore his political authority as well.
With such power, Abdul Hamid could block European interference in his internal affairs. At the same time, he could control the minorities’ demands of autonomy. He could even suppress new separatist movements. As a result of the Pan-Islamic policies of Abdul Hamid, the enmity between the Armenians and the Kurds escalated to new hights after 1880. The two neighboring people were unable to tolerate each other. According to Sasuni: “The Kurdish national movement stopped completely at about the same moment the Armenian national freedom struggle was born. At this juncture, a new Turko-Kurdish united front was shaped. In the decades that followed, it became the primary evil against the Armenian struggle for freedom.”[23]
The absorption of the Kurdish “nobility” within the ruling Ottoman elite was to be one of Abdul Hamid’s canniest moves ever. Kendal notes that:

“… This policy of centralization, based on the integration of the Kurdish leaders, enabled the empire to make good use of the Kurdish people’s warlike qualities, partly as backing for an eventually conflict with the Russians, but mainly as a means of repressing the national movements of the various peoples struggling against Ottoman rule such as Armenians, Arabs, Albanians, and even the Kurds.”[24]

In every corner of the eastern vilayets, Kurds viewed Armenians as infidels who could be robbed, and mimed. In Alashkert, Vaspurkan (vilayet of Van), Pasen, and Diarbekir, armed bands of Kurdish tribal warriors named Hamidiye-- after sultan Abdul Hamid II, who sanctioned their establishment-- raided and looted Armenian towns and villages. They even murdered Armenian peasants. Some of these atrocities were the consequence of fanatic religious speeches that filled Kurds with blind hatred and transformed them into vigilantes. Anarchy was now dominant from on end of Western Armenia to the other. To defend themselves against this Kurdish menace, Armenians tried to get organized. Some Armenians were outlawed because of injuring or killing a raiding Kurd. They were obligated to flee form Ottoman justice and take refuge in the mountains as fugitives. Soon these fugitives grew in number in the remote mountainous areas. They organized themselves into fedayeen groups with the intent to avenge their families.[25] Arapo and Mekho in Sasun, Huno in Alashkert, Akripasian and Koloshian in Vaspurakan were thus transformed into legendary “outlaws” who became leaders of these groups. Those modern Robin Hoods fought Kurdish and Turkish army units. They tried to defend their rights and seek justice with their own hands. “However, these bands were few in number and their actions had but a limited effect on the situation in general. They were unable to restrain the Kurdish terror which by now had grown to an unbearable magnitude.”[26]
Kurdish atrocities against Armenians reached their peak in 1895, when thousands of Kurds, with the help of regular Turkish regiments, attacked the secluded mountainous Armenian villages of Sasun and ruthlessly massacred the population. Notorious amongst Kurdish Chieftains in their dealings with Armenians were Musa Beg and his brother Chacho. Musa Beg’s evils were spread all over Sasun and even Mush. The government was unable to deny the many protests which Armenian villagers submitted against him. The authorities unwillingly exiled Musa Beg into Western Turkey. Yet the Kurdish chieftain returned after a while and was even appointed a leader of a Hamidiyeh regiment.[27]
Another event that is worth mentioning is the battle of the Birm. Kurds tried to subjugate the Armenian villages of the Birm district. Yet Armenian villagers defended themselves. Having exhausted their ammunition and supplies, their resistance was destroyed and they were massacred. Similar battles occurred in Ghizilaghaj, Hirgert and other parts of Ottoman Armenia.[28]

A. The Rebellions of Sasun (1892-1904)

After 1890, the Turkish government and the Kurdish tribes focused their attention on the mountainous Armenian villages and settlements of Sasun. Abdul Hamid was very specific in choosing this Armenian “freedom nest.” Subjugating the last of the Armenian strongholds would evidently silence the Armenian liberation movement and its demands of autonomy. Furthermore, this would serve as an example to other minorities who entertained ideas about autonomy or even separation from the Ottoman Empire.
In 1892, skirmishes between Kurds and Armenian villagers became frequent all over Sasun. Kurdish chieftains were outraged, because Armenian villagers refused to pay extra taxes. On the other hand, Armenians argued that the Ottoman government heavily taxed them. Moreover, being poor villagers, they were unable to pay the extra taxes demanded by the Kurdish tribal leaders. However, it must be stated that it was at about this time that some Armenian agitators, mainly from the Henchakian party, had moved to Sasun to entice the villages of this remote Armenian dwelling. Acknowledged as patriots by local Armenian villagers and as revolutionaries, terrorists, and even traitors by the government, it was these nationalist instigators who encouraged the villagers to refuse to pay the Kurdish lords.
The first serious Kurdish advance towards Sasun started in the summer of 1894. Murad, the Henchakian leader in Sasun organized the bombing of the Satan’s Bridge, (Sadani Gamurch), which was still being built. It was to serve as a strategic passage to the mountains of Sasun and was to provide ample employment for Kurdish laborers. Outraged by this act, Kurdish forces moved toward the Armenian stronghold on the first of August. Kurdish Hamidiye cavalrymen and troops from fourth Turkish army battalion from Bitlis soon joined them. The villages of Sasun were besieged, yet neither the Kurdish nor the Turkish forces were able to advance because of the tight-armed resistance of Armenian villagers and the few nationalist agitators helping them.
The outraged Mushir Zeki Pasha, the commander in chief of the joint Turko-Kurdish forces, planned and executed yet another offensive in 1895. In a way, these attacks were reminiscent of Ottoman assaults launched against Kurdish Amirs during earlier decades of the nineteenth century.
This second offensive lacked any success. However, Armenian resistance was also weekend because of several weeks of intense fighting, Turkish troops and Kurdish irregulars were finally able to pierce through Armenian front lines and enter Sasun. The “eagles’ nest” was subjugated. More than a thousand villagers were killed; some one hundred and sixty fedayeens were captured and murdered by torture.[29]
The atrocities of the Turkish troops and the Kurdish tribesmen in Sasun attracted European interest. European ambassadors intervened on behalf of Armenians to stop the brutality and the meaningless massacres. On May 11, 1895, the ambassadors of England, France, Russia, and other European states handed Sultan Abdul Hamid a memorandum demanding swift reforms in the six Armenian vilayets of Eastern Anatolia. Sultan Hamid had no other choice but to agree to the reform project, at least to silence Europe whose representatives had already traveled to Sasun and had witnessed the cruelties first hand.
What sultan Abdul Hamid accepted was the memorandum known as “The May Project of Reforms.” However, he not only Prevented it from being enforced, but also even continued his aggression on Sasun during 1896-1897. Armenian villagers did stage limited acts of self-defense. In the long run, however, they were always to be defeated against the broader Turkish and Kurdish forces. Thousands of Armenians perished of brutality in the period 1895-1897. Susan revolted once again in 1904. But it was once again silenced by similar measures.
During Sasun’s fight for self-defense in 1895, Armenian nationalistic agitation was already surfacing in other parts of Ottoman Armenia. Acts were staged even in the capital city of Constantinople. Events like the seizure of the Ottoman Bank by A.R.F. fedayeens and the disturbances that occurred at about the same time in some suburbs of the capital alarmed the sultan. Abdul Hamid was not dealing with the problem in the secluded mountains of Sasun, but in the very heart of his capital, exposed to European powers and the international community at large. By accepting the May reform project, Hamid was able to silence Europe and free his hand in seeking revenge against Armenians. He dumped hundreds of thew into prison. He brilliantly staged a series of massacres near and even inside Istanbul under the very eyes of the European ambassadors. Hamid presented his policies as measures and tactics taken against revolutionaries and traitors. To toll of these Hamidian Massacres was some three hundred thousand Armenian dead.[30] In the Eastern vilayets, Kurds once again became the tools of the slaughter.
The May reform project showed that European powers intervened simply at the last moment and on a solely humanitarian basis in order to preserve Armenian existence. Armenians never gave up hope from Europe. Yet it seems that the Armenian provinces were too remote to attract such importance as that of the magnitude that Greece or the Balkans possessed.
The only Christian power interested in Western Armenia was Russia. It had labored and gradually absorbed the Eastern Armenian provinces, namely the Khanates of Erivan, Nakhichevan, Gharabagh, and Gianja from Kajar Iran as well as the territories of Kars and Artahan from the Ottoman Empire. Armenian nationalistic agitation and political societies first fermented in the Eastern provinces of Armenia, as well as Tbilisi, the capitol of Georgia.
In European capitols such as London, Paris, Vienna, Geneva Armenian University students had already organized themselves into political groups. They discussed the Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire, and they tried to find the means with which an autonomous Armenian entity could be materialized. In fact, Ottoman Armenia was the birthplace of the first Armenian political party, the Armenakan Party, created in Van, in 1885, through efforts of an Armenian intellectual, Mekerdich Portukalian, himself a student from Europe, who, after returning to his hometown, started his nationalistic career as a teacher. Portukalian surrounded himself with the active youth of the city, and motivated them towards the cause of freedom.
In 1887, the second Armenian political Party, the Henchakian Party, was formed in Geneva by a group of Armenian students. It soon started to publish its organ, Henchak (literally The Bell, after Gologol—also Bell—the organ of the Russian anarchists and their founder, Bakunin), advocating Armenian freedom.
The first attempt at uniting Armenian nationalists and revolutionary intellectuals failed in Tiflis where the Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries was created in August 1890. Two years later, the Federation was transformed into a new party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (A.R.F.). It assumed the role of the protector of oppressed Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, and it devoted itself to the cause of their liberation. For this reason, the A.R.F. realized the importance of Kurdish cooperation and tried to approach this tribal people and to bring it closer to the Armenian cause. This was not a simple task to achieve. Armenians had almost nothing to offer the Kurds except their true friendship and an honest faith in the power of a unified Armenian-Kurdish struggle and what it could accomplish.
It was not easy to make the Kurdish tribes understand this important and vital message, especially since they were repeatedly hearing the opposite from their Ottoman rulers. Armenian nationalists realized this difficulty early on. They were convinced that in order to bring the Kurds to their camp, a show of force was required, because it was only might and vigor that could influence a Kurd. Armenians also approached some Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul. They even established a limited communication with some of the so-called “liberal” Kurdish chieftains and they tried to make them aware of the reality.

B. Relations During Hamid’s Reign.

Abdul Hamid encouraged and motivated the Kurdish tribes towards suppressing the Armenians. In many instances Armenians were cast as outlaws. Kurdish brutality against them was even permitted by law. The sultan armed the Kurdish tribes and then formed the Hamidiye corps from among the fiercest of the Kurdish fighters. Incorporated within the framework of the Ottoman army, these Hamidiye regiments proved to be a real menace for Armenians. In a matter of months they accomplished what regular Ottoman troops took years to accomplish. Elucidating this period Sasuni states: -

“During this long period of enmity between Kurds and Armenians (1880-1908), the Armenian cause suffered. This enmity took a heavy toll on Armenians. Its memories remained even when later conditions were changed between the two people. In order to shed some light on the future developments of Armenian-Kurdish relations, we have to add here that many attempts were made to ease the situation and to decrease the hostility between the two neighbors.”[31]

What were these “attempts” and what kind of work was done in order to bring a compromise?
After the first A.R.F. general convention, almost all of its leaders who were sent to Western Armenia tried to approach the Kurdish tribes. It was necessary, even imperative, to make Kurds understand that the Armenian freedom movement was directed towards the Ottoman and not the Kurds.
Even before the retaliatory Khanasor Expedition, during which the A.R.F. fedayeen punished the Kurdish Mazrik tribe (stationed on the southeastern border region between Iran and the Ottoman Empire), to show Kurds that they do not have a free hand in raiding and killing Armenian peasants, the A.R.F. Central committee of Iran established direct negotiations with the Kurdish tribes of Vaspurakan, with the purpose of achieving an accord with them. The negotiation had only a partial success. Some Kurdish tribes began to cooperate with the Armenian parties and the fedayeen groups, especially in such tasks as messenger services and arms transportation. First transporting military supplies from Russia to the Iranian border districts and from there to Van, Mush, and Sasun in Western Armenia accomplished this. This network operated smoothly through the help of Kurdish tribes dwelling along the transportation route.
It must be noted, however, that Kurdish tribes and villages that cooperated with the Armenian Movement were limited in number. Most of them, it seems, participated in the effort out of fear, because they were situated within the field of action of the Armenian fedayeen groups. Only a very small number of individual Kurds collaborated with Armenians because of their belief in the justness of the Armenian cause. Some even joined the Armenian fedayeen groups and died heroically fighting side by side with their Armenian comrades.
Before attempting to reach a final evaluation of the various means employed at creating a more positive Armenian-Kurdish relationship, a cursory mention of some notable Armenian patriots who endeavored to establish a mutual understanding between these who neighboring people will suffice. The list of those patriots dates back to the 1850’s when clergymen like Khrimian Hayrig (Megerditch Khrimian). Hayrig means Father in Armenian), then the Catholicos of Monastery of Akhtamar in Van, Karekin Servantziants, a priest and author at the same monastery, tried to advocate Armenian-Kurdish cooperation through their literature. In the 1890’s this work was continued by figures such as Rev. Vartan (Vartan Vartapet) of Saint Garabed’s Monastery in Sasun, Hrayr Tzhokhks (Armenak) of Sasun, and Keri (literally uncle, Rupen Shishmanian) of Dersim.
Rev. Vartan was a respected clergyman. He was also a devoted nationalist. During his administration, the monastery became a hiding place for Armenian fedayeen and a depot for arms and ammunition. Rev. Vartan realized very early in his career that an understanding must be reached with the Kurdish tribes of Hazzo (Sasun). He dedicated his life to accomplish this important task. He created some inroads with Kurds through his pious character. The “Keshish” (literally priest, father) as the Kurds used to call him thus brought some ease to the Armenian villages that he served.
Creating a positive atmosphere between Kurds and Armenians was a priority to Hrayr of Sasun, another devoted figure of the Armenian Nationalist Movement. He started his revolutionary career as a member of the Henchakian Party and was initiated by Mihran Damadian, the first Henchakist agent to Sasun. Later, Hrayr joined the ranks of the A.R.F. After 1895, he became the central figure of the Armenian Nationalist Movement in Sasun. He stringently advocated Armenian-Kurdish cooperation. His teaching became the basis for other revolutionary figure such as Kevork Chavush and Rupen Ter Minassian. Hrayr journeyed to the Armenian and Kurdish villages of Sasun disguised as a dervish (beggar, pious man). Once his presence was established he motivated the illiterate masses towards the cause of freedom. However, these calls remained incidental and their results negligible. Kurdish Sheiks and Begs sometimes cooperated with the A.R.F. on a personal basis and for only short periods of time.
As for Keri, he became the central figure of the Armenian freedom struggle in the districts of Dersim and Erzinjan as early as 1895 and continued to be so until 1899. The A.R.F. Bureau (highest executive body) sent Garabet Ghumrikian as its agent to organize these remote Kurdish territories and motivate its leaders towards freedom. Keri, who was by now heading a fedayeen group, participated enthusiastically in this task. However, he was discouraged by the politics of the A.R.F. Bureau, which directed most of the organization’s potential towards Sasun and Vaspurakan, thus leaving Keri alone with no funds or dedicated personnel to continue his task in Dersim. Meanwhile, Keri succeeded in establishing firm and friendly ties with the Kurdish leaders of Dersim. He enjoyed a high popularity within the Kurdish tribes there. Most of them respected him and always listened to his advice. Keri’s efforts blossomed very late, when Sheik Said Ali of Piran rebelled against the Turkish government in 1924-1925. By then Keri was already martyred. Eventually, he did not witness the results of his dedicated endeavor.
Stories of devoted Kurdish fedayeen and their adherence to the Armenian cause of freedom occupies a special chapter in the history of the Armenian Revolutionary Movement. This in itself could be the subject of an important historical research, which is outside the scope of this narrative.
The Kurds never suspected, however, that the Armenian massacres were only the first phase of a more general plan, whose second act would be their--i.e. The Kurd’s--own distinction. By the time Kurds realized this, it was already too late. In 1897, atrocities similar to those in Sasun occurred in the city of Van. Armenians were obliged to take defensive measures. When Armenian resistance was weakened, the militants of the three Armenian political parties operating in Van—after negotiating with the authorities through the offices of the Russian consul – decided to retreat from the city to save the population from eminent massacres. However, as soon as they started to retreat, they came under heavy fire and were attacked by a Kurdish mob. The Armenian fedayeen took refuge in the hills surrounding Van. They were besieged and murdered by Kurdish irregulars, who hunted them down.
Recalling this incident Rupen Ter Minasian writes: -

“With this (the Van resistance), the leaders of the three Armenian parties of Van and most of their devoted followers were massacred. And so they died on the path of freedom, which they adored. This was a tremendous blow not only for the parties involved but to the Armenian people of Vaspurakan as well. The most devoted and educated of the Armenian nationalists were martyred. After this blow, they [Henchakian Party, G.M.] never recovered. Its organization in Van was halted. With the martyrdom of Avetisian, the Armenakan Party in turn received a decisive blow. Its remaining members soon joined the A.R.F.”[32]

The cruelty of the Turkish regiments and especially that of the Kurdish mob proved once again that there was no, nor can there be any, mutual trust between Kurds and Armenians. It was as if cooperation with Armenians was a misnomer for Kurdish mentality. The A.R.F. finally realized that the mild means with which it advocated cooperation were useless. As a direct result, the Khanasor Expedition was organized in late 1897. This retaliatory act heralded the massage that the A.R.F. did not forgive those who spilled Armenian blood in the hills surrounding Van. Moreover, the message was clear: severe punishment was to be extracted against Kurds thereafter.[33] On the other hand, the expedition was truly an example of discipline and organization. The fedayeen that attacked the Mazrik tribe acted as true soldiers. They directed their rifles only against Kurdish tribal warriors, thus completing their task with a minimum number of civilian casualties.
Nevertheless, most Kurdish aggression towards Armenians had no certain motive behind it. Kurdish warriors had to comply with the battle calls of their sheiks and tribal chieftains who followed Sultan Abdul Hamid’s policies almost blind-foldedly. Sasuni mentions that at the eleventh hour before the Khanasor Expedition commenced, Vazken Teroyan, known also as “Vazken of Vaspurakan”-- not being in favor of such an overt military act and preferring the continuation of covert, underground organizational efforts instead-- decided against participation in the campaign and ordered his fedayees (guerilla fighters) back to Van. On their way back, the group was scouted and was caught in a fight against a sizable Kurdish force which was about to surround it when Avo, the Kurdish scout of Vasken’s group told the fedayeen to direct all their rifles in the direction of the leader of the marauders whom he pointed by his finger. Eventually the Kurdish chieftain was fatally wounded. Amazingly enough, the Kurds halted there offensive and retreated at the exact moment when they could have given the fedayeen the decisive blow.[34]
Many such incidents are recorded in the history of the Armenian National Movement. Ultimately, they prove the point that Sasuni tries to make. Obviously, Kurds followed their leaders blindly, yet they deserted them at the first sign of danger.

C. Relations With Kurdish Intellectuals.

If brutality and mayhem were the marks of Kurdish raids in the Eastern vilayets, Their intellectuals in Europe and even in the capital, Istanbul showed totally different attitude towards Armenians. A Kurdish inelligentsia had started to mushroom in the different European capitals after 1898. Kurdish students traveled to Europe to achieve higher education. Living in Western societies and having engulfed the social understandings and the nationalistic philosophies of the day, those young and active Kurdish intellectuals realized the erroneous directions towards which the illiterate Kurdish masses were driven. They tried hard to inform the Kurdish masses and motivate them to live in cohesion and mutual understanding with their Armenian neighbors. Some Kurdish students even wrote pamphlets in this regard. An example of such an essay is the one written by Abdulrahman, the son of Bedirkhan Bey, whose Armenian translation appeared in the A.R.F. organ, Droshak. The original Kurdish pamphlet was secretly distributed within the Kurdish tribes. It was titled “Kurtlere Khitap” (A Call To The Kurds), and it advocated cooperation with the Armenians and their cause. With simple words and sentences Abdulrahman told his brethren about “the evil Sultan Abdul Hamid and his treacherous policies,” insisting that joining hands with the Armenians is important “because their struggle against the Ottoman oppressor is just, and Kurds must take an example from it.”[35]
The A.R.F. organ dedicated two editorials to the question of mutual cooperation between Kurds and Armenians. In them, the A.R.F. formally expressed its position of welcoming Kurds to join the Armenian struggle. At the same time, however, it advised them not to show hostility towards Armenians or their cause…
By 1900, the Armenian National Movement had acquired a respectable reputation. Kurds realized that they either had to cooperate with Armenians or continue their enmity and raid and be confronted by the vengeance of Armenian fedayeens. The A.R.F. still advocated ideas of collaboration and mutual understanding. The party’s literature of the day reflects this, since it uses the examples of the nineteenth century Kurdish Amirs and their endeavors in establishing good relations with their Christian neighbors. Of course, this was done to bring Kurds closer to the Armenian cause of liberation, since there was a clear understanding in this regard between all Armenian nationalists: only with the accomplishment of a strong Armenian-Kurdish cooperation could the Armenian cause be effectively solved.
In 1903 Malkhas (Artashes Hovsepian), an American-Armenian physician and an A.R.F. member, undertook a tedious and extremely dangerous journey to the southernmost part of Kurdistan and reached its capital, Shamsdinan. The objective of the trip was to meet with Sheik Sedekh, the son of the famous Sheik Obeydullah, and establish negotiations with him. Malkhas persuaded the sheik to join his forces with the Armenians.[36] This trend did not continue, because the A.R.F. was unable to send another envoy to the sheik in 1904. Eventually, Sheik Sedekh’s enthusiasm faded away. He brought his participation only late in 1908, after the declaration of the Ottoman constitution.
The A.R.F. also tried to show friendly attitudes towards the raya (serf) Kurdish population, whose life was as miserable as that of the Armenian peasants. Between 1907-1908, the A.R.F. launched a campaign against Turkish and Kurdish tax-farmers and absentee landlords. It went as far as assassinating some of the most cruel and bloodthirsty of those bankers, who were a real threat to Armenian and Kurdish peasants alike. In fact, Sultan Abdul Hamid had swarmed the Eastern vilayets with his agents and spies “the eyes and the ears of the Sultan” and he knew about the assassination plans. However, he was unable to stop the killing of some of his best servants. This elevated the esteem of the A.R.F. and the Armenian movement among the raya Kurds. Some of them even joined the Armenian movement.
The achievements mentioned above were only partial successes. Many Armenian patriots gave their lives as a price for their trust in the Kurdish character. Those were “true advocates of a positive Armenian-Kurdish relationship and had dedicated most of their work for the achievement of that goal.”[37]

V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, WORLD WAR I AND THE QUESTION
OF ARMENIAN AND KURDISH INDEPENDENCE (1908-1920)

The Ottoman Constitution was reinstated on the tenth of July 1908. A season of festivity spread throughout the empire. Oppressed nationalities and minorities thought that the constitution would bring them liberty, justice and freedom. Moreover, it was generally thought that the new constitutional government would condemn the brutal policies of the Hamidian regime and initiate era of equality. Armenians also entertained the hope that the constitutional was their long awaited salvation, and that under the new, constitutional government, they would reclaim and even repossess their lands. As Christian subjects of the empire, Armenians would now be relieved from heavy direct taxation by the central government and indirect levies by Kurdish chieftains.
For the Kurds, the new government structure was something incomprehensible. Rumors indicated that the centuries old feudal system and customs would come to a halt. This was outrageous, since yesterday’s raya (servant) Christians would stand up and demand their rights, their lands, and their rectitude. Diverse interpretations of the established governmental character created an even stronger division and enmity between Armenians and Kurds.
Armenians advocated the Constitution. They remained a pro-constitutional element and protected it until late in 1913, when, in reality, events such as the 1909 massacres in Adana strongly indicated that constitutional Turkey was not the just and ideal state which Armenians believed it to be. Until 1913, and even after, Armenian parties and especially the A.R.F. continued to adhere to a policy of cooperation with the constitutional Young Turk government. They primarily remained an ally of the Ittihad Ve Terraki Firkasi (Union and Progress Party) Turkish party. Kurds, on the other hand, adamantly remained a pro-sultan element and freely advocated the restoration of feudal-tribal life in the Eastern vilayets of Anatolia and Kurdistan.
The constitution did however bring enlightenment to some Kurds, in and around Istanbul. As was mentioned before, a small Kurdish intelligentsia had developed in the capital. Kurdish intellectuals took upon themselves the tedious and difficult task of educating he Kurdish masses and enlightening them with the idea of liberalism. They realized that Kurds could not continue to live in the Middle ages when the world was changing rapidly. Kurdish intellectuals ultimately aspired for the creation of a Kurdish nation as the first step towards the establishment of Kurdistan.

A. The First Kurdish Organizations

One of the most important reasons behind the failure of the Kurdish rebellions movements of the nineteenth century was the absence of political parties and their programs, which would have enhanced the popular basis of those movements.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, a few Kurdish students had the privilege of attending European universities and acquiring Western education. In Europe Kurdish students were introduced to the nationalistic and liberal ideologies of the day. They brought those notions with them when they returned home. It is ironic to think that after all it was the Ottoman government that sent scores of Turkish and Kurdish youth to study aboard. Engulfed by the new ideologies, those returning intellectuals were not to sit still. Actually, a true process of change had started to ferment in the Ottoman capital. The reforms earlier in the century had culminated in the edicts of Hatti Sharif and Hatti Humayun, the labor of love of European educated Ottoman reformists who became known as the “Young Ottomans.” The sultan grudgingly ratified those edicts, bowing to the will of the Turkish (and Kurdish) intelligentsia, whose members had by now assumed important positions within the governmental structure. The reform process came to a halt, however, when Sultan Abdul Hamid II ascended the throne in the wake of the 1876-1878 Russo-Turkish war. It was to restart again in 1908, this time by the new Ittihadist “Young Turk” intelligentsia, which had inherited the reformist and liberalist ideologies of its predecessor.
After 1908, many Kurdish intellectuals were assigned to high governmental positions. They motivated many Kurdish students to enter the University of Istanbul and the Military Academy. Those educational institutions had their doors open to Kurds since 1870. However, they were exclusive to sons of prominent Kurdish chieftains. Moreover, Kurds attending those institutions were specially prepared to assume leading positions within the Kurdish nobility and, at the same time, become obedient followers of the sultan.
Yet things were changing by the end of the nineteenth century. According to Kendal:

“In Istanbul of the turn of the century a city bubbling with revolutionary and nationalistic agitation, these privileged few [Kurdish intellectuals, G.M.] became familiar with European bourgeois ideas. They befriended liberal Kurdish nationalists. Like the intellectuals of other nations, they launched journals and associations, both clandestine and legal.”[38]

Until the Young Turk coup d’etat of 1908, Kurdish nationalists worked among various other organizations. Some of them even held important positions within the framework of the Ittihad Ve Terakki Party. In April of 1898, Midhad Bey, son of Amir Bedir Khan, published the first Kurdish bilingual journal (Kurdish and Turkish). This periodical published articles dealing with cultural and educational issues in general. Soon it became “an important reviving tool for the Kurdish national sentiments.” The pages of the publication represented a real platform for Kurdish intellectuals. Abdul Rahman succeeded his brother, Midhat, as chief editor. Because of the tight political atmosphere, which preceded the first global war, he relocated the periodical to Geneva. Here Abdul Rahman came into contact with the editorial staff of the A.R.F. organ, Droshak. He published his illustrious article “Kurtlere Khitap” which was mentioned earlier. The newspaper offices then moved to London. But in 1908, with the Young Turks in power, the periodical and its editor were repatriated to Istanbul. After a while, Sureya Bedir Khan became the editor of the periodical. After the war, she relocated to Cairo where she published it under the name “Kurdistan”. The newspaper was by then accepted as the organ of the Kurdish National Movement and it served the cause up to the days of the Ararat Rebellion (1929-1931).
From the beginning, the Kurdish nationalists took their stand beside the Young Turks. They argued that with Turkish “revolutionaries” in power the demands of Kurdish nationalists would be seriously taken into consideration. Grasping the opportunity that the 1908 constitutional movement provided, some prominent Kurdish nationalists such as Ali Bedir Khan Bey, General Sharif Pasha, and Sheik Abdul Kadir (son of the new Ottoman Parliament’s president, Sheik Obeidullah, organized the Taali Ve Terakki Kurdistan (Recovery And Progress Of Kurdistan) group. Soon after they started publishing the Kurt Teavun Ve Terakki Gazetesi (Gazette of Kurdish Mutual Aid And Progress) journal in Turkish. The periodical became the organ of the newly founded organization. It was also recognized as the first legal Kurdish newspaper in Turkey. Moreover, it enjoyed ample popularity within the Kurdish community of Istanbul.[39]
According to Kendal, the Kurdish Cultural and Education Organization, Kurt Neshri Maarif Jemiyeti (Kurdish Committee For The Advancement of Learning) was formed as a subsidiary of the Taali Ve Terakki Kurdistan. This institution undertook the difficult task of establishing, and also operating, the first Kurdish school in Istanbul, located in the Tchemberli quarter.
Contrary to the fact that the Taali Ve Terakki Kurdistan did not possess any clear political program, ideology, or a distinguished organizational machine, it was able to unite Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists under its banner. With its cultural and educational achievements, the organization spread the torch of education social understanding in the various parts of Kurdistan and among its numerous clans. However, the corruption of its leadership quickened the disintegration of the organization. Sheik Abdul Kadir left and established his own liberal gazette, the Hetawe Kurd (the Kurdish Sun), which became a new nexus of Kurdish nationalist and intellectual agitation.[40]
Kendal writes in this regard that:

“…While Kurdish activities marked time [sick] in Istanbul, Kurdistan itself was beginning to awaken to modern political life. Young militants and intellectuals set up Kurdish clubs (Kurt Kulupleri) in the main urban centers, notably Bitlis, Diarbekir, Mush, Erzerum, and Musul. The Mush club, for example, had established contact with the main tribes of the vilayet. When it opened at the end of 1908, the Bitlis club had seven hundred names on its roster. The clubs were organized on semi-military lines derived from the young Turks, who had themselves cloned the model of the Italian Carbonari. These clubs indubitably signaled the start of an organized political struggle in Kurdistan and clearly constituted a first attempt at setting a modern political organization.”[41]

After defeating Abdul Hamid, new policies were formulated within the Young Turk leadership. Some felt that they could now continue without the help or cooperation of the non-Turkish nationalist and intellectual elements. As a result, of this restrictive policy, existing non-Turk schools and organizations were closed, and publications were banned. These measures were decisive blows to the dreams of Armenians, Kurds, and other minorities. As a direct consequence of these policies, many Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists preferred exile to escape imprisonment. Most of the newly established Kurdish organizations vanished. Only a handful continued to work underground and prepare for the future.
Meanwhile, even with the Young Turks in power, Kurdistan was not a peaceful place. Rebellions resurfaced as early as 1909. The two new centers of agitation were Dersim and Musul, where Sheik Mahmud Barzandji demanded an unconditional withdrawal of all Ottoman forces. The Young Turk government not only did not pull its armies back from Musul, but even reinforced them with new regiments, declared war on Barzandji, destroyed his movement as well as many Kurdish towns and villages that had joined the rebellion.
Another minor rebellion was staged at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. This rebellion started in Bitlis under the leadership of Mulla Selim. He incited the Kurdish population of the city against the Turkish vali (governor) and his forces. In two days the rebels captured the whole city. However, they had to retreat against the arriving Turkish regiments, which reoccupied Bitlis and persecuted the perpetrators of the rebellion. As for the rebel leader, Mulla Salim, he sought refuge in the Russian consulate of the city.[42]
After 1909, Kurdish nationalists themselves embarked on seeking relations with Armenians and Arabs. It is necessary to underline here that the Ittihadist government was encountering an Arab uprising at the southernmost corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Sheik Yahia Said was the leader of this Arab rebellion in the Yemen. He compelled the Young Turk government to change its policies of aggressions against the Kurds to focus its attention on this Arab threat. In 1912, permission was granted to the Kiviya Kurd (Kurdish Hope)--organized secretly in 1910-- to operate legally. Hassan Motki, who was a member of the Ottoman Parliament, led this organization. It operated for two years with a dynamic program. However, it too dissolved in the beginning of the First World War. Speaking about this “dynamic” period in the Kurdish national movement, Sasuni quotes that:

“The Kurdish intellectuals had finally found the missing cultural, educational and political keys, without which Kurdish unity was impossibility. Unfortunately, Kurdish intellectuals assumed governmental and private sector careers. Some became representatives in the Ottoman Parliaments. Others became senators in the upper house of parliament. Still others became governmental officials, and military leaders. They, however, enjoyed the benefits of these careers personally. Kurds remained without a united literature, or a united alphabet. Kurdistan was still deprived of education. The few neophyte movements in this regard in Istanbul did no produce any echoes in the distant and isolated parts of Kurdistan. The nationalistic movement was gradually dithered and the Kurdish masses continued their conservative way of life.[43]

Kurdish intellectuals were not totally responsible for the failure of this fledging Kurdish awakening. These were dangerous times that preceded the First World War. During this global conflict many such movements were incapacitated. The Kurdish loss was twofold. Some Kurdish territories became the battlefields of long and exhausting campaigns between the Turkish and the Entente armies. Eventually, it was impossible to bring any sort of organization--let alone nationalistic motivation-- into such war-torn territories. On the other hand, Kurdish intellectuals living in Istanbul were silenced, as were intellectuals of other minorities. They were unable to speak out to aid their brothers in the homeland. It has been reported, however, that some Kurdish intellectuals had secret ties with their kin in the interior. These ties were the reason behind some major Kurdish revolts during and after the war.
During the first global war, Kurds retained their negative attitudes towards Armenians. Under the constitutional government, Armenian-Kurdish relations – except those on the intellectual level—were almost non-existing. The Young Turks preferred to deal with Armenian and Kurdish nationalists separately. By this token (of liberalism), the A.R.F. became a legal, constitutional party thus attaining its seats in the newly establish Ottoman Parliament, beside those of the Kurds and other minorities. No one suspected that this liberal and to some extent “revolutionary” administration could after only a few years organize the first genocide of the century.
Divesting from all relations with the Kurds caused Armenians a great deal of suffering. Kurds became the real tools of extermination during the Armenian massacres. History revealed once again that Kurdish tribal hordes could still be employed to butcher innocent Armenians during their march into the Syrian desert.

B. The First World War Period.

Directed by the powerful German Empire, and with dreams of reinstituting Ottoman Might and integrity, the Young Turk triumvirate (Enver, Talaat, Jemal, who had consolidated power in 1912) pushed Turkey into the war. The primary objective was the creation of the Turan, the united empire of all Trukic tribes and peoples. As a new ideology Zia Gokalp, Ahmed Akchura and other ultra nationalist, racist Turkish intellectuals, who had praised the idea of Tuan incessantly in their literature, formulated Pan-Turkism.[44]
Under the cove of the war, the Ittihadist Turkish government undertook the realization of the covert goals of Pan-Turkism. It organized and executed the extermination of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, simply because they were a geographical, historical, and physical hurdle against the creation of Turan. The whole genocidal scenario was prepared in advance. The result was the punishment of some one and one half million Armenians. Moreover, the Eastern, i.e. Armenians, vilayets of the empire was emptied from their original inhabitants. All this was accomplished just to remove the “obstacle’ that separated the Turks of the Ottoman Empire from their ethnic brethren in Azarbaijian and Central Asia. Ironically, Kurdish sources observe that some seven hundred thousands Kurds perished during this same period.[45] This Kurdish death toll is somewhat questionable. The Young Turk government of the day instructed the feeble Sultan Rashid to order the people that the extermination Armenians was tantamount to a Jihad, a holy war, against infidel Christians. This was done to secure the cooperation of non-Turkic, Muslim elements of the empire such as the Kurds. It follows that the Kurds assumed an active role in the obliteration of the Armenians by themselves becoming the executioners (and not the “victims” as Kendal or other Kurdish historians desperately try to argue. Therefore, it is plausible to say that Kurdish casualties of war (obviously much lesser than the number given above) occurred because of civilian deaths during the battles which took place in Kurdistan, and also among the ranks of the Kurdish soldiers serving in the Ottoman armies on the various battlefronts.
It is unimaginable how wars affect people and their fates. Sasuni mentions that:

“… Because of the war, huge Turkish armies were garrisoned in Armenia. The nationalist movement came to a halt, and all forms of civil life changed. All were frightened. And everyone tried to escape with his head. Armenians and Kurdish national volition was crushed. All forms of Armenian-Kurdish relations were uprooted. Military operations became frequent, and Turks seemed to know how to operate in an organized fashion. On the other hand, Armenians were left to their fate. They were subjugated and dealt with according to the military rule which gave unlimited power to the leaders of the Turkish armies.”[46]

Armenians and Kurds had to enlist into the Ottoman army. The draft law stated that all competent males between the ages of eighteen and forty must enlist as regular soldiers. Many Kurds circumvented the problem by paying the badali askariye (military exemption fee). On the other hand, poor Armenian peasants had to forcibly join the army because of lack of funds. They were enlisted and sent to a certain death if not on the battlefronts (where they were stationed on the advanced battle lines) then in the numerous labor camps, which were an important element in the process of the obliteration of the Armenian labor battalions.[47] Even in the few locals were Armenians organized self defense battles, Kurds helped the government by weakening Armenian defenses through their continuous raids. Such were the cases Sasun, Van, Shadakh Khnus, Daron, and Bitlis. Only Van was spared total annihilation because it was able to defend itself until the arrival of the advancing Russian armies and the Armenian Volunteer Regiments (Haygagan Gamavoragan Kunter). But on the whole, Kurds massacred Armenians with their own hands in Sasun, Daron, Bitlis, and the remote environs of Van.[48]
It must be stated, however, that in some areas of Southern Kurdistan, and especially in Dersim, Kurds not only did not participate in the war efforts or the Armenian massacres, but also even confronted Turks as their enemies.[49] On the other hand, some Northern Kurdish tribes came into contact with the advancing Russian armies and fought alongside against the Turkish armies headed by Enver Pasha, minister of war of the Ittihad government.
Russia, for its part, gave rosy promises to Kurdish tribes that helped her during the war. By securing the cooperation of Armenians and Northern Kurdish tribes, Russia aimed at annexing Armenia and Kurdistan as part of its colonizing policies. Russia’s European allies had similar aims for different areas of the Ottoman Empire. This imperialist mood was apparent in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between France, Great Britain, and Russia. According to this treaty, the three powers divided the Caucasus and the Middle East between themselves (Russia later abandoned the treaty when the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917. Lenin even uncovered all the secret negotiations pertaining to the agreement and its content).
The rapid advance of the Russian armies did protect Armenian lives in Van and some other areas of Western Armenia. Soon Armenian refugee relocation tasks were underway with the purpose of saving the lives of those who were hiding in the mountains and valleys. In the Southern territories, some Armenian families had found refuge near the Kurdish tribes that had not participated in the war or the Armenian massacres. Some Kurds had even helped and gave shelter to Armenian families in Sasun. In Dersim frightened Armenians lived with the Kurdish tribes and clans of the remote mountains. Here, old Kurdish customs still prevailed. Kurds did not want to break their centuries old neighborly ties with Armenians. They helped their Armenian brethren in their times of utmost need.
Most useful in helping Armenians were the Kurdish tribes of Northern Syria. They protected those Armenians who escaped the death marches in the North Syrian desert. As an eyewitness to these events Sasuni cities:

“I personally was interested in this matter (the Kurdish tribes of Northern Syria helping the Armenians). I was able to confirm that during 1915-1917 many Kurdish tribal leaders were questioned and even tortured by Ottoman authorities, because they had given refuge to Armenians by keeping them in their tribes, under the disguise of Kurdish clothing, so as not to arouse any suspicions.”[50]

It is also to be noted that during the first four months of 1915-- the most active months of the Armenian massacres--Kurdish rayas (serfs) were the greatest tool in the ensuing Armenian Mayhem. The government fully utilized the poor and greedy Kurdish peasants to kill and loot Armenians during the death marches.
What was the result of all this? In 1916, Kurds finally realized that they had actually become the tools of the Ittihad policies. Obviously Armenia was uprooted and soon they, the Kurds, would face a similar fate. It was already too late. But even in those difficult days of self-realization, unity did not find fertile basis among the Kurdish tribes. Kurds remained divided, and they were transformed to a minority even in their own homeland. After 1915, the Ittihad government had no reason to fear Armenian-Kurdish collaboration. Everything seemed to be ready for the second phase of the Pan-Turkic plan--to bury the Kurdish issue of autonomy.
The Turkish government first made sure that Kurds would never remain a majority on their lands. Massive immigration of Kurds to the remote parts of Anatolia was organized. In the Eastern vilayets, Kurds statistically were reduced to about five percent of the total population. Not content with these measures, the government herded Kurdish leaders and active youth into exile to the Western districts of the empire. Kurdish “nationalists” were thus deprived of their popular basis. According to Sasuni, the exile law had a secret article according to which:

“All Turkish civil and military authorities must see to it that the exiled Kurds encounter the UTMOST DIFFICULTY [G.M.] en-route, in other word, it was suggested that the exiled should, if possible, be massacred like the Armenians before them.”

Although firm on its decision, the Turkish government did no seek the total obliteration of the Kurds. It wanted to relocate them to other areas and to start the process of their Turkification. Even with such Turkish policies in action, Kurds dwelling in the Russian occupied territories of the empire kept on helping the defeated Turkish government. When the Russian armies retreated in 1917, Armenians in Van and its vicinity had to retreat with them to the Caucasus. Kurds now joined forces with the incoming Turkish army. Sasuni states that on the Pergri Bridge alone Kurds massacred about four thousand Armenians and threw their bodies into the river. A.R.F. leaders tried to negotiate with the Kurds even before the Russian retreat, when there was no actual sign of such a withdrawal. The purpose of this approach was to make Kurds understand that Armenians were willing to forget the past for the sake of cooperation and mutual understanding. Sasuni, who was a participant in the events and also a member of the negotiating team, writes:

“I myself conducted part of these negotiations. I invented forty Kurdish leaders in January of 1918 to speak to them about restoring relations. This could be considered the first Armenian-Kurdish convention of this time…. Some of the leaders promised to be friendly, but the majority obviously showed the enmity and hatred that was hidden deep in their hearts….In February, when the advancing Turkish troops reached Van, those same Kurdish leaders joined them and persecuted fleeing Armenians and even massacred many of them.”[51]

C. Defeat and Victory: The Treaties of Sevres And Lausanne

The Ottoman Empire surrendered in October of 1918, by singing the Mudros Armistice. This not only saved Turkey from being totally conquered by the Entente, but it even created a chance of coming out of the war with only partial losses and an obligation to sign a peace treaty that would in the long run conserve the integrity of the new Turkish State. The Pan-Turkic dreams of the Ittihadists were about to cost the total loss of the empire. The British fleet was stationed in the Bosphorus. English, French, Italian, and Greek troops occupied big chunks of Turkish territory. The huge Ottoman Empire was drastically reduced. Only Anatolia and the southern shores of the Black Sea remained under its control.
The period between October of 1918 and June of 1919 was therefore an unprecedented opportunity for Kurds to establish their national homeland. It might be argued with some certainly that this opportunity could have been extended even to 1921, since during those three critical years Turkey was experiencing a potentially volatile political vacuum.[52] The whole country was in a total state of anarchy and chaos. The Ittihadist government had fled; the Sultan’s rule did no go beyond the boundaries of the capital, Istanbul; the remnants of what used to be the Ottoman army were disintegrating; the commanders and officers were fleeing to save their own lives. On the other hand, Russia was encountering severe internal problems. Those were exacerbated by the Bolshevik takeover of the government in October of 1917. The new rulers of Russia cut off its ties with the Entente powers; signed the shameful surrender treaty of Brest Litovsk with Germany; called their armies home. Russia was now a secluded state trying to cope with the tyranny of the new Communist regime. The revolutionary government, under the leadership of Lenin, abandoned all previous Tsarist policies. This also meant that for the time being communist Russia was not interested in the colonizing policies of its predecessor of which Kurdistan was an essential part, in accord with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916.
The Persian army too was in a state of disintegration. It so happened that all three powers, Turkey, Russia, and Iran were engulfed in internal problems and strife. Europe was unable to interfere. The Kurds could have simply grasped the opportunity to declare the independence of their national homeland.
In May 1918, the three Caucasian states of Georgia, Azarbaijian, and Armenia declared their independence. These states almost immediately enjoyed the recognition of Europe and the United States as well as their economic aid. Europe had to show a positive image to those new republics, because they were to assume the role of natural barriers against Communist Russia. All Kurds had to do was to follow in the footsteps of the Armenians and to declare their sovereignty. Even if European powers like France or England were opposed to such a declaration (rather unlikely at the time), they were unable to stop it from happening. In fact, their withdrawal from Aintab and Urfa (both in Cilicia) proves this.[53] It must be noted here that France and Britain were at odds in their Caucasian and Middle Eastern policies. England was trying desperately to reach the oil fields of Musul – scientific research proved to the British that those fields were rich in crude oil. England had kept this a secret from France. It was for this reason that the British seemed ready to negotiate with the Kurds for the establishment of a free and independent Kurdistan. France also approached the Kurds in this direction. What France wanted was a Kurdistan under French mandate. So all that Kurdish leaders had to do was to negotiate with the English and the French simultaneously and to make them agree to the idea of an independent Kurdish state.
However, what Kurds were lacking was their own collective force. There were no Armenians in eastern Anatolia to help this Kurdish move. Moreover, the fledgling Armenian Republic could in no way help the Kurdish cause of independence.
As in the past, there was no hope of the formation of a United Kurdish front, let alone an independent Kurdish state. It was really embarrassing to be unable of grasping such a historic opportunity. The question implies itself. Why didn’t the Kurds unite even when confronted with such an opportunity? In 1919, the hero of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, then an officer in the Turkish army in Istanbul, was sent on a mission to the Eastern vilayets. Arriving in Sivas, Kemal severed all ties with the central government in Istanbul and originated a new movement to reorganize Turkey as a modern republic. He was able to gather an army of thirty five thousand men (mostly Kurds). Kurdish chieftains could have easily destroyed Kemal and his forces. Some gave serious thought to crushing the new Kemalist army. However, once again Kurdish leaders were the “victims” of British diplomacy, which wanted to use Kemal as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the central Turkish government.
Sasuni writes that in August 1919, prominent Kurdish leaders conducted a meeting in Malatia. Speaking about this meeting, he quotes a paragraph from a Kurdish publication that appeared in the United States under the title “The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey” (published by the Kurdish National Organization) which states:

“During this time, concern and fear led Kurdish leaders to conduct a meeting in Kahta, near Malatia. The participants decided to join forces and confront the new Turkish Nationalist Movement of Mustafa Kemal. But Col. Bill (surname unknown) of the British Intelligence Bureau of Aleppo appeared at the meeting, and in the name of his government asked the chieftains to keep their silence, and, most importantly, not to organize any military campaign against Kemal and his forces. The Colonel also assured the Kurdish leaders that the Kurdish Question was to be solved in a just way by the Allied Power.”[54]

It seems that England once more stood as the protector of Turkish integrity. By so doing it extinguished any new hopes of Kurdish independence. But, most of all, England allowed Kemal’s movement to flourish and gain more firm ground. This proved to be a disaster not only for Kurds but also for Armenians. In the long run, Kemal’s momentum hurt even Britain’s policies in the Levant. The new Turkey immerging under the leadership of Kemal regarded Britain as an enemy and didn’t act in a manner which was agreeable or pleasing to England.
Yet one is compelled to think of the reasons behind this pro-Kemal British tactic. The question that asserts itself here is why the Kurdish leaders who were gathered in Malatia accepted the English terms so quickly. According to Kurdish intellectuals, Kurdish leaders were certain that their country’s independence was dependent on English and French approval. In other words, almost all of the Middle Eastern states that immerged during this time or shortly afterwards were either British or French protectorates or mandates. Kurds knew that if they were to have their independence, then most probably they were to have that under an English mandate. For this reason they were obliged to accept all English demands even if they were opposed to it. Yet what Kurds did not know was the bitter fact that neither England nor France was interested in having a mandate over Kurdistan. Moreover, they were absolutely against antagonizing Kemal for such a venture. France was the first to act and to sign a treaty of friendship and economic exchange and even cooperation with Kemal in as early as 1920, (the Ankara Agreement). Moreover, Most of the participants in the Malatia Convention were not nationalists or radical intellectuals, but rather conservative and religious sheiks. They were always influenced by the British policies, which was brought to them by British consuls.
The most powerful organization in Kurdish society was the Kurd Istiqlal Jemiyeti (Committee of Kurdish Independence). It had assumed direct talks with Kemal. Some of its members even advocated the nationalistic cause of the Turkish hero. Anyway, this organization became the victim of Kemal’s Milli Movement. Late in 1921, one hundred and ten of its radical members (who detested the close ties with the Kemalist Movement) were sentenced to death.[55] They were either hanged or put in front of firing squads. The failure of the Khata meeting and the accumulating mistakes of the Kurdish leadership gave Kemal the opportunity to strengthen his posture. Once he accomplished this, he moved to the offensive. He fought the Kurdish nationalist elements furiously. Kemal saw in them the capacity of becoming a real threat to the new Turkish republic that he was trying to establish.
Meanwhile, preparations for the Peace Conference were underway early in 1919. Before speaking about the Paris Peace Conference, it is important to give a brief description about the relations and the negotiations that occurred between the two Armenian Delegations and the Kurdish Commission in Paris in the months that preceded the Peace Conference. These negotiations lasted until August 10, 1920, the date on which the Treaty of Serves was signed.
For a period of almost a year between 1919 and 1920, Armenian and Kurdish delegates continued their political and diplomatic “skirmishes” in Paris over disputed borders and overlapping territories. During this same time, in Anatolia, Kemal continued to grow stronger and to constitute the basis of his new Republic. In the early stages, no one thought seriously about Kemal or his feeble movement. This gave the Turkish nationalist a free hand. By the time the Peace Treaty was ready to be signed, Kemal came forth as a capable and to some extent strong leader, which wanted to definitely be counted as a player in the game. European powers now had to face this new reality imposed by Kemal. They were negotiating with the delegates of a defeated Ottoman Empire, whereas real power in Turkey was in the hands of the young and energetic Mustafa Kemal.
The Kurdish Delegation in Paris was headed by Sherif Pasha who, according to Sasuni, “still kept the character of an Ottoman official and even acted in accordance to that psychology.” He was always confused and unable to reach an agreement. He could not argue effectively. Sherif Pasha did no have a clear picture of the geographic boundaries of an independent Kurdistan. He was unable to define its borders or the territories that he wanted to be included within the envisioned Kurdish state.
The long and tedious negotiations finally resulted in an agreement between the Armenian and the Kurdish delegations. The central theme of this agreement was that the two people wanted to be free from oppressive Turkish rule. The problem of the disputed territories and borders were not solved. They were sent back to the Peace Conference to be decided over.
In an official letter addressed to the Peace Conference and signed by the two delegations, Armenians and Kurds asked for the establishment of independent Armenian and Kurdish states, leaving the problem of disputed territories in Vaspurakan and elsewhere to the discretion of the Peace Conference.[56]
The Armenian-Kurdish negotiations and the matter of the disputed territories met the protests of Armenians everywhere. Some though that too many concessions were being made in order to reach a compromise with the Kurds. The first such protestor was the Armenian Ambassador to Washington D.C., Armen Karo (Karekin Pastermajian). Armenians had two delegations in Paris; Avetis Aharonian, the representative of the Republic of Armenia, headed one, Boghos Nubar Pasha headed the second. It represented Western and Cilician Armenians (it was this delegation that demanded an Armenia “from sea unto sea” with Cilician territories included within the future Armenian republic (this in turn unleashed a sarcastic campaign in the European and especially the French media about an “Armenian Empire”). The “concessions” issue became the subject of hot debates in the Armenian diasporan media itself. This compelled the two Armenian delegations to publish a joint communiqué in order to clarify the issue and prove that the agreement in no way jeopardized Armenian demands.[57]
Sherif Pasha did not remain as the head of the Kurdish delegation until the end of the Peace Conference. He declared that he opposed the Armenian-Kurdish agreement that he himself had signed. After his departure from Paris, Kurds continued their lobbying but had a very limited and unorganized presence in the diplomatic circles of the Peace Conference.
On August 10, 1920, a Peace Treaty was singed in Severs. The representative of Kemal, the real power in Anatolia, was not present. The delegate of the feeble sultan who had no real power in the Anatolian interior presented Turkey. As a matter of fact, his rule encompassed only the capital Istanbul, and some of its suburbs. During the Conference Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States of America put his famous sixteen points concerning the right of people to decide their futures and freedom on the discussion table. President Wilson himself drew the borders of the free and independent Republic of Armenia. As for the question of Kurdish independence, articles 62, 63, and 64 of the treaty addressed that issue.[58]
Article 62 stated that a committee formed from the representatives of the three Entente powers France, England, and Italy, was to reside in Istanbul and was in a matter of six months prepare a program of autonomy in the regions inhabited by the Kurds. This offered a partial solution to the question of Kurdish independence. Kurds were outraged. According to them, the newly established Armenian Republic had acquired territories that were considered theirs. Kendal argues that President Wilson annexed to Armenia lands that were inhabited by Kurds in Mush, Erzinjan, Bingeol, Bitlis, Van, Gharakilise, Iktir, and Erzerum.[59] This is a topic of hot debate. It is clear that by 1920, and mostly due to the Armenian massacres during the war, those Armenian territories were emptied from their original Armenian inhabitants. Was it really possible to translate the ownership of such disputed territories by the mere fact that after the massacres and the deportation of Armenians Kurds had become a majority in those areas? Nevertheless, even this Kurdish majority was questionable at the time, since with the blessings of the new Kemalist government massive numbers of Turkish immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus were being dumped into those areas. However, for the record it must be stated that culturally, ethnically, and historically these disputed lands represented the ancient homeland of the Armenian nation who lived there as an undisputed majority for over two millennia enduring Turkish, Kurdish, Cherkez, and other immigrations organized by the various Ottoman sultans.
Nevertheless, the Treaty of Severe was destined to fail even before its ink was dried. Kemal was to grow and eventually give a decisive blow to the Allied Powers and their friends, the Greek, who was entrusted with the execution of the ill-fated treaty.
Kemal gathered his forces and first blockaded the Greek advance. Himself moving to the offensive he defeated the outnumbering Greek armies near Izmir and literally threw them into the Black Sea under the very eyes of the British fleet, which stood silently during the whole unfolding “drama.” Kemal literally burned the seaport city of Izmir. Thousands of civilians (including many Armenians who had returned home encouraged by the Allied Powers) were either burned or put at the mercy of the sea.
By new Kemal’s position was that of a strong man. He was now ready to negotiate with Europe according to his own terms. The Treaty of Severe was to be nulled. Another was singed at Laussane in 1923. Armenian and Kurdish independence was totally jeopardized, since Kemal insisted that Turkish sovereignty must be reinstated over all of Anatolia. The Entente powers had to agree in order to gain Kemal as an ally rather then an enemy who was certain to fall into the lap of Communist Russia. Kemal was promised help from Moscow too. His position was a favorable one. He had all the cards in his hands and he played expertly. By so doing he constituted the cornerstone of a new phase of relations with Europe.
After 1921, the A.R.F. leaders tried once more to establish relations with the Kurds, since now Armenians and Kurds represented the only two people who still had demands from republican Turkey. In 1924, an agreement was reached with the Kurdish National Committee. Soon after, in 1925, a new Kurdish rebellion burst out on Dersim under the leadership of Sheik Said Ali. The Sheik gathered the Kurdish nationalists under his flag and raised arms against the Turkish oppressor, which this time was represented by the new Kemalist Republic.

VI. SHEIK SAID ALI’S REBELLION AND THE FORMATION OF
“HOYBOUN,” THE KURDISH NATIONAL PARTY

“My natural life is finished. I do not regret that I am dying for my country and nation. I would be satisfied if our grand-children do not shame us in front of our enemies.”

Sheik Said Ali of Piran

After defeating the implementation of the Sevres treaty, Kemal approached communist Russia for economic and military aid. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 gave the impetus necessary for the creation of a pseudo Turkish Communist Party. Kemal tolerated the formation of such a political entity to secure Soviet friendship and, most importantly, aid. Later, however, in an effort to rectify his position with Europe—that is, to appease its powers--Kemal dissolved that party in 1925, of course after physically eliminating its leaders first.
The initial Kemalist tilt towards Communist Russia alarmed Europe. Its most affected powers, i.e. France, Britain were worried that such a tilt would definitely endanger their new Middle Eastern possessions. Moreover, a Turkey friendly to Russia would extend communism’s frontiers to the detriment of Europe and its spheres of influence.
France was the first to sign a treaty of friendship with the Kemalist government. This happened in early October 1921, when Kemal’s forces had not yet extended their rule over all of modern day Turkey. Moreover, Greek forces were still active in Anatolia. In fact, to most Turkish nationalist leaders, the very existance of such massive Greek forces did endanger the very existence of their fledgling nationalist movement. It is in this context that France’s erratic behavior must be understood and properly analyzed— most probably a case of “cold feet.” With such French encouragement—as the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship with Turkey could have entailed-- Kemalist forces were able to halt the advance of the Greek armies who had already conquered Izmir and were moving inward, toward central Anatolia.
This Turkish victory was achieved through substantial Kurdish aid to Kemal’s army. Thousands of Kurdish tribal warriors and previous Hamidiye regiment soldiers joined Kemal’s army. The Turkish leader was thus not only able to confront the Greek armies but even to stage a strong counter-offensive which swept the advancing Greek army back to Izmir and literally into the Black Sea, together with the Greek and Armenian population of the city, under the very eyes of the British fleet which watched the tragedy unfold (according to some reports Her Majesty’s sailors, following orders from their officers, even went as far as pouring boiling water on those seeking refuge on board British ships.
What was the reason or reasons behind this massive Kurdish aid to Kemal? After all, it was only months before that’s Kurdish chieftains who had met in Malatia had agreed to get rid of him. There is nothing surprising in such Kurdish attitude. By now, Kemal had become a seasoned politician. So, in order not to alienate the Kurdish chieftains, Kemal never used the term “Turkish Republic” when addressing them or the Kurdish population at large. Instead, he started his movement in the heart of Kurdistan, where he promised Kurds a country where Turks and Kurds would live mutually, and harmoniously like brothers and equals in every aspect. Kemal’s promises were negotiated and hammered down during several. meetings and conventions.
The first such convention was held in Erzerum. It is also known as the Congress of the Eastern Vilayets. Rumors had it that the Paris Peace Conference had already annexed the vilayets of Erzerum, Kars, Bitlis, Erzinjan, Mush and Van to the Armenian republic, whose borders were to be drawn by the president of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson. Fifty-four prominent Kurdish chieftains and leaders from these territories came to Erzerum to meet Kemal and to join forces to struggle against the annexation of Kurdish territories to neighboring Armenia. Kendal, who had previously erred by claiming that those vilayets were “historically Kurdish territories,” and that “Armenians had no legitimate claims over them,” contradicts himself by stating that:

“The Kurdish notable [who did participate in the Erzerum Convention of 1919, G.M.] had their own reasons for resisting such an outcome [annexation, G.M.]. When Armenians were deported during the war, Kurdish notables had sized their goods (lands). Serving under Armenian domination would have meant dispossession as well as persecution [by] and servitude to a Christian regime.”[60]

The Erzerum Convention decided to act quickly, and to do all that is in its power to prevent the annexation of the six eastern vilayets to the Armenian republic. The Convention also decided that Kurds would help the Turkish army against any Armenian expansion. Kazim Karabekir Pasha was sent to Kurdistan to recruit Kurdish soldiers and to supervise their training. It was this mainly Kurdish army that advanced against the Armenian Republic in 1922. This offensive lead to the singing of the peace treaty of Gumri (Leninakan, during the Soviet era) which resulted in the Armenian loss of not only the contested vilayets but also of the districts of Kars and Ardahan. The Armenian Republic was thus squeezed into a small state, with an area of a bit over thirty thousand square kilometers.
The question that asserts itself here is weather the Kurds, after all their endeavors, were able to keep the eastern vilayets for themselves or their posterity? The answer to this question is a definite no. After the Erzerum Congress, Kemal led his army from one victory to another. He destroyed all possibilities of executing the Treaty of Severe. For three years he waged a two front war against the Allies in eastern and western Asia Minor. He made them realize that they had to deal with him as the new strong man in Turkey. In 1923, a new treaty was signed at Lausanne. Here, Kemal’s free and independent Republic of Turkey participated as an equal negotiator. European nations, who only months before were engaged in a war of attrition against him, were now desperate to gain his friendship and have his new Turkey on their side as an important new ally, and, of course, a barrier, against Communist Russia.
In Lausanne, all dreams of Kurdish autonomy were shattered. The treaty made it abundantly clear that hopes of establishing an “enlarged” Armenian Republic were futile. Deserted by its European allies and even the United States (which completely reneged on its previous promise of providing the feeble Caucasian state with a mandate and protection because of its important strategic value as a country bordering Communist Russia), Armenia now came under the duel fire of Turkey and Russia. Kemal’s Army had already reached Kars and Ardahan. On the other front, the Russian Red Army, through the help of local communist agitators and agents, defeated the abruptly organized Armenian army; instituted Communist rule over the republic; and compelled the leadership of the liberal, pro-Western ruling party, the A.R.F., to exile first to Iran, then to the newly established Middle Eastern countries (some finally settled in Europe and the United States).
As for the Kurds, they were deprived of any political recognition. The Turkish envoy to Lausanne silenced all talks about Kurdish autonomy. He stressed that “Kurds and Turks are now equal partners in the government of Turkey,” and that “although Turks and Kurds may speak different languages, these two people are not different from the point of view of race, faith and custom.”[61] If anything, this statement indicates that Kemalist Turkey viewed the assimilation and Turkification of the Kurds as a natural process. The Treaty of Lausanne gave other minorities in Turkey--like Armenians, Greeks, and Jews religious as well as some cultural “freedoms.” But Kurds, because of being represented as “equal partners” to the Turkish majority, were not counted as a minority. Thus, they were deprived from even the meager “freedoms” that other minorities were to enjoy. After 1923, the Turkification of the Kurds accelerated with the objective of literally melting them within the Turkish race.
In yet another blow to the Kurds, the Treaty of Lausanne divided Historical Kurdistan between the newly established Middle Eastern states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This was an indirect consequence of the planning and the execution of the Sykes-Picot agreement. England wanted the oil-rich fields of southern Kurdistan (Musul). It was annexed by Iraq, a British mandate. The oil issue exacerbated relations between France and England. Supposedly, oil was discovered after the Lausanne Treaty was signed. However, France insisted that the British already knew about the oil reserves in the area and preferred to say nothing about it during negotiations. Nevertheless, the two European powers were able to reach a compromise. Accordingly, France received twenty five percent of the oil revenue and also the districts of Jezireh and Kurd Dagi (Kurdish Mountain) in southwestern Kurdistan, which it annexed to its Syrian protectorate.

A. Sheik Said Ali’s Rebellion in Dersim

In the Turkish parts of Kurdistan, and also in the eastern vilayets, Kemalist oppression followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. As an initial phase of assimilation, Mustafa Kemal closed all Kurdish schools and deployed new methods Turkification in areas inhabited by the Kurds. There was no doubt in Kemal’s mind that Turkey was to become a homogeneous Turkish state. By this token its inhabitants were to be only Turks.
To add insult upon injury, unfair taxation, unjust judicial procedures, and bribe taking, corrupted Turkish civil and military officials made life unbearable for Kurds.[62]
Late in 1922, Kurdish deputies in the Turkish parliament such as Yusuf Zia of Bitlis and Colonel Halid Bey from Chebran founded the Kurt Istiqlal Jemiyeti (Kurdish Association of Independence). The association organization branches in the major towns and cities of Turkish Kurdistan. This underground organization had its sub-committees in Diarbekir, Bitlis, Urfa, Siirt, and Elazig (Kharput, Kharpert). Army officers of Kurdish origins joined the association because they feared that the Turkification policies imposed by Kemal aimed at cutting the Kurdish people from their roots.
Kurdish nationalists and intellectuals joined the association as well. Surprisingly, even some Kurdish religious figures such as Sheik Said Ali of Piran, Sheik Sherif of Palu and Sheik Abdullah of Melkan contacted the leaders of the association and put themselves under their command.[63]
In March 1924, Kemal nulled the Khalifate by a governmental decree. Soon, another decree followed. This time Kemal banned all Kurdish organizations, as well as regular and religious schools. This action enlarged the existing gulf between him and the Kurdish people. It also pushed the latter into rebellion. From the onset, the Kurdish Association of Independence was making preparations for a general rebellion.[64] It had established ties with most of the religious sheiks and tribal chieftains. Its leadership had also created links with the Kurdish communities of Istanbul and Aleppo. In other words, the period 1923-1924 was completely devoted to the accumulation of military and other provisions in preparation for the general rebellion.
Late in the summer of 1924, Yusuf Zia, the Kurdish deputy from Bitlis, went to Istanbul with the objective of contacting the leaders of the anti-Kemalist party, the Terraki Perver Chumburiyet Firkasi (Progressive Republican Party). It seems that Zia was successful in his mission. Yet, after only few days of his return to Erzerum, rebellion broke out in the northern districts of Bitlis. It follows that the Turkish government was also closely monitoring the underground activities of Yusuf Zia. It had assigned a number of agents and spies for this purpose. Taking advantage of the opportunity that this Kurdish insurrection provided, Turkish troops besieged Zia’s home; put him under custody; demanded the arrest of his brother--who was accused of being one of the primary agitators of the rebellion. Hundred of Kurdish rebels and Independence Association members were also imprisoned. They were brought to trial before a special military court in Bitlis in October 1924. They were charged with treason and were sentenced to death.
It was at this juncture of the rebellion that Sheik Said Ali of Piran assumed the leadership of the Kurdish Rebellion. Knowing well that most of the captured Kurdish leaders and rebels were to be summarily murdered, he contacted the Kurdish tribes of Kharput, Diarbekir, Gendj and Darhini and persuaded them to raise arms against Mustafa Kemal and his government. Sheik Said also established ties with some Armenian nationalists and through them with the A.R.F. According to sources Sheik Said even had an A.R.F. representative, Vramian, in his camp. This Vramian became the liaison between the Kurds and the A.R.F. He also oversaw the administration of Armenian aid to the rebels.
There is no doubt that this Armenian aid was symbolic. However, its significance lies in the fact that it was perhaps the first step toward a more rigid Armenian-Kurdish cooperation after almost decades of hostility and intolerance. This Armenian cooperation could also be considered the beginning of a decade long (1924-1934) mutual understanding and cooperation between Armenian and Kurdish nationalists, during which the A.R.F. tried to help the Kurdish people in its struggles against the almost genocidal procedures imposed on them by Kemalist Turkey.
Kemal sent several Turkish regiments to the rebel Kurdish territories. Even with the leaders of the Kurdish independence movement either murdered or imprisoned the general Kurdish rebellion was underway. On February 5, 1925, Kurdish rebels took to the offensive and seized Mush, Khnus, Varto and Arzni.[65]
The Kurdish rebellion gained momentum day after day. Kurds from all over came to join the rebel forces. This was happening in spite of draconian Turkish measures to silence the rebellion. For example, in Kharput alone, four hundred Kurds were hanged after being summarily sentenced by the established pseudo military court.
Kemal’s cunning character becomes apparent when one considers how he used the Kurdish insurrection to rid himself of the Turkish communist movement and party that he himself had instituted years ago as a puppet organization to attract Soviet aid. By introducing the brutal and unjust court martial system, Kemal created a permanent source of fear in the eastern vilayets and Kurdistan.
On the international front, Kemal tried to convince the international community that the Kurdish uprising was a reactionary movement that aimed at restoring the sultanate. He worked hard to manipulate both the domestic and the international newspapers by attributing fanatic, religious overtones to the nationalistic aspirations of Kurdish rebels.[66] Moreover, Kemal went as for as to suggest that by restoring the Ottoman Sultanate Kurds were aiming at destroying Kemal and his cause of modernization.
Nevertheless, all of Kemal’s measures considered, according to the A.R.F. central organ “Droshak” within only two months-- end of March 1925-- Kurdish rebel forces had occupied almost all of the twelve districts constituting Turkish Kurdistan.[67]
Kemal and his government could not envisage such a Kurdish victory. A Turkish army of eighty thousand men was deployed within the areas engulfed by the rebellion. Moreover, with the permission of French authorities in Syria, the Northern Syrian railroad was utilized to transport new Turkish infantry regiments to Kurdistan. Soon, these two Turkish armies besieged the mountainous town of Diarbekir. They shelled it day and night until it fell in April 1925. Most of the Kurdish rebels were either murdered or captured. Others, however, still managed to escape and to seek refuge with the Kurdish tribes of Iran and Iraq.
After the Turkish seizure of Diarbekir, atrocities began to multiply in the Kurdish territories. On September 4, 1925, the government hanged the rebel Sheik Said Ali and fifty-two of his followers. Thousands of Kurds were massacred, and scores of towns and villages were pillaged and reduced to ashes. Not content with these measures, the Turkish government instituted yet a new court martial that after only short and staged trials condemned hundreds of Kurdish rebels to death.
It took the Turkish army months, even years to cleanse the rebel areas and to cut all supply and communication lines between the rebels. Turkish Kurdistan was put under military rule. Deportation measures were reintroduced to uproot Kurdistan from its original inhabitants. Kurds were relocated to eliminate all fears of future rebellions.
Kurds had to fight for their existence. To do so they had only their rifles and their mountains with which to continue the uneven battle. Sasuni writes that: -

“Now Kurds had finally realized that the Turks were after them for good. They were no more the victims of Turkish lies. The Kurdish National Revolution had acquired a general character. Internal conflicts and personal enmities were all forgotten in the face of Turkish danger. The notion of a united Kurdish national organization was spreading quickly into every corner of Kurdistan. The Turkish brutality indirectly helped in the development of this new spirit. Thus, every Kurd realized that unity was a necessity rather than a tactic or a political maneuver.”[68]

During the last stages of Sheik Said Ali’s Rebellion, some Kurdish rebels had escaped to Iran and Iraq. From, there they reentered Kurdistan in small groups and gathered in the region of Ararat which seemed to be the final refuge--and also the new center of rebellion-- for all Kurdish freedom fighters.
In 1926, Col. Ihsan Nuri Pasha, a Kurdish nationalist serving in the Turkish army, deserted the ranks and with the help of some Kurdish and Armenian friends reached Mt. Ararat, where he joined the rebel forces of Haski Telli, the new Kurdish rebel leader. During the following months, hundreds of Kurdish rebels reached Ararat to partake in the preparations for the big event.
On the other hand, minor skirmishes and battles still continued to occur in Hakiari, Hazzo, and Dersim. Kurdish rebel chieftains in these areas too had established relations with the A.R.F. through the agents of the latter.
It is interesting to note that Kurds had started to approach Armenians differently as early as 1924. Gone were the memories of Armenian as friends and neighbors that Kurdish Amirs of the previous century had tried to instill in their people. For decades, Kurds had viewed Armenians as an element that can be officially exploited. As a matter of fact that was what the government had made them learn. That Armenians, after decades of Kurdish cruelty, were ready to forget the past and were still eager to lend them a helping hand in their struggle against the government was enough to change Kurdish attitudes towards them. Kurds thus developed a new appreciation towards Armenians and their organizations.[69]
The spirit of Armenian-Kurdish unity and cooperation at last started to flourish. Kurds were convinced that in order to gain their freedom they had to fight Kemal’s armies to the last man. As for Kemal, he continued to shape public opinion to his side by attempting to convince it that the continuing Kurdish menace was not an internal issue, but rather one that had many external links, and that England and its agents were primarily involved in it.[70] Kemal’s propaganda did not work in this intense. Moreover, Kurds were sure that Europe and especially England had long since abandoned them and their cause. In their disparity Kurds turned their eyes towards their past neighbors and primary allies, the Armenians, who “sometimes Islamized and wrapped up in Kurdish dress fought by their side and were even martyred for the sake of the Kurdish cause, thus gaining the gratitude and the admiration of the Kurdish people.”[71]
Sasuni states that Armenians in Iran, Iraq and Syria were the motivating forces behind organizing the different Kurdish forces and political currents. The A.R.F. was active and even instrumental in this regard. On their part, when Kurds saw the enthusiasm with which Armenians approached their—i.e. the Kurds-- cause, they became strongly attached to the Armenians and welcomed their help. As a result of this Armenian endeavor, Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists coalesced to create a united political and military organization that was essential in leading their struggle. Sasuni also writes: -

“Kurdish and Armenian revolutionary elements worked hard during 1926-1927: They prepared plans for the future, brought together opposing groups and leaders, and, in the summer of 1927, organized a series of conventions and meetings. In autumn, all preparations were made and everything seemed to be ready for the commencement of the first Kurdish National Congress. Exiled Kurdish intellectuals, leaders of the Kurdish Diaspora, and representatives from the rebel areas of Mt. Ararat came together under the same roof. This could be considered the first serious Kurdish political, and at the same time, revolutionary, congress.”[72]

The congress gave birth to “Hoyboun” the Kurdish National Political Party, around which all Kurdish forces gathered. The party was built along lines similar to the A.R.F. During tedious discussions, its goals, political program, and its internal workings were all meticulously crafted.[73]

B. Hoyboun and Its Activities

In the Kurdish language, Hoyboun means independence. After the failure of the 1925 rebellion, rebel Kurds from all over Turkish Kurdistan gathered in and around Mt. Ararat to continue the struggle for the Kurdish Hoyboun.
The founding meetings of the Hoyboun party were conducted in August 1927, in the Lebanese mountain resort town of Bhamdoun. All Kurdish organizations and rebel groupings had sent their representatives to this convention. Among the most important achievements of this congress was that it established a consensus about the issue of the unification of all Kurdish elements under the flag of a single and general organization. Another priority that was achieved during the convention was the implementation of a strong and firm Armenian-Kurdish cooperation. The A.R.F. even sent its representative, Vahan Papazian, better known as Koms (a seasoned revolutionary and a member of the Ottoman parliament during the Ittihadist period), to the convention. Sources agree that Kurds desperately sought the A.R.F. for consultation. Kendal states that:

“This Armeno-Kurdish alliance seemed essential to the Kurdish leaders who were very much on the lookout for possible sources of support and aid for their movement. The Armenian party [A.R.F.] seems to have enjoyed more genuine Western support, perhaps because it was struggling not only for the liberation of Turkish Armenia, but also against Soviet control of Russian Armenia…It was as a result of this agreement between the Kurdish and Armenian nationalist leaders, and probably at the request of the latter, that the Ararat region, not far from Soviet Armenia, was chosen as a center for the new uprising. Another factor influencing this choice must have been the fact that from the Ararat area it would be easy to establish lines of communication with Iran, which had also promised to aid the Kurdish movement. The Shah had everything to gain: He would be weakening his rival, Kemalist Turkey, and his control over the insurrection would enable him to forestall the Kurdish revolt which was threatening to break out in Iran itself, under the leadership of Simko.”[74]

The founding congress also elected a central committee that soon became known as the Kurdish National Cabinet. The central committee realized that in order to gain momentum and recognition a flexible diplomatic corps was needed to capture international attention toward the Kurdish cause of freedom. The committee also approached Iran and the Arab states of Iraq and Syria in an effort to establish friendly relations with their respective governments. The Kurdish National Cabinet also consigned letters to the Second Socialist International (S.S.I. hereafter) and important European newspapers to direct Europe’s attention towards the Kurdish cause.
Turkey had every reason to fear what was happening. According to Kemalist intelligence sources, the Ararat Mountain was a hotbed of external influence and interference. It was a nest of anti-Kemalist elements. The Turkish army was put on the alert and regiment after another were sent there to give the Kurdish National Movement the final and decisive blow.
Late in 1927, a Turkish army of ten thousand men reached Mt. Ararat and launched a triangular offensive. Ironically, it was Turkey who provoked the Kurdish forces and ignited the general rebellion. During the initial battles, the Turkish army suffered nearly two thousand casualties between dead and wounded.
1928-1929 was a year of military preparations on both sides. Hoyboun published one communiqué after another and motivated Kurds to Join the general rebellion both physically and morally.

VII. THE ARARAT REBELLION AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN THE
SECOND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

Although the Turkish government crushed Sheik Said Ali’s rebellion with iron first, Turkish troops, however, were unable to bring all of Kurdistan under their control. Scattered into small, underground fedayeen groups, Kurdish militants and revolutionary elements were almost always on the move to cause harm to the army regiments deployed in the area. Turkish troops faced a grave danger because of the striking methods of the Kurdish fedayeen that seemed to enjoy the devoted and unconditional help of the Kurdish populace.
The Kurdish fighters of Dersim moved to Mt. Ararat. Kurdish revolutionary leaders such as Ibrahim Heski Telli, chief of military operations Ihsan Nuri Pasha and Ziylan Bey were already stationed in the remote mountain.[75] With their enthusiasm they were motivating all Kurdish rebels to join in Ararat.
By now, the Kurdish liberation movement had become a true menace to the authorities. Most importantly, Kurdish fedayeen attacks were obstructing the immigration programs that the Kemalist government was trying to implement. It so happened, that just before the outbreak of the 1925 Kurdish rebellion, Turkish authorities were eagerly working to settle some one hundred thousand Turkic people from the Caucasus, Syria, and Cyprus in Kurdistan and the Eastern [i.e. Armenian, G.M.] vilayets. This immigration project was very important to the Turkish government. In spite of the difficult economic situation that it encountered, the government allocated one million gold coins for this purpose. All this was undertaken to alter the ethnic status quo of the territories under discussion, which was definitely in favor of the Kurds.[76]
Armenians in the homeland and especially in their Diaspora viewed the Kurdish rebellious movements as a blessing. After all, this Kurdish movement was blocking the Turkic immigration wave, which aimed at filling emptied Armenian territories with Turkish muhajirs (immigrants). The A.R.F. was most enthusiastic in defending the Kurdish insurrections. On this occasion Arshak Chamalian (Isahakian) writes in A.R.F. organ Droshak: -

“We are closely monitoring the Kurdish movements and the substantial attacks that the Kurdish fighters are successfully waging against Turkish troops. By so doing, they are preventing the Turkish government from fulfilling its immigration programs of inhabiting Turkish Armenia with new Turkish muhajirs. It is not surprising that this new wave of Turkish Immigration is something that the Kemalist government is trying to successfully accomplish since the singing of the Lausanne Treaty. Sheik Said Ali’s rebellion was a decisive blow to this project, since it compelled the muhajirs to escape from the East and seek refuge in Western Anatolian territories. Hoyboun’s actions obstructed Kemal from accomplishing his dream of brining Turks from Trace, Bulgaria and Rumania and settling them in the eastern vilayets. Those immigrants did not reach beyond Izmir, and it is there that they are staying.”
“We have to realize the great danger behind populating the emptied Armenian lands with the new coming Turkish muhajirs. A project of such magnitude is capable of changing the ethnography of the land; endanger Armenian rights over these places; be a substantial danger to Armenians living in the Trans Caucasian parts of Armenia, since their security will always be compromised. Therefore, even if these Kurdish movements represent no other importance to us Armenians, their obstruction of the Turkish governments immigration policies is reason enough for us to monitor and to support them continuously.”[77]

Mustafa Kemal had no other Choice but to try to subdue the Kurdish danger by crushing the Kurdish rebel forces. He realized that he desperately needed to accomplish this to be freed from the only minority issue remaining in his “homogeneous” republic. Moreover, by annihilating the Kurds, he would open the way to communications with the Turkish people of the Trans-Caucasus -- the still unrealized Pan-Turkish dream. Since he had gotten the “green light” from Communist Russia to oppress the Kurds, thus, with Moscow’s blessing, he started to exert pressure on Iran to allow passage for his troops, so that he could surround Mt. Ararat and strangle the Kurdish rebel nest at Ararat.[78]
Kemal proceeded according to this plan and sent his regiments to the battlefield with orders to besiege Mt. Ararat from all sides. Kurds had prepared for this day. Mt. Ararat was now a bomb waiting to explode at any moment.

A. The Ararat Rebellion

Early in 1930 Turkish troops stationed around Mt. Ararat started their advance. However, they encountered severe losses because they were unable to effectively besiege the rebel mountain. Moreover, Kurdish revolutionaries still enjoyed the benefits of a supply line through the Iranian corridor. Turkey and Communist Russia insisted that European powers--England, in particular-- were aiding the Kurdish rebels both militarily and economically. It was obvious that this Kurdish-Russian ploy was for propaganda purposes and possessed no kernel of truth. All indications showed that the Kurds were cut from the West and left to their fate. Only limited Armenian aid offered by the A.R.F. ever reached the rebels in Ararat. On the other hand, there are indications that some European powers were in fact aiding Kemal. France was the first to follow such a policy. It allowed Turkish troops to utilize the North Syrian railroad system to transport troops to the southern flanks of Mt. Ararat. Moreover, French authorities made sure that no Kurds living in Iraq or Syria were able to cross to Ararat to take part in the rebellion.
The only attempt to reach and help the Kurdish rebels in Ararat was organized by the Iraqi Kurdish leader, Barazani, who crossed the Turkish border via Iraq with some five hundred Kurdish horsemen. However, after encountering numerous confrontations with Turkish troops, he was compelled to return to his base in the mountains of Musul.
Turkey increased its pressure on Iran. It demanded the Shah to open the Iranian border to Turkish troops and to participate in the Turkish military effort to besiege Mt. Ararat, to cut the Kurdish supply lines, and to crush the rebellion.
During the initial stages of the conflict, the Shah sent some regiments to the border. He tried to make it amply clear to the Turkish government that crossing the Iranian border will be considered a hostile act. After a while, however, the Shah gave in to diplomatic pressures from Turkey and the Soviet Union. He opened his border to Turkish troops, who swiftly arranged a security cordon around the Iranian skirts of Mt. Ararat. Thus, the rebels’ only operating passage and link with the outside was lost. The Shah also instructed his regiments not to let the Kurdish rebels to escape to Iran, and to help the Turkish troops in their endeavors.
By now Ararat was completely surrounded. Deprived of new resources and any kind of external help; clustered within a narrow strip of land; having lost their only line of communication and supply, Kurdish freedom fighters were confronted by a regular army equipped with submachine guns, artillery, and even an airforce. The battles were intense; however, Kurds stubbornly continued to defend their strongholds. They were even able to shoot down several Turkish military airplanes.
Meanwhile, a fledgling Turkey was facing huge economic hardships, because of the military expenses it had to incur. The government was on the verge of bankruptcy. The Kurdish uprisings and their human and economic toll made Turks question the validity of their government’s policies. Many opposition leaders started to freely criticize Kemal’s actions. Ismet Pasha, Turkey’s prime minister, tried his best to silence those angry voices. Unable to achieve this peacefully, he utilized his only other alternative, the army. This created a chain reaction, which added to the political and economic turmoil.
The Turkish government tried desperately to strengthen its economic position. Attempts to provide European loans failed. Bankers refused to venture in a country facing severe internal and economic problems. Once again, it was Communist Russia that came to Kemal’s aid. It was through Soviet gold that Kemal was able to continue his war.[79]
Turkish troops continued their military operations in Ararat. Kemal sent all his reserve regiments and even new recruits to the battlefield. Fortified in their high mountain strongholds, Kurds continued to remain adamant and to inflict a heavy loss on the Turkish army. High ranking Turkish officers were outraged by the strong Kurdish defenses. In some instances they had to sacrifice hundreds of Turkish soldiers just to occupy a single Kurdish stronghold.[80]
Kemal was convinced that subduing the Ararat rebellion was only a matter or time. His conviction was based on the facts that Kurds 1) were cut off from all of their communication and supply lines. 2) They had severe shortages of ammunition and food supplies. 3) Turkish offensives, although very costly in terms of number of soldiers lost, wasted huge amounts of Kurdish military supplies. All these factors added to the Kurdish predicament.
On the mountain, beside Kurdish freedom fighters, there were civilians (usually families and relatives of fighters). Supplying them with food and shelter was difficult, especially because winter was so near. Some Kurdish leaders like Ihsan Nuri Pasha thought about leading the people and most of the fighters to other places under the cover of dark. Others, fanatics like Ibrahim Heski Telli, wanted to remain and defend the mountain until the last man. As for the problem that civilian Kurds posed, the extremist Telli advocated killing them all so that their presence and eventual predicament would not weaken the rebels’ will. Telli went as for as trying to kill some members of his own family to set an example for others. Some of his most loyal fighters interfered to stop the madness.[81]
As a last resort, a group of Kurdish fighters were able to open a corridor to the Iranian side of the mountain. Civilian Kurds and many of the fighters used this passage. Once on the other side of the mountain they surrendered to the Iranian authorities. Heski Telli and his ardent followers vanished from site for some months. They took refuge in the caves on the mountaintop. Telli and his devoted fedayeens continued their struggle for two more years until they were all massacred in 1932. Apparently, Telli lived by his vow to fight until the last man…

B. The Kurdish Question in the Second Socialist International

The most active and positive page in the history of Armenian-Kurdish relations was written prior to and during the actual Kurdish rebellions of Dersim and especially Mt. Ararat. The A.R.F. was instrumental in providing much needed aid to the Kurdish national Movement. It provided the moral support that Kurdish warriors needed in their battles against the Turkish armies.
It was within the confines of this moral support that the A.R.F. provided critical help to the Kurdish Revolution and its leading organization, Hoyboun. This was achieved through the channels of the Second Socialist International (S.S.I. hereafter). It was through the dedicated work of Arshak Chamalian, the A.R.F. representative to the S.S.I., that in August of 1930 the General Assembly of the International ratified an important resolution concerning the Kurdish issue. It read as follows:

“The executive of the S.S.I. calls the world’s attention to the massacres which are being committed by the Turkish government. Peaceful Kurdish peasants who have not participated in the Insurrection (Ararat Rebellion) are being exterminated just as the Armenians were. The degree of repression extents far beyond containment of the Kurdish struggle for freedom. Yet Capitalist public opinion has not in any way protested against this bloody savagery.”
[82]
The S.S.I. tried to direct the attention of the European newspapers toward the Kurdish issue. It even utilized its diplomatic channels to bring the matter to the attention of The League of Nations. However, these efforts were defeated because Turkey, being a member of the League, used all of its diplomatic muscle to block the discussion of the Kurdish issue, insisting that it was solely an internal Turkish affair.
The 1930-1931 issues of the A.R.F. organ Droshak are almost entirely dedicated to articles dealing with the debates of the Kurdish issue in the S.S.I. The articles confirm the sympathy and the cooperation of the Armenians and the A.R.F. in particular with the Kurds and their liberation movement.
The A.R.F. did all this with only one goal in mind. To make the world understand that in the far away mountain of Ararat a people was fighting for freedom. It was besieged by regular army battalions that were shelling not only freedom fighters but even families, children, and elderly people.
Chamalian presented a through report regarding the Kurdish Question during the S.S.I. meeting. He tried to clarify the causes that led to the Kurdish resurrections. A historical background of the Kurdish people was delivered to the General Assembly concentrating particularly on the events of the last decade (1920-1930). It emphasized the deportation and relocation policies deployed by the Kemalist government that aimed at the Turkification of the Kurds and their uprooting from their ancestral, national, and historical homeland.[83]
Turkey’s European diplomatic corps and missions tried to rewrite history by presenting events in Kurdistan as “the Turkish government’s effort to silence bands of robbers and criminals who were causing hardships to peaceful peasants.”[84]
European newspapers remained silent about the Kurdish issue. Only a handful of journalistic and diplomatic reports came from that part of the world. Moreover, the validity, and, most importantly, the authenticity of those reports remained questionable.
Contrary to the sympathy that the International’s most influential representatives (like those of France, Great Britain, and Austria) had toward the Kurdish anguish, nothing could be expected from a congress of socialist parties in the midst of capitalist Europe. It was true that the S.S.I. was an international form; however, it did not have the political muscle to force its will over European powers concerning the Kurdish Question. Moreover, the S.S.I. regarded the Kurdish issue as the first phase of a total “Eastern Conflict” that could endanger European peace. From this point of view, the S.S.I. was in favor of a truce between Turks and Kurds. Therefore, it preferred a diplomatic solution to the Kurdish Question.
After quenching the Ararat Rebellion, the Turkish government started implementing a new wave of Kurdish deportation and relocation projects. Turkish troops stationed in Kurdish territories supervised those massive Kurdish deportations to Western Turkey. Simultaneously, thousands of Turkish immigrants were brought to inhabit vacated Kurdish territories. Turkish civil authorities were, by law, urged to assist the military in Kurdish relocation project on condition that “Kurds must not exceed the ten percent limit of the population in the relocated areas.”[85]
Thus, in the winter of 1932, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deported from Kurdistan. Nevertheless, in Dersim Kurds decided to resist deportation and never to leave their homeland. This Kurdish resistance too was crushed by regular Turkish troops. Kurds continued to fight until late in 1937, when the Turkish government was finally able to suppress all of Kurdistan.

C. “The Mountain Turks”!!!

In the following decades, Kurdistan and its people lived in anguish and turmoil. Consecutive Turkish governments suppressed the Kurds and Kurdish spirit. Assimilation, annihilation and Turkification continued. All these measures aimed at making the Kurds believe that they are an inseparable part of the Turkish race and not a distinct ethnic element that possess its own history, civilization, and culture. Kurdish language and literature were banned. The words “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” were omitted from dictionaries and history books. Turkish “scholars” rewrote the history of the Kurds. They became known as “The Mountain Turks.”[86]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLISHED MATERIAL

Altalabani, Jalal, Kurdistan wa Alharaka al Khowmiya al Kurdiya, Tali’a Press,
Beirut, 1971.

Arfa, Hasan, The Kurds, Oxford University Press, New York, 1966.

Chaliand, Gerard, Editor, People Without a Country: Kurds And Kurdistan, Zed
Press, London, 1980.

Edmonds, Cecil John, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1957.

Eagleton, William, Junior, The Kurdish Republic of 1946, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1963.

Fisher, Sydney N., The Middle East: A History, New York, 1965.

Makhmutov, N. Kh., Kurt Zhoghovurde, Haypet Hrat Press, Erevan, 1959.

Malkhas (Hovsepian, Artashes), Aprumner - Jambus Vra, 2 volumes, New York, 1959.

Mazhar, Kamal Ahmad, Kurdistan Fi Sanawat al Harb al Alamiya al Ula, Bagdad,
1977.

Mikayelian, Kristapor, Ampokhayin Tramabanutiun, Hamazkaine Press, Beirut, 1974.

Sasuni, Karo, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere Ev Hay Krtakan Haraberutiunnere,
Hamazkaine Press, Beirut, 1969.

Shiod, M. T., Kurtere Tajgats’ Hayastanum, Pushkinyan Press, St. Petersburg, 1905.

Ter Minassian, Ruben, Hay Heghapokhakani Me Hishataknere, 8 volumes,
Hamazkaine Press, Beirut, 1974.

Varantian Mikayel, Ho.Hi.Ta. Patmutiun, 2 volumes, Geneva, 1910.

Vratzian, Simon, A.R.F. Archives, Batch #s 34-2 & 34-5

HAYRENIK Issues (Chronological)

Ter Minassian, Ruben, “Hayastani Arevelke,” Hayrenik, Boston, 1927, # 11, pp. 94-108.

Sasuni, Karo, “Kurteru Ev Hayeru Azatagrakan Sharzhman Pulere Ev Anonts’ Pokh
Haraberudiunnere,” Hayrenik, Boston, 1929, # 1, pp. 134-145, also 1930, # 7, pp. 124-133, 1930, #12, pp. 134-140.

__________ , “Kurt Azgayin Kusakts’utiune,” Hayrenik, Boston, 1931, # 5, pp. 74-100,
1931, # 6, pp. 125-131.

DROSHAK Issues (Chronological)

Abdul Rahman Bey, “Koch’ Kurterun,” [Kurtlere Khitab], Droshak, 1898, # 6, pp.

Ter Minassian, Ruben, “Krtakan Sharzhume,” Droshak, 1925, # 1, pp. 10-14, 1925, # 2,
pp. 38-40.

Vratzian, Simon, “Hayastane Ev Ir Harevannere,” Droshak, 1925, # 3, pp. 68-71.

Author Unknown, “Krtakan Sharzhume,” Droshak, 1925, # 4, pp. 124-127.

Hakki, Ismail, “Krtakan Apstambutiune,” Droshak, 1925, # 6, pp. 179-182, 1926, # 1,
pp. 18-21.

Chamalian, Arshak, “Viennayi TurkDespanutiune Ev Krtakan Khendire,” Droshak,
1926, # 2, pp. 52-54.

Amatuni, H., “Krtakan Sharzhumnere,” Droshak, 1926, # 4, pp. 110-112.

Vahakn, “Musuli Khendire,” Droshak, 1926, # 6, pp.

Auther Unknown, “Kurt-Trkakan Paykare,” Droshak, 1928, # 1, pp. 29-30.

Auther Unknown, “Krtakan Sharzhume Ev Iran,” Droshak, 1928, # 4, pp.

Ashot, “Krtakan Sharzhume Khorherdayin Aknots’ov,” Droshak, 1928, # 5, pp.

Auther Unknown, “Ararati Krivnere,” Droshak, 1929, # 8, pp. 147-148.

Chamalian, Arshak, “Krtakan harts’e,” Droshak, 1930, # 8, pp. 185-188.

________________, “Krtakan Harts’e Internats’ionalum,” Droshak, 1930, # 8, pp

Sasuni, Karo, “Krtakan Apstambutiune,” Droshak, 1930, # 8, pp. 191-196.

__________, “Krtakan Sharzhume,” Droshak, 1931, # 1-2, pp. 11-14.

Misakian Shavarsh, “Tashnak-Hoyepun,” Droshak, 1931, # 3, pp.

Chamalian, Arshak, “Krtrakan harts’e Internats’ionalum,” Droshak, 1931, # 3, pp. ,
1931, # 2, pp. 77-80.

PATMABANASIRAKAN HANDES Issues (Chronological)

Poladyan, A.B., “Kurtistane Arach’in Hamashkharhayin Paterazmi Tarinerin,”
Patmabanasirakan Handes, Erevan, 1979, # 2, pp. 259-262.

Jalali, Jalal, “Bitlisi 1914 Tvi Krtakan Apstamputiune Hay mamuli Gnahatmamb,”
Patmabanasirakan Handes, Erevan, 1985, # 4, pp.126-134.

AZDAK Issues (Chronological)

Sasuni, Armen, “Kurt Azgayin Sharzhume,” Azdak, Beirut, 1927, # 1, p. 2.

____________, “Krtakan Sharzhume Ke Dz’avali,” Azdak, Beirut, 1927, # 17, p.1.

Author(s) Unknown, Reports, “Azat Ev Ankakh Kurtistan, Azdak, Beirut, 1927, # 28, p.
1, # 34, p. 1, # 44, pp, 1-2.

____________, “Krtakan Apstambutiune,” Azdak, Beirut, 1927, # 52, p. 1,
# 56, p. 1.

____________, “Krtakan Sharzhumnere,” Azdak, Beirut, 1927, # 62, p 1, #
67, p. 1, # 72, p.1, # 78, p. 1, 1928, # 93, p. 1.

Author Unknown, “Krtakan Sharzhumnere Ev Arab Terti Me Mtahogutiunnere,” Azdak,
Beirut, 1928, # 92, p. 1.

___________, “Kurt Ev Trkakan Kurtistani Krivnere,” Azdak, Beirut, 1928, # 129, p.1.

___________, “Krtakan Krivnere,” Azdak, Beirut, 1928, # 122, p. 1.

___________, “Krtakan Ch’ardere,” Azdak, Beirut, 1928, # 122, p. 1.
[1] Karo, Sasuni, “Kurteru Ev Hayeru Azatagrakan Sharzhman Pulere Ev Anonts' Pokh
Haraberutiunnere,” Hayrenik, 1929, # 1, p. According to more recent research concerning the origins of Indo-European peoples, the British linguist-archeologist, Robert Renfrew [The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins] as well as the Russian and Georgian historians, Ivanof and Komgralitse respectively, attest that the Kurds too are of Indo-European stock. Therefore, they can be considered as the original inhabitants of the region under discussion.

[2] Ibid, It is important to note here that Sasuni cites the terms of the treaty from a
Hoyboun (Kurdish National Organization, or Committee for Kurdish
Independence) publication.

[3] Leo, Hayotz Patmutiun, Vol. III, Erevan, 1946, p. 178. Here, the famous Armenian Historian analyzes why the Ottoman Sultan was showing a friendly attitude toward the Kurdish princes. It was through such policies that the sultan was able to bring the popular Kurdish Mulla Idris of Bitlis to his camp. Mulla Idris worked ardently for the Ottoman cause; accepted bribes; with his furious religious speeches motivated thousands of Kurds to come and live in the northern areas of Lake Van (thus overlapping land which were historically Armenian); thus securing the border against any Persian intervention. In a similar fashion, a Kurdish author, Makhmutov, adds that the Kurds who were living in Erzerum and Van were actually from Diarbekir. They had migrated to those areas because of Mulla Idris’s motivational tactics. According to Makhmutov, “Mulla Idris did accomplish Turkish policies even at the expense of his own people, the Kurds.” N. Makhmutov Kh., Kurt Zhoghovurte, Haybed Hrad Press, Erevan, 1959, p. 110.

[4] Sasuni, “Kurderu Eva Hayeru Azatagrakan,” p. 45

[5] Gerard, Chaliand, Ed., People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan,
Zed Press, London, 1980, p. 26. The quotation is from Kendal, whose paper appears in the above-mentioned volume, with the title “The Kurds Under Ottoman Rule.”

[6] Ibid, p. 27.

[7] Ibid, p. 27. Also see: Arshak, Safrastian, Kurds And Kurdistan, Harvic Press,
London, 1948, p. 52.

[8] Chaliand, People Without, p. 27. Also see: Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp.
86-89.

[9] In 1839 the Ottomans suffered a serious defeat at Nazib (in Syria) against the forces
of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Egypt’s viceroy, Mohamed Ali.

[10] Chaliand, People Without, p. 29. Also see: Safrastian, Kurds and Kurdistan, p. 55.

[11] Chaliand, People Without, p. 29. Also see: Sydney, Fisher N., The Middle East: A
History, New York, 1965, p. 331.

[12] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin, pp. 101-103. According to Makhmutov, Amir Bedir Khan did not enjoy friendly relations with the Christians living in his domain. Makhmutov implies directly that the Amir had no intention of establishing any friendly relations with those Christians. In this author’s opinion, such an analysis is vague and confusing. The mere fact that Bedir Khan intended to establish communications with Russia and Georgia necessitated that he create friendly ties with his Armenian, Assyrian, Nestorian and other Christian subjects, even if he was not sincere in his intentions. It follows that Armenians even participated in his army (although in very small numbers), Makhmutov, Kurt Zhoghovurte, p. 30.

[13] Chaliand, People Without, p. 120. Also see: Makhmutov, Kurt Zhoghovurte, p. 120. The major difference between Kendal and Makhmutov is that according to the latter Yezdansher had an army of one hundred thousand soldiers in February 1855. According to Kendal, Yezdansher’s army grew to that number only late in the summer of 1855. There is a time gap of almost nine months. Kendal’s time frame seems to be more accurate. If Yezdansher had his massive army in February, why would he lose such valuable time and postpone the offensive (winter was not a problem, and the element of surprise was to be lost, G.M.) just for the sake of establishing communications with the Russians of which he was not so sure anyway?

[14] The indication is of the Crimean War during which European powers joined forces
with the Ottomans to defeat Russia and thus preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The defeat was a decisive blow for the Russians, especially for their southwestern expansion. The outcome of the war was a shameful treaty that compelled the Russians to postpone their expansion policy by some twenty years (1875-1876).

[15] Chaliand, People Without, p. 30.

[16] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, p. 138.

[17] Ibid, pp. 139-140.

[18] Chaliand, People Without, p. 31.

[19] Ibid, pp. 31-32.

[20] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin, pp. 145-146.

[21] Makhmutov, Kurt Zhoghovurte, p. 129

[22] Sources do not label this rebellion a “national liberation movement.” However, one must take into consideration the tribal status quo of the Kurds itself was a primary obstacle for the propagation of national liberation sentiments in the population. It is therefore important to look at the events from this perspective.

[23] Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru Azatagrakan Sharzhman Pulere,” Hayrenik, 1930, # 7, p. 124.

[24] Chaliand, People Without, p. 33.

[25] For information regarding the organization and the ideology of its leaders see:
Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru”, Hayrenik, 1930, # 7, p.124.

[26] Ibid, p. 124.

[27] Ibid, pp. 125-127. Also see: Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 162-166.

[28] Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru”, p. 127.

[29] For more information about the 1894-96 insurrection in Sasun see: Ruben, Ter Minassian, Hay Heghabokhagani me Hishataknere, Hamazkaine Press, Beirut, 1974, Vol. III, pp. 70-113. Also see: Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 166-169, and
Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru”, pp. 127-128.

[30] The number of Armenians massacred is a matter of debate. While some sources
estimate it at about three hundred thousand, others, like Sydney Fisher figure it at around one hundred thousand. This numbers represent Armenians who were massacred in Sasun, the eastern vilayets and also in pogroms in and around the capital city, Istanbul during 1894-96. Nevertheless, what all sources agree upon is that these “Hamidian Massacres” (After sultan Abdul Hamid, who instigated them) were the first planned [G.M.] extermination that the Ottoman government undertook. Moreover, the magnitude of these massacres show, that they exceeded all previous forms of atrocities committed against Armenians in the empire.

[31] Sasuni, “Kurteru Ev Hayeru,” pp. 1280129.

[32] Ter Minassian, Hay Heghapokhakani, Vol. II, p. 106. About the battles of Vaspurakan, see: Ibid, pp. 93-106. About the life and work of Rev. Vartan, Hrayr, Keri, and other Armenian patriots who were the real advocates of Armenian-Kurdish cooperation and friendship see: Ter Minassian, Hay Heghapokhakani, Vol. III, pp. 130-140, 240-270. As for the 1904 second rebellion of Sasun, first Ter Minassian’s voluminous work contains an abundance of first hand information about it, since he was present and an eye witness of the events he describes.

[33] The Khanasor Expedition is a huge subject in itself. It can easily be the topic of another research narrative because it possesses a momentous literature of its own. In the context of this narrative, it was cited as an example of the armed propaganda that the A.R.F. deployed to show that Armenians were not going to remain passive, but would even retaliate-- with force if necessary—to protect their lives and fortunes.

[34] Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru,” p. 129.

[35] Ibid, pp. 130-133. Regarding this matter also see: Abdul Rahman Bey, “Koch Kurterun"[Kurtlere Khitab], Droshak, 1898, # 6, p. 51. Droshak published the Armenian version of said document. On the other hand, the A.R.F. was instrumental in procuring thousands of copies of the pamphlet in Turkish to distribute it in Kurdistan.

[36] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 185-188.

[37] Ibid, pp. 189-191. An example of this sort of Turkish treachery is Ghasem Beg, who joined the ranks of the A.R.F. and even became a member of one of its regional committees. He assumed the name “Nor Melik” (New Prince, G.M.) However, He committed a dreadful crime that caused the death of several devoted and seasoned Armenian freedom fighters, fedayeens. According to Ter Minassian, Ghasem Beg invited the fedayeens who were visiting his village to his home where he fed them and then, with his accomplices, killed them while they were fast asleep.

[38] Chaliand, People Without, p. 34.

[39] Ibid, p. 35.

[40] Ibid, pp. 35-36

[41] Ibid, p. 36

[42] Jalil, Jalali, “Bitlisi 1914 Tvi Krtagan Apstambutiune Hay Mamuli Gnahatmamb,” Patmabanasirakan Handes, Erevan, 1985, # 4, pp. 127-130.

[43] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, p. 206.

[44] Chaliand, People Without, p. 37. Zia Gukalp, the exponent of Pan-Turanism or Pan-Turkism, was from Diarbekir. He was able to influence the Young Turks with his extremely poetic, yet at the same time politically extremist literature. The leaders of the Young Turks became his ardent followers. Also important in this regard was Ahmed Akchura, another proponent of Pan-Turkism, whose writing gained him a following within the ranks of the Young Turks.

[45] Chaliand, People Without, p. 37.

[46] Sasuni, “Kurteru Ev Hayeru Azatagrakan,” p. 134.

[47] When Turks and Kurds were drafted into the army, the former took part in the Armenian Conscription Committees, while the latter joined the Hamidiye bands, thus remaining in their own territory or region. As for the Armenian villagers, it was almost impossible for them to pay the “Badali Askariye,” (conscription exemption fee or tax) because, simply put; they could not afford it. A famous scenario was that Hamidiye bands would attack Armenian villages and rob the villagers just prior to the visit of the Conscription Committee officials. Unable to rescue their young men, they were dragged into the army to serve in remote areas, often in “work battalions.” On the other hand, searching for Armenian deserters was often enough for Turkish regular troops to surround Armenian villages and towns causing great hardship to the inhabitants. Only the mountainous regions of Sasun remained exempt from military draft. While young Armenians from Mush, Van, Bitlis and other eastern vilayets were drafted only to join “work battalions” and then to be massacred once their roles were fulfilled.

[48] Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru Azatagrakan,” p. 135.

[49] Chaliand, People Without, p. 38.

[50] Sasuni, “Kurteru Eva Hayeru Azatagrakan,” pp. 135-136.
[51] Ibid, p. 137

[52] Ibid, p. 138.

[53]Chaliand, People Without, p. 39.

[54] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, p. 231.

[55] Ibid, p. 234.

[56]Ibid, pp. 234-235. Also see: Simon, Vrats'ian, A.R.F. Archives, # 34-2, Boston, Mass.
Vratsian was a leading A.R.F. figure. During the period of the Armenian Republic (1918-1920) he served twice as prime minister.

[57] Vratsian, Archives, # 34-5. This document represents a copy of the original response that the two Armenian delegations sent to the Armenian newspapers of the day. Both delegations tried to make it clear that no concessions were made to the Kurds during the negotiations.

[58] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 236-238. Also see: Chaliand, People Without, pp. 41-42.

[59] Chaliand, People Without, p. 43.

[60]Chaliand, People Without, p. 55.

[61] Ibid, p. 59-60.

[62] Hakki, “Krtakan Apstambutiune,” Droshak, 1926, #6, pp. 179-182.
[63] Chaliand, People Without, p. 60. Also see: Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, p. 240. According to Sasuni, the organization was founded in October 1920, with the objective of liberating Kurdistan from Turkish rule. On the other hand, Kendal shifts the founding of the organization and the Central Committee to 1922. Kendal’s date, i.e. 1922 is more plausible, since in 1920 Kurds and their leaders were still followers of Kemal and were engaging their capabilities against the Republic of Armenia.

[64] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 242-244. After the fall of the independent Armenian Republic, A.R.F. leaders and members at large were forced to exile and to an eventual process of reorganization. In this regard, many exiled leaders were in favor of close cooperation with the Kurds. It follows, therefore, that this exiled A.R.F. leadership was instrumental in the formation of Hoyboun, and the preparations for the Ararat Rebellion. It is perhaps worth mentioning, that an agreement was signed between the A.R.F. and the Kurdish national Movement (Hoyboun) in 1924, with the purpose of rejuvenating the Treaty of Sevres and accepting the articles of that treaty as a determinant for the boundaries between Armenia and Kurdistan.

[65] Hakki, “Krtakan,” p. 182. Also see: Chaliand, People Without, p. 61.

[66] Hakki, “Krtakan,” p. 182.

[67]Chaliand, People Without, p. 63.

[68] Sasuni, “Kurt Azgayin Kusaksutiune,” Hayrenik, 1931, # 5, p. 75.

[69] Ibid, p. 76.

[70]Chaliand, People Without, p. 63.

[71]Sasuni, “Kurt Kusaksutiune,” p. 77.

[72] Ibid, p. 78.

[73] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 255-266.

[74] Chaliand, People Without, p. 64.

[75] During the beginning stages of the Ararat Rebellion, Armenian-Kurdish cooperation was achieved through the efforts of Ziylan Bey, known to be one of the most famous rebels on the mountain. The shocking reality is that Ziylan Bey was not Kurdish but Armenian from the Khnus village of Sasun. His real name was Artashes Muradian. Sasuni, who knew Ziylan Bey-Artashes Muradian adds: “Ziylan Bey, who was none other than Artashes Muradian from Khnus. He was a devoted A.R.F. agent sent secretly by the party to Ararat with the purpose of strengthening Armenian-Kurdish relations and helping the Kurds in their utmost struggle. Today, after twenty four years, we can openly declare the Armenian identity of Ziylan Bey.” Ziylan Bey (Artashes Muradian) was ambushed and killed by communist spies who had infiltrated the ranks of the rebels on Mt. Ararat. Sasuni also mentions that Ziylan Bey was only one of the scores of Armenian freedom fighters in the Ararat Rebellion. His case is publicized because he had attained a certain level of leadership in the rebellion. The identities of other Armenians-- disguised as Kurds-- in the rebellion still remains to be determined. Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, p. 284.

[76] Ibid, p. 285.

[77] Arshak, Chamalian, “Krtakan Harts'e,” Droshak, 1930, # 1, p. 185.

[78] Ibid, pp. 185-186.

[79] Sasuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhumnere, pp. 290-291.

[80] Ibid, p. 292.

[81] Ibid, p. 293.

[82] Chaliand, People Without, p. 66.

[83] Chamalian, “Krtakan Harts'e Internats'ionalum,” Droshak, 1931, # 3, p. 46 , # 4, pp. 77-80.

[84] Author Unknown, “Viennayi Turk Despanutiune Eva Krtakan Khendire,” Droshak, 1926, # 2, pp. 52-54. The article starts with a reprint of a communiqué issued by the Turkish Embassy at Vienna, which states that all news materials printed in the newspapers of the day concerning the Kurdish resurrections are untrue “…and full of lies.” It also accuses Armenians and the A.R.F. in particular for being the source of these news. The second part of the article is a response by Arshak Chamalian. He defends the justness of the Kurdish rebellion as well as the A.R.F. position regarding the Kurdish issue.

[85] Chaliand, People Without, p. 66.

[86] Ibid, p. 68.

CILICIA UNDER FRENCH MANDATE, 1918-1921‎

2008-05-15T18:20:00.000-07:00

CILICIA UNDER FRENCH MANDATE, 1918-1921:
Armenian Aspirations, Turkish Intrigues, and French Double Standards

GARABET K. MOUMDJIAN

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Cilicia, an Ottoman region in the southeastern corner of Asia Minor, was brought under French control from December 1918 until October 1921. The initial months of occupation were marked by measures taken first by the British and then by the French to bring over 170,000 Armenian refugees back to their homes. The majority of repatriates were Cilician Armenians, whom the Turks had forcibly deported to the Syrian Desert in 1915.
During the war, the Allied powers had repeatedly assured Armenians and other minorities of the empire that they were soon to be freed from the Turkish yoke. The French, at least during the initial stage of their occupation of Cilicia, tried to repopulate the region with Armenians. Encouraged by French support, Armenians hoped to create an autonomous Armenian entity in Cilicia.[1]
The rise of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal, ethnic rivalries between Armenians and Turks, and a shift in French policy to one of rapprochement and then of agreement with the Turkish nationalist movement shattered Armenian dreams and compelled thousands of Armenians to forsake the area with the retreating French forces.
On October 30, 1918, aboard the British battleship Agamemnon anchored in the Turkish port of Mudros, the representatives of a defeated Ottoman Empire signed a humiliating document of surrender. The Turkish defeat in the battle of Arara (Palestine, September 1918) against the Allied expeditionary force under the command of General Edmund Allenby was a major factor in forcing the Ottoman Empire out of World War I. According to the stipulations of the armistice, the defeated Ottomans had to accept the Allied occupation of those Ottoman territories that were considered "strategic" for preserving peace. Moreover, article 16 of the Mudros Armistice stated, among other things, that the defeated Turkish army -- stationed at the time in Adana, Cilicia -- was to retreat north of the Bozanti-Hajin-Marash line, where its soldiers were to be demobilized. Accordingly, the British were to occupy the province of Adana and to place military units in the highly strategic Amanus and Taurus tunnel system that was still under construction.[2] The British were the first to send their forces to Cilicia after the armistice. The British thought they could hold on to Cilicia even though that was contrary to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement by which Britain and France had practically divided the Levant between themselves.[3] The agreement stated that, in the event of an Allied victory, France was to acquire Syria together with Cilicia and other territories in eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia.[4]
Towards the end of December 1918, a French civil administration with small French military contingents was installed in Cilicia. However, because of the lack of sufficient forces, the British remained for one more year. The British and thereafter the French encouraged Armenians who had been deported from Cilicia to repatriate. As a result, over 170,000 Armenian refugees returned. However, postwar rivalries between the French and British allies on the one hand, and Kemalist incursions, on the other, gradually destroyed Armenian aspirations towards an autonomous Cilicia. On October 21, 1921, France signed the Ankara Agreement with the Kemalists and relinquished Cilicia to them.[5] By January 1922 the region was brought under Kemalist control.
This paper focuses on the province of Adana from the repatriation of Armenians in late 1918 to their subsequent evacuation. Issues such as the characteristics of the French civil and military administrations, Franco-Turkish, Franco-Armenian, and Armeno-Turkish relations, the Cilician economy during French occupation, the deployment of the Armenian Legion in Cilicia, and Armenian national and communal life in Cilicia will be assessed. Although the scope of this paper is the plain of Cilicia, an area encompassing the cities of Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, Jihun, Osmaniye, Deort-Yol, Toprak-Kale, Ayas, Payas, and Alexandretta, the main focus will be on the provincial capital of Adana.

THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION

In accordance with the stipulations of the Mudros Armistice, British forces occupied Cilicia in November 1918. It remained under direct British control until February 1919, when a French civil administration was installed there (although British forces remained in Cilicia until the end of 1919). During the four months of British control, the existing Ottoman administration was kept intact awaiting new orders from Jerusalem, the Allied headquarters in the Levant, as to how it should be replaced. Because of this uncertainty, many of the cadres of the Turkish army defied the order to retreat, and were placed in the still-intact Ottoman administration.[6] It was these new Turkish officials that, disguised under their new administrative titles, constituted the nuclei of the Kemalist committees, which became a menace to the French administration during the following three-year period.[7] Moreover, Turkish and French sources agree that retreating Turkish troops sold or simply left a good portion of their weapons (totaling some twenty five thousand rifles and depots of ammunition) behind for the Turkish population. These were hidden in underground caches.[8]
The armistice also tolerated the formation of a gendarme unit, all of whose three thousand members were recruited from among the retreating Turkish troops.[9] This police force was put under the command of Colonel Hashim Bye, an ex-Ottoman officer who "was continuing to wage war against the allies."[10]
Because of the numeric weakness of French combatants in the Levant, the Allied headquarters in Jerusalem agreed to keep the nineteenth Indian Brigade of the British army, under the command of General Norman Leslie, in Cilicia.[11] In December 1918, the Legion Arménienne, which was stationed in the city of Beirut after the victory at Arara, was sent to Cilicia under the command of lieutenant colonel Louis Romieu. The fourth battalion of the Armenian legion was stationed in Alexandretta (Iskandarun), and its units were deployed in that port city, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, and Baghche. The first, second, and third battalions went ashore at the port of Mersin and were deployed in Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, Jihun, and the outpost of Bozanti.[12] Thus, a relatively small force of five thousand Armenian soldiers had to secure an area of fifty thousand square kilometers. [13]
Although the French brought in some Algerian battalions after the British left, the insufficient number of French soldiers in the province continued to be a real problem for the French administration. Moreover, problems created by the shortage of combatants were worsened by the lack of munitions, fuel, food, and means of transportation. [14]

Problems the French faced in Cilicia

The Allied headquarters divided the Levant into four occupational territories. Cilicia comprised the Northern Occupation Territory with the city of Adana as its administrative center.[15] Colonel Edouard Bremond, whom the French government named administrator-in-chief of Cilicia, arrived in Adana on February 1, 1919, and assumed his duties as the head of the civil administration of the province. [16] The cities of Marash, Aintab, Urfa, and Kilis were not incorporated within the jurisdiction of the French administration. Instead, they were assigned to a newly established fifth occupational zone and put under the command of the British Desert Mounted Corps whose administrative center was in Aleppo.[17]
At the time when the French civil and military administrations had started to organize and regulate living conditions in Cilicia, Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Armenia[18] and one of the signatories of the Sykes-Picot agreement --whose position and duties, according to Bremond, were "poorly defined and subsequently caused much friction between him and the local officials in Cilicia and elsewhere"[19] -- encouraged and even urged Armenian deportees stationed in Syria to repatriate to Cilicia.[20] A total of 120,000 deportees, mostly women, children, and elderly people thus returned home. They were transported to Adana by railway, where they were temporarily assigned to specially built camps awaiting orders from the French administration that would allow them to reclaim their towns and villages.[21] During this same period, some fifty thousand Armenian deportees repatriated to their cities and villages in the Eastern Occupation Zone under the command of the British Desert Mounted Corps.[22]
Colonel Bremond's administration was put to its first test in the beginning days of April 1919. On the sixth day of the month, a special administrative order was released from the office of the Chief of Administration stating that “all lands and properties, movable or otherwise, which belonged to Armenians prior to their deportation in 1915 and were later confiscated by local Turkish authorities and distributed among the Turks in Cilicia, had to be returned to their original owners in a period of two months." Moreover, the administrative order stated that even if people had actually bought such properties from the Turkish authorities, they should immediately return them to their original owners if they were claimed as such. The newly revived Agricultural Bank was to compensate those who had bought such properties.[23]
The Turks, to whom the administrative order was apparently directed, regarded the French demand as an infringement on their rights. The French administration did not initiate this order, but rather acted on instructions received from Allied headquarters in Jerusalem. As soon as it had divided the Levant into several occupation zones, the Allied headquarters had formed a special committee that sat in Haifa, Palestine, to decide on what action to take to enable deportees to repossess their lands and properties after repatriation. The committee had studied the issue and had presented its recommendations to Allied headquarters, which, in turn, had instructed French and British administrations in the occupational zones to act in accordance with the presented recommendations.[24]
Turkish sources have more than bitter words for the special court system that the French administration had formed to look after and decide in land ownership cases. Rejep Dalkir, a former officer in the Turkish army who, through the help of some influential Turks, had remained behind and had assumed an administrative position in the Sis (Kozan) municipality, blames the French for the initiation of the Tesviye-i Mesalih Komisyoni (Brokerage for Settlement of [Property] Rights) courts. He writes in his memoirs that this court system was established to benefit Armenian "settlers" by confiscating Turkish lands and handing them over to Armenians without proper judicial procedures.[25] It must be noted, however, that the activities of the aforementioned court were limited to only a few hundred cases, not all of which were decided in favor of Armenian plaintiffs. Often, Armenians, because of their sudden and panicky deportation in 1915, had left everything behind and hence could not produce the proper Tapus (Tapu, Turkish for land deeds) to reclaim their properties. Moreover, if unjust acts of land confiscation had actually occurred, it is to be assumed that almost all such cases had to taken place near or around the major cities where French protection was provided, since no Armenian could have ventured to confiscate lands from Turks in the remote villages. In any case, Armenians did not have a free hand in confiscating Turkish properties, since the French administration, in its effort to reestablish law and order, would not allow them to do so. Moreover, Turkish peasants, encouraged by Kemalist agitators, disrupted the implementation of the orders of the arbitrating court. Dalkir and other Turkish sources do not mention the fact that after the deportation of the Armenians in 1915, the Turkish government had relocated some eight thousand Turkish muhajirs (refugees) from the Balkans and Russia into Cilicia and had allowed them to settle on Armenian properties.[26] It caused the French administration much hardship to send some of these families back to where they had come from, while the rest continued to dwell on their newly acquired properties

Suffice it to say that the French administration made special arrangements for all non-Cilician Armenians repatriating to Cilicia. These people, together with Cilicians from the remote villages of the province, were settled in tent towns in the provincial capital of Adana, which had an Armenian refugee population of sixty thousand.[27] Since the French administration was unable to resettle these people in their old villages, it had to shoulder the heavy economic burden of feeding and providing shelter for a refugee population numbering in the thousands.[28] The inability of the French to resettle these people strengthened the Kemalists who were encouraging Turkish peasants to hinder the resettlement of the Armenians.[29] Turkish sources maintain that the Turkish population defied the orders of the arbitrating court in such places as Kozan, Fekke, Kars-Pazar, and Harouniye. [30] Wherever the population was unable to accomplish this end, Turkish bandits roaming the plain completed the task. A case in point is an incident that took place in the village of Sheikh Murad near Adana, where Turkish chetes (guerrilla fighters) murdered several Armenian peasants in front of their families.[31] For Armenians, this and several similar incidents were sufficient to question the capability of the French administration to protect their lives. The cruelty of the Turkish bandits convinced Armenians that it was safer to remain as refugees in Adana rather than to venture in small, vulnerable numbers in the outlying villages.
The arbitrating court posed problems and created friction between Turks and Armenians in Deort-Yol, Hasan-Beyli, Harouniye, and other places.[32] The French were unable to calm the situation. It can be argued with certainty that the inability of the French to confront this issue was due mainly to the limited number of their forces in Cilicia. Therefore, Pierre Redan's estimate that "the arbitrating court solved the problem (i.e. the land ownership issues) and contented both parties with their decisions" [33]cannot be readily accepted.
Another issue that damaged French prestige in Cilicia was the court's decision to bring some Unionist (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) perpetrators of the 1915 genocide to justice. This court turned out to be a complete failure. Presided over by an ex-Ittihadist judge and having a Greek as an inquisition officer, the court considered only a fraction of the cases brought before it by the French administration and Armenian organizations. After several months of interrogations and deliberations, not even one Turkish official was convicted.[34]
Kemalist cells and their development

Cilicia was the first Turkish territory that the Kemalists “liberated" from the Allied powers in their “War of Independence." The paucity of French forces in Cilicia was one of the main reasons for the Kemalists to have the province in the forefront of their struggle for liberation. Besides, Cilicia was the only area under Allied occupation that had kept its Ottoman administration intact, operable, and willing to help Kemal in his struggle against the Allies. Cilicia was thus totally different from Syria, where all Ottoman functionaries were deposed and replaced by French or local officials.[35]
Nazim Bey, who was the Vali (governor) of the province when the British and the French occupied it, saw to it that during the few months that he remained in office (until September 1919) ex-Ittihadist and Kemalist propagandists had a free hand in disseminating their ideology within the Turkish population. It seems that the vali was not content with helping Turkish agitators. He was personally involved in the organization of a secret network of "Union and Progress" party cells in almost all the major cities and towns. One of his associates, Nehad Pasha, was even encouraged by the governor "to form Islamic organizations directed against the Christian population and the French Administration".[36]
Turkish sources confirm that Ittihadist and Kemalist committees were active in Cilicia during the first months of the British occupation. Those committees were being nourished by such organizations as the Kilikia Mudafaa-i Hukuk Jemiyeti (Organization for the Defense of Kilikia's Rights), which was formed in Constantinople by some Cilician Turks, who soon after dispatched some of their members to Cilicia.[37] Apparently, the committees were directed against the Allied occupiers. Turkish agitators tried hard to convince the Turkish population that only an armed struggle could liberate Cilicia from the French.
On 28 April, 1919, Colonel Bremond, head of the French administration in Cilicia, issued yet another crucial order demanding the population to hand over all weapons to the French authorities within twenty four hours.[38] The order was generated from Constantinople where General Allenby was on a short visit. Allenby’s fiat was conducted masterfully in the areas under British Rule including the Eastern Occupational zone (Marash, Aintab, and Kilis).[39]
Once again it was obvious that the order was directed against the Turks. In February 1919, the French administration had uncovered a secret plan that called upon the Turkish population to participate in riots and take up arms against the French administration. The French order was thus intended to disarm the Turks and lessen the possibility of any new uprising. As in the case of the April 6 order, this one too was not vigorously imposed, even though one Turkish author exaggerates by writing that "Turks were thus deprived even from carrying their hunting rifles," or that "some of those who defied the order were punished by being drowned in the Sihun River."[40]
Another issue that became a source of friction between the Turks and the French authorities in Cilicia was that of the French tricolor replacing the Ottoman flag. As an occupied area of the Ottoman Empire, Cilicia was to fly the flag of the victors, in this case, that of the French. However, the replacement of the flag was totally unacceptable to the Ittihadists and Kemalists whose agitators used the issue to stir up Turkish nationalist emotions against the French. Trouble came on March 18, 1919, on the occasion of the French High Commissioner's visit to Cilicia. In preparing for Georges Picot's official visit, the French Administration had decorated the main boulevards of Adana with thousands of French tricolors. In some places the Armenian tricolor, the banner of the newly established Armenian Republic in the Caucasus, was raised alongside the French insignia. According to Turkish sources, the raising of the French and especially the Armenian tricolors was an insult that the Turks could not tolerate. For Turks, the question was one of national honor. Encouraged by Ottoman officials, some Turks desperately tried to fly the Ottoman banner on all official buildings and schools. The French responded by apprehending some of the vandals and imprisoning them for short periods of time.[41]
The involvement of Turkish officials in anti-French activities was one of the delicate issues that faced the French in Cilicia. French authorities had virtually no control over the activities of the vali and the high-ranking Ottoman officials. The only instance in which the French authorities took a firm stand against the still operating Ottoman administration was immediately following the disturbances that took place in the beginning of February 1919. Some of the Turkish agitators arrested during the initial rioting in Adana confessed that an uprising of much greater magnitude was being prepared. Moreover, the French authorities uncovered the plan for a general armed resistance in which the complicity of the vali, Nazim Bey, and the commander of the gendarme force, Hashim Bey, was apparent. The French had reason to suppose that the two officials were organizing Turks and arming them to overthrow the French administration. Only when all evidence became clear were the French authorities able to ask to depose the vali. Nazim Bey handed in his resignation and was soon called to Constantinople. He was replaced by Jelal Bey, who continued his predecessor's work and even surpassed him. As for Hashim Bey, he, as head of the gendarme force, was under French jurisdiction. As soon as the investigation was over, a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was apprehended and sent to serve his prison term in Syria, where he eventually died.[42]
General Leslie, a British officer who was at the time acting as the commander of the Allied occupation forces in Cilicia, appointed the French Captain Luppe as the new inspector-in-chief of the three thousand man gendarme force. The latter assumed his duties on April 24, 1919. His first task was to reduce the force to two thousand two hundred men by ousting all the suspicious elements that were involved in the uprising plan. Captain Luppe enlisted some five hundred Armenians and other Christians into the force.[43]
The mild French response to Turkish agitation coupled with the administration's inability to implement sound policies created suspicions within the Armenians. Obviously, Armenians wanted more than what the French were able to deliver. The major setback in French-Armenian relations occurred towards the end of 1919, when the French High Commissioner in the Levant, Georges Picot, not only halted the process of Armenian repatriation to Cilicia, but he even ventured to travel to Ankara to meet with Kemal. Picot's visit to Ankara--which he undertook upon completing his mission in the Levant--was a turning point in French policy toward Armenians in Cilicia. Moreover, Picot's visit and the change in French attitudes regarding Armenians coincided with the presentation of the somewhat inflated Armenian demands to the Peace Conference in Paris.[44]
The Delegation of Integral Armenia, headed by Avetis Aharonian, representative of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, and Boghos Nubar Pasha, representative of the National Armenian Delegation, introduced an Armenian agenda to the Peace Conference, which stated, among other things, that Cilicia was to be made part of the Armenian state to be created by the Allies.[45] The Armenian demand of encompassing Cilicia in the future Armenian state was alarming to the French. It became a major consideration in the change of French policy towards Armenians in Cilicia. Picot, who at the beginning of 1919 had assured Armenians that he was doing everything in his power to encourage massive Armenian repatriation to Cilicia, declared after a few months that the repatriation process was an expensive venture that had cost the French treasury more than ninety million francs, and had to be halted because of insufficient funding.[46]
On leaving the Levant, Picot went to Ankara and met with Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, who was fighting to oust the French from Cilicia. Picot's visit was to clear obstacles against Franco-Turkish cooperation as was manifested in the signing of the Ankara Treaty in October 1921. Although some French sources emphasize the fact that in traveling to Ankara Picot was acting in accordance with the recommendation of the French government that was furious at Armenian demands concerning Cilicia, Bremond finds the visit contradictory to Allied and French policies in the Levant. He also states that Allied headquarters in Jerusalem and Constantinople criticized Picot’s meeting with Kemal.[47]
Picot's visit damaged the prestige of the French administration in Cilicia. The Kemalists realized that French interest in the area was decreasing. Accordingly, Kemalist attacks on French occupation forces gained momentum during the period immediately after the visit. The last of the British forces left Cilicia in November 1919. The departure of the much-needed British regiments created new problems. The French High Commissariat in Beirut tried to remedy the situation by dispatching several companies under the command of General Dufieux to Cilicia. Upon arrival, Dufieux was named commander-in-chief of the French occupation forces in Cilicia. He assumed his duties on December 2, 1919.[48]
The arrival of General Dufieux coincided with that of the newly appointed vali, Jelal Bey, whom Constantinople had sent to replace the deposed governor, Nazim Bey. The new vali was an Ittihadist functionary whom Bremond describes as "intractably Francophobe." [49] Jelal Bye not only neglected the existence of the French administration and encouraged local Turks to rebel against the occupation forces, but he was instrumental in strengthening and furthering the cause of anti-French groups.[50] Moreover, Jelal Bey’s appointment was contrary to the stipulations of the 1918 armistice in that Constantinople had designated him without asking for the consent of Allied headquarters.[51] Turkish historian Kasim Ener writes that, upon his arrival to Adana, Jelal Bey was greeted by a delegation comprised of Turkish eshraf (notables), Ittihadist leaders, and undercover Kemalists with whom he conferred for two days: "As soon as [Jelal Bey] arrived at Adana, he became a member of the Kemalist Party formed by the ex-deputy Subhi Pasha. Subhi Pasha and his brother, Kadri in Adana, Sadik Pasha in Tarsus and his son-in-law, Hakki Bey were against the French occupation of Cilicia . . . It so happened that Jelal Bey joined forces with these people."[52]
Jelal Bey’s appointment coincided with Mustafa Kemal's declaration of the illegality of the French occupation of Aintab and Marash.[53] In January 1920 Kemal ordered his troops to attack Marash. Although the local French garrison and the several French companies stationed there were able to halt the Kemalists, Colonel Norman, the commander of the French troops in Marash, for reasons that remain moot even today, ordered his troops to retreat from the city without first warning the Christian population.[54] Only half of the eight thousand Armenians were able to join the retreating French forces; Kemalist bands wiped out the rest.[55] The retreat from Marash to Osmaniye was a disaster because of the harsh winter of 1920. Hundreds of French soldiers and Armenian refugees froze to death, while the rest reached their destination exhausted.
French sources admit that the retreat of their forces from Marash was a shameful act of cowardice rather than a tactical, military move. Moreover, the retreat from Marash was a severe blow to the already fading French reputation in Cilicia.
From another perspective, the fall of Marash was a much needed victory for the Kemalists; it enabled them to win the support of Turkish peasants and even some Turkish elements that had previously opposed Kemal and his nationalistic policies. Mustafa Kemal was now ready to galvanize this popular support and accelerate his offensive. Two months later, in March, Kemalist forces besieged the Armenian stronghold of Hadjin. Meanwhile, in the Eastern occupation zone, some Kemalist units were fighting the French in Aintab. It was during these trying times that a twenty-day truce was signed on May 28, 1920.[56] The French agreed to hand over Aintab to the Kemalists, who, contrary to the provisions of the truce, tightened their grip over Hadjin and terrorized Armenians in Sis (Kozan) and the surrounding villages. Thousands of Armenians took refuge in Sis, from where they retreated with the French forces south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway.
The fall of Marash, Aintab, and Sis, the siege of Hadjin, and the French retreat south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway alerted Armenians in Adana to the gravity of their situation. Armenian fears grew even more when almost all of the Turkish population of Adana retreated north of the railway and joined forces with the Kemalists. Only when the situation had deteriorated beyond any repair did Armenians start to organize themselves in order to defend the capital city of Adana and its vicinity.[57]
From January to June 1920 the vali, Jelal Bey, continued to communicate freely with the Kemalists. He was able to inform them of the positions and movements of the retreating French forces.[58] The French administration even became aware that it was the governor who was spreading the rumor that the French were soon to evacuate Cilicia.[59] After the fall of Aintab, Jelal Bye tried to organize a similar Kemalist incursion and takeover in Adana. Nevertheless, the French had taken notice of his activities and took measures to prevent him.[60] The conspiring vali continued his intrigues for almost one more year. On May 17, 1921, the minister of interior, Reshad Effendy, recalled him to Constantinople.[61]
Four months later, in October 1921, the French finally gave in by signing the Ankara agreement with Kemal. [62] Cilicia was brought under Kemalist control while the French retreated south of the Alexandretta-Midan Ekbez-Kilis line. Armenians had to once again leave their ancestral homes and follow the retreating French troops.

THE ARMENIAN LEGION

From December 1918 to November 1919 the four battalions of the Armenian Legion constituted the majority of French occupation forces in Cilicia. The five thousand Armenian soldiers of the legion were deployed in the plain of Cilicia with advanced posts at Bozanti and Baghche. During this period, the British units maintained their positions in the Taurus and Amanus tunnel system as well as the Eastern Occupational Zone. Although several Algerian companies strengthened the four Armenian battalions, at no time did french troops in Cilicia reach the number that was necessary and sufficient to control the region.
Allied commanders had on several occasions commended Armenian soldiers for their bravery and perseverance. French commanders had repeatedly assured Armenian legionnaires that they were not being sent to Cilicia as forces of occupation but as liberators to form the nucleus of an Armenian army that was to be created soon. These initial French assurances were soon forgotten. A systematic policy of dishonoring and discharging Armenian soldiers was implemented.
The idea of forming an Armenian fighting unit alongside the French army in the Levant was that of Boghos Nubar Pasha, a prominent Egyptian Armenian who had served in several ministerial posts under the Khedives. In 1916, Nubar Pasha left Egypt for Paris to head the Armenian National Delegation.[63] After several months of negotiations with the representatives of the French and British governments Nubar Pasha was able to convince them to adopt his idea and to sign an agreement authorizing the formation of an Armenian volunteer unit which was "to be deployed only in the Levant for the sole purpose of liberating Cilicia from Turkish rule."[64] The agreement also stated that the proposed Armenian battalions were to be trained by the French and considered as part of the French Army.[65] They were to fight alongside the Allied troops and later be deployed in Cilicia where an autonomous Armenian entity was to be created as a result of an eventual Allied victory.[66]
Following the agreement, a French military delegation was dispatched to Egypt. On November 26, 1916, the formation of the first battalion of the Legion d'Orient (a neutral name that was chosen for the Armenian unit so as not to antagonize the Turks and endanger the lives of Armenian deportees in Syria) was officially initiated. The training of Armenian volunteers began at Port Said.[67] This city was chosen because of its proximity to the Armenian refugee camp where thousands of exiles from Musa Dagh (a mountainous Armenian enclave near Antioch) were relocated after being rescued by the French navy in September 1915.
The first battalion was recruited from this refugee camp. Soon, Syrian Arabs and other Christian soldiers, who had either deserted the Ottoman army or were captured by Allied troops in Yemen and/or southern Mesopotamia, joined the Legion d'Orient. The French military command relocated the Legion to Cyprus, where new Armenian volunteers from Egypt, Europe, and the United States joined its ranks. By January 1917, the Legion d'Orient had almost five thousand men in training. The soldiers were divided into four battalions ready to engage in battle.
That opportunity came in September 1918, when orders were issued to Allied forces in the Levant, under the command of General Edmund Allenby, to attack the Turkish Yildirim army, stationed in Palestine.
French sources state that at least three of the Armenian battalions were instrumental in the battle of Arara, which ended in total Allied victory. Twenty-three Armenian soldiers died and scores were wounded as a result of the September 18 offensive.[68] After a short rest, the Armenian battalions marched north with the rest of the Allied troops that liberated Syria and the Lebanon. The march from Palestine to Beirut was full of hardships, since the area was suffering an acute famine. The lack of means of transportation was also a major hardship for the advancing Allied troops. Many were forced to stay behind when a wave of Spanish influenza hit the Allied army.[69] Nevertheless, the Armenian battalions finally reached Haifa. After a short respite, they continued their march to Beirut.
Because of some misunderstanding and friction between the Armenian volunteers and the predominantly Muslim population of Beirut the French relocated the Legion d'Orient to the coastal town of Junieh, where it remained until its deployment in Cilicia.[70]
At this juncture, the Legion d'Orient was renamed the Legion Arménienne. British and French naval vessels carried its battalions to Cilicia. The First, Second and Third battalions went ashore at Mersin and were stationed in Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, Jihun, and Bozanti. The Fourth battalion came ashore in Alexandretta. Its units were deployed in Deort Yol, Osmaniye, and Baghche, where skirmishes occurred with Turkish armed bands.[71]
The French military command in Cilicia had stationed several Algerian units of the Ninth Tirailleurs in and around the port city of Alexandretta. Those units were soon strengthened by two companies of the Fourth Armenian battalion, much to the dismay of the Turkish population. In his memoirs, Dikran Boyadjian, who at the time was an Armenian volunteer serving in Cilicia, states that the Turkish population of the city had established friendly relations with the Muslim Algerian soldiers and incited hatred and intolerance among them against the Armenian volunteers.[72]
On February 10, 1919, a small fist fight between Armenian volunteers and Algerian soldiers turned into a shooting match that continued for three days and resulted in the death of fourteen Armenians and several Algerians. Although the Algerians were as much to blame for the incident, the French put the whole fault on the "undisciplined" Armenian soldiers and arbitrarily disarmed and discharged the four hundred soldiers of the tenth and thirteenth companies of the Fourth Armenian battalion.[73] The disarming and discharging of the Armenian volunteers came at a crucial moment when every single French soldier was desperately needed to bring Cilicia under the control of the newly established French administration. Numerous Turkish and Kurdish armed bands were terrorizing the population between Ayas and Osmaniye and hindering Armenian refugees from returning to their towns and villages.[74]
Although much of the change in French attitude toward the Armenians should be attributed to French politicians in Paris, there were several local factors that perpetuated this change. Interesting in this regard is what some Turkish sources reveal about the scandalous actions of some Turkish notables who tried and apparently succeeded in winning over some greedy French officers whose only aim was to pile riches before returning to France. Costly presents and bribes are but few of the dubious methods that Turkish notables used to win over those officers.[75] N. Paillares, a French journalist who at the time was residing in Constantinople, stresses the fact that bribe taking, a centuries old Ottoman habit, was a major problem for the French and had infested their virtues. He also underlines what he calls "a policy of harems" which Turks employed to win over some French officers. Paillares writes: “The [Turkish] Pashas and Beys opened wide the doors of their villas and presented their beautiful unveiled women to the greedy young [French] officers.”[76]
Armenian volunteers were told that they had been deployed in Cilicia as liberators of a region that was to be theirs. In their memoirs, some volunteers find it irrational to be branded as culprits who were punished and discharged for allegations advanced by Ottoman officials questioning their behavior. Armenian soldiers were stunned when the French administration prevented them from rescuing Armenian women and children who were taken in by Turks during the 1915 deportations and were forcibly Turkified.[77] Armenian volunteers, most of whom were uneducated, could not have grasped the subtle complexities of French foreign diplomacy, which was propelled by political and economic interests and considerations rather than noble principles. “Our every move” concludes one volunteer, “even as harmless as it may have been, was considered an undisciplined act and we were severely punished for it. The French had only one-way with which to silence us, to disarm and discharge us from our duties. They did just that. They dismantled all the Armenian units stationed from Bozanti to Yenije and brought in their Algerian units instead.”[78]
The French tried to defend their actions by stating that disciplinary measures against Armenian volunteers were necessary in order not to alienate those Turks that were opposed to Kemal and could be won over. By silencing Armenian soldiers and by discharging them en masse, the French military command not only weakened the already feeble French occupation forces, but also gave the Kemalist bands the opportunity to intensify their attacks on Armenian villages and French garrisons and to win the support of the Turkish population whom the French were ostensibly campaigning to win over.[79]
Armenian soldiers had numerous other reasons to distrust the French administration. Foremost among these was the fact that by mid-1919 the French had not only discharged more than half the volunteers, but also neglected their previous promise of recruiting new ones for the Armenian Legion and raising the number of its soldiers to twelve thousand men.[80]
Moreover, during their military service, the Armenian soldiers were deprived of many of the rights that regular French and even Algerian soldiers enjoyed. They were classified as “assisting soldiers." Their pay was much less than regular French soldiers, even though their serving contract stated that they were to be paid on an equal basis with regular French soldiers. In his memoirs, Boyadjian argues that the French allocated less money and materials to the Armenian Legion than necessary for regular operation. As a result of this neglect, Armenian volunteers faced severe shortages in food, clothing, communication devices, and means of transportation.[81]
Perhaps more aggravating was the fact that the Armenian battalions were deprived of an Armenian officer corps. The French officers who were assigned to these battalions turned a deaf ear to the problems that Armenian soldiers encountered. The Legion had only four Armenian officers with the rank of non-commissioned lieutenants who had earned their ranks even before joining the Armenian force.[82]
The Legion also had a score of soldiers with the rank of sergeant. “It is unfortunate,” writes John Shishmanian, an American Armenian and one of the four officers,” that there are several educated soldiers among the Armenian volunteers who should have been considered for the rank of lieutenant after almost two years of service in the French army.”[83]
The disarming and discharging of Armenian soldiers also resulted in the resignation of other Armenian legionnaires. Many of the discharged volunteers left Cilicia. Those who preferred to remain were soon recruited into the Armenian guard units that were formed under the guidance of the Armenian National Union, a central body entrusted with the task of regulating and defending Armenian communal life in Adana and the plain of Cilicia.[84]
Mihran Damadian, who served in Cilicia as the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia from June 1919 to August 1920, worked hard to stop Armenian volunteers from resigning. He entreated them not to be demoralized by the change in French attitude. In a circular addressed to Armenian volunteers and printed in the local Armenian newspapers on July 24, 1919, Damadian asked the Armenian legionnaires not to leave their posts, since their mission was not yet accomplished. Damadian also advised the Armenian volunteers to obey their French commanders, “because soldiers are to obey and not to criticize orders."[85]
Damadian’s work was complemented by that of the Union of Armenian Legionnaires. Armenian officers who held the executive posts in this Union worked desperately to keep the First, Second, and Third Armenian battalions intact immediately after the French summarily discharged the Armenian volunteers of the Fourth battalion. Numerous circulars advised and even urged Armenian volunteers not to resign.[86] Despite these efforts, by mid-1919 the Armenian Legion was reduced to about five hundred men. This small force was then put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fly-Sainte-Marie who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Romieu. No effort on the part of the French administration was made thereafter to revive the Armenian battalions.
Thus, after only six months of deployment in Cilicia, the French rendered the Armenian Legion impotent. “The nucleus of the future Armenian Army,” a French reference to the Armenian Legion, was totally forgotten and was never reiterated.
As a microcosm of Armenian existence in Cilicia during 1919-1921, the Armenian Legion experienced the bitterness of shifting French policies. For France, the Legion Arménienne had already served its purpose. Given the future calculations of French politics in the Levant, Paris saw no need for an Armenian force.

ECONOMY AND HEALTH CARE

By the time the Ottoman government surrendered to the Allies in October 1918, the country was in ruins. Like other areas of the empire, Cilicia, whose agriculture-oriented economy had suffered greatly during the war, received foreign occupation with an empty local treasury, a staggering economy, and little or no agricultural production. The deportation of much of its population in 1915 had resulted in the closing of businesses and had caused severe cuts in cotton and other agricultural production.
During their occupation of Cilicia, the French regarded the province as a financial liability, especially as the French economy was itself facing major difficulties because of the huge wartime military expenditures. The French administration had to obtain the necessary funds for Armenian repatriation, the maintenance of the Armenian Legion and the several French and Algerian units stationed in the province, and the feeding of a population of almost four hundred thousand, most of whom were unable to produce sufficient food for at least one full year. However, as one French author puts it, if properly attended to, the natural and agricultural resources of Cilicia would, in the very immediate future, enable it not only to be self sufficient, but even to pump cash into the French treasury and supply French markets with cheap products.[87]
The French, however, never thought of Cilicia as a profitable enterprise. Had they had the patience and the intention to plan and organize the economy in Cilicia on an equal basis with that of Syria or the Lebanon, favorable changes might have been achieved.
According to both Ottoman and European prewar statistics, Cilicia was one of the richest provinces in the empire. At a time when the Ottoman government was sinking under the pressure of its European debt, the Cilician economy, based on the exportation of its agricultural products (cotton, tobacco, and cereals) was thriving. Many European enterprises had local branches in the province. France had the lion’s share in those businesses.[88]
With almost 2,600,000 hectares of arable land [89], Cilicia produced and exported 100,000 tons of cereals and 120,000 bales of cotton per annum.[90] Interestingly enough, during the first year of French occupation (1919), cereal production had dropped by 50 percent compared to prewar production. Cotton production during the same year was estimated at five to six thousand bales.[91]
During 1919, lumber production, once a profitable enterprise, was reduced to a small fraction of its prewar volume. The valley of the Jihun River, once famous for its tobacco crops, was left unattended for a long period of time. In fact, tobacco production was revived only in late 1919 when the local tobacco factory resumed its operation. Even then, production was negligible compared to prewar figures.
Cilicia accommodated some five hundred miles of railway that traversed the province of Adana. Moreover, Constantinople was accessible through the Bozanti-Yenije line. Before the war, the railway system was a profitable government owned business. Although this system was operable when the French occupied the province, shortages in personnel, poor repairs and, most importantly, lack of security rendered it unprofitable and a liability.[92]
The ports of Mersin, Alexandretta, Ayas, and Payas could not operate at full capacity because of the damage they had sustained from repeated Allied naval bombardments during the war.[93]
Basing his information on statistics published in Constantinople in 1912, Pierre Andre Redan estimates the population of Cilicia (that is, the provinces of Adana, excluding Marash and Aintab at around 400,000[94] of which 215,000 were Christians (Armenians, Greeks, Chaldians, Assyrians, Syrians, and Maronites) and 185,000 Muslims (Arabs, Turks, Tatars, Kurds, and Cherkez).[95] During the first six months of 1919, 120,000 Armenians repatriated to Cilicia. Their approximate distribution is shown in table 1.

CITY
REPATRIATES
Hadjin
8,000
Hasan-Beyli
1,000
Osmaniye
1,000
Islahie
1,000
Baghche
1,000
Deort-Yol
22,000
Missis
1,500
Tarsus
3,000-4,000
Mersin
2,000-3,000
Sis
6,000-7,000
Adana
60,000
TOTAL
106,500-109,500

Table 1[96]
Armenian repatriation to
Cilicia, first six months of 1919)
.
Adana became a first station for repatriating Armenians. Refugees were brought there and waited to return to their towns and villages outside the city. Since and for security reasons the relocation process was not fully implemented, Adana was gradually filled with refugees.[97] The French administration sheltered these people in camps and tent cities such as the Camp Passage, Camp Picot, Camp Gouraud, and the Gulbenkian Factory.
The refugees clustered in Adana posed a serious problem to the French administration. It was necessary to provide these people with food, clothing, medical care, and shelter during winter. It was not easy for Armenian refugees to make their homes in the camps and tent towns where living conditions were miserable. France had a moral obligation towards those refugees whom the British -- and to some extent French authorities in Syria -- had literally dumped into Adana without first making sure that the local French administration was able to absorb them.
Although the French administration tried to revive agriculture by reopening the Turkish Agricultural Bank and by creating chambers of commerce in Adana, Mersin, and other cities, [98] by the end of 1919 only half of the tillable lands were cultivated. During 1920, this ratio declined to one twentieth.[99]
Taxes presented yet another problem. Although the population had not paid any tribute for four years, the French were unable to collect back taxes, nor were they, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, allowed to raise taxes or impose new ones to generate revenues. The Turks always managed to avoid taxes. Repatriating Armenians were exempt since they were deported from Cilicia in 1915 and, therefore, had produced nothing taxable. Moreover, repatriating Armenians needed at least a year in order to be able to raise crops and pay taxes.
Inflation rates were high in postwar Cilicia. Basic foods and everyday necessities had inflation rates ranging from 600 to 800 percent. The price of bread rose from 2-3 Turkish piasters (T.p. hereafter. 100 T.p. = 1 Turkish pound = 10 French francs) to 14-15, that of meat from 8-10 T.p. to 40-50, that of sugar from 6-7 T.p. to 50-55. [100] Middle and low-income families were left without homes because of the acute shortage in rented lodgings. The annual rent of a single room apartment had risen from 120-160 to 1,000 Turkish pounds.[101]
It was natural that, against such high inflation rates, wages should increase too. They did, yet only in moderate proportions. The French administration’s efforts to control inflation were futile. As an employer, it was normal that the French administration would not be in favor of raising wages. Yet, as the acting government of the province, it had to regulate labor and look after the welfare of the people under its control. It was because of this responsibility that the French administration had to give in to popular demands and allow a moderate increase in salaries. The regulation of labor and daily wages was implemented through an official order issued by the French administration. The Order, which adjusted wages according to age group and field of labor, was published in the local newspapers. It stated:

Taking into consideration the raise in monthly wages let it be known to all what the chief-of-administration [Colonel Bremond] has established as a final list of daily wages. The authorities also announce that starting on October 10 [1919], all those who are being paid in excess of this wage list will be subject to imprisonment.[102]

The order then lists the categories of daily wages: "Boys 25-30 T.p., construction and other laborers 50-60 T.p., foremen 90-100 T.p., masons 140-150 T.p., stone cutters 160 T.p., miners 70-80 T.p., mechanics 140-160 T.p., drivers 80-90 T.p."
The order concludes by stating: "Those wages can be increased by up to 15 percent, if working conditions require such an increase. All such increases, however, must first be approved by the French administration.[103]
Laborers, who constituted the majority of the population, received the lowest wages, and, consequently, were unable to meet the basic needs of their families. They and their families had no other choice but to move and live in the tent cities.
The Davros newspaper, whose issues contain numerous articles on the acute economic problems of Cilicia, states that the French administration did not attempt to find permanent solutions to these problems. As the official organ of the Social Democrat Hnchakian Party, Davros addressed important issues such as labor regulation, the formation of labor unions, higher wages, and fewer working hours. [104]
Although Turks living in the cities of the plain were more or less faced with similar problems, most Muslims in Cilicia were peasants still living on their lands and able to earn a livelihood. The volume of agricultural production in 1919 and 1920 tends to imply that Turks, who possessed most of the cultivable land, did not produce what was expected of them. In 1919, for example, Muslims cultivated 50 percent of the arable lands. Although this percentage was enough to sustain the population, cereal shortages in the cities was so critical that French authorities had to import large quantities of grain. Because of Kemalist incursions, only one-twentieth of all arable lands were cultivated in 1920, even though the French administration provided the means for a good agricultural season. [105] On November 28, 1919, for example, the French administration announced that in order to help peasants in Cilicia, the French High Commissariat in Beirut, as a gesture of friendship, was sending 2,700 tons of good quality seeds to boost cereal production and that an initial shipment of 700 tons had already reached the port of Mersin and would soon be distributed.[106]
The ports of Cilicia seem to have been a major source of uninterrupted revenue for the French administration. November 1919 figures show that the ports at Mersin and Alexandretta provided a combined customs income of almost 4,000,000 French Francs. The French administration estimated that the two ports would provide an annual income of at least 30,000,000 Francs. [107] Col. Bremond reckons that taxes and an organized railway might have provided an additional annual income of 40,000,000 Francs, thus establishing an annual spending budget of some 70,000,000 francs. [108] French authorities in Cilicia undertook the task of improving facilities in the major ports. They invested heavily in the port at Mersin. The rugged nature of the seashore created engineering problems for the expansion of the port. Nevertheless, many obstacles were overcome and by June 1920 work was under way to construct at least one new dock. [109]
The seriousness of the French endeavor is manifested in the amounts that were spent for the purpose of expanding the Port of Mersin. In May 1920, for example, the French administration allocated 3,729,944 Francs for operation, maintenance, salaries and construction of new facilities there. Custom revenues during the same month were estimated at 3,200,228 francs.[110] The French invested in Cilicia's other ports as well. At the time new facilities were built at Mersin, expansion projects were underway at Alexandretta, Ayas, and Payas.
It is logical to assume that the French had to invest in railroads as a link between the ports and the interior of the province. In reality, however, French investment in improving and reorganizing the existing railway system was negligible compared to their heavy investment in the ports. The reason for this was that the French administration had only the coastal strip under its control. The same, however, could not be said of the interior where the railroad was under constant attack by Kemalist elements.
It was because of the lack of security that the majority of repatriating Armenians were obliged to dwell in areas that were under the protection of the French occupation forces. Only a handful of Armenians ventured to live in villages situated north of the cities of Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Deort-Yol, and Osmaniye. On the other hand, most Armenian peasants dwelling in the cities were forced to work as laborers in small industries that European firms and some well-to-do Armenians had reestablished after the war. Others went into shoemaking, glass, clay production, carpentry, weaving, and blacksmithing. Armenian women joined the workforce to help their husbands in providing the needs of their families. Many were employed in small workshops specializing in cloth production, which were initiated by French, Swiss, and American missionaries and by Armenian benevolent organizations.
Armenian merchants reestablished their import-export businesses.[111] The Orozdi Baak Armenian corporation is a good example in this regard. One of the major distributors of fabrics throughout the province before the war, this corporation reopened its doors immediately after the establishment of the French administration in Cilicia. It became one of the main suppliers of the French occupation army and employed several hundred Armenians. [112]
Many factories reopened their doors after the war. They employed hundreds of Armenians and stimulated the provincial economy. Some of the important factories in this category appear in table 2.

Corporation
Specialization
Number of Employees

Tripani
Weaving and cotton products.

400

Simeon Oglu
Cotton processing
350
Bodur Oglu
Cotton processing; later, production of
flour (35 tons daily capacity)

60
Ashekian
(unknown)
40
Régie de Tabac
Tobacco production
200

Table 2[113]

The Armenian newspapers printed in Cilicia during 1919-1921 carry numerous advertisements by merchants and importers announcing the availability of tractors for agricultural purposes, buses for local transportation, and "transport services" (group taxis) for traveling to Syria and Lebanon. Naval vessels operating through the ports of Mersin and Alexandretta accommodated sea travel. Davros, for example, carries detailed tariff lists for land and sea travel in its issues.[114]

Sanitation and health care

Many doctors and medical practitioners had by 1919 reopened their clinics in Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Deort-Yol and Alexandretta. Twenty-five doctors (twenty Armenians and five Turks) served in the three major hospitals of Adana alone.[115]
Although the French administration had appointed a special committee to look after and find solutions to sanitation problems in the Armenian camps, the refugee shelters remained hazardous places that lacked basic sanitation requirements. Open sewers and pools of dirty water were dreadful features in those shanty shelters. [116]
Davros, on November 20, 1919, ran an article titled “Adana From a Hygienic Perspective” in which the editor criticized the French administration and the Armenian National Union for not paying attention to the sanitary needs of Adana and the other cities of the plain. The article deplored the fact that street sweeping was nonexistent, marketplaces were filthy, refugee camps were hazardous places that caused havoc among the Armenian refugee population, and officials seemed content and unwilling to do anything to change the situation. [117]
No doubt the French administration's views were different. Although it accepted the fact that health conditions were not up to its expectations, it foresaw no immediate danger.[118] According to the reports of the French administration, Adana and the other cities had sufficient health-care facilities. The municipality of Adana, for example, had hired some sixty street sweepers, seventeen fire fighters, and five health inspectors. [119] The city had a score of pharmacies some even working night shifts.[120]

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE

In a matter of months after the establishment of the French Civil Administration in Cilicia Armenian social and political institutions were reorganized. Armenian benevolent organizations reopened schools. French, Swiss, and American missionaries reestablished their schools and administered several orphanages that sheltered thousands of orphans.
On the political scene, perhaps the most important achievement of Armenians in Cilicia during this period was the formation of the Armenian National Union. This central body acted as an unofficial Armenian government. It included representatives from the three Armenian religious denominations as well as the four Armenian political parties. Despite the strong competition among the political parties and the cultural, educational, and social committees that each had distinctly formed, the uniqueness of the circumstances and the experience of the previous years necessitated a strong sense of unity. The political parties and the church worked hand in hand with the French administration. [121]
Before being dispatched to Cilicia, Damadian was instrumental in galvanizing worldwide moral and financial support for the formation of the Armenian Legion. While in Cilicia, Damadian not only regulated relations between Armenians and the French administration, but became the motivating force behind the social, cultural, and educational achievements of the community. He worked relentlessly to generate solidarity among the competing Armenian political parties.[122]

Education

The newly created Armenian National Union in Adana formed special educational committees and entrusted them with the task of facilitating the reopening of schools as soon as possible. During 1919-1921 a total of seventeen schools resumed operation in the city of Adana alone. [123] Of these, the Armenian prelacy administered seven, four were reestablished by the other Armenian denominations, and six were missionary schools.[124]
Although it is hard to find similar statistics for other cities in Cilicia, it is clear that schools opened in Mersin, Tarsus, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, Alexandretta, and elsewhere. The French administration allocated sums that were necessary to reopen all prewar French missionary schools. Moreover, a special order from the office of the chief-of-administration stated that the teaching of the French language was to be mandatory in all schools.[125]
Many Turkish schools also benefited from the peace and welcomed students. Turkish schools, however, had not suffered as much as Armenian and other Christian schools. Turkish educational institutions had practically operated on a regular basis during the war and were only closed for a short period during 1918. Armenian schools, however, were closed for the entire war and resumed their duties only in 1919. Several years of neglect had brought costly damage to the buildings that needed huge sums to rebuilt and renovate. The French administration was helpful in this regard. It allocated sums to revive not only Armenian and other Christian schools (Greek, Arab) but Turkish ones as well. [126] Some twelve thousand Armenian students were registered at schools operating through the efforts of the Armenian community. [127]
Armenian orphanages provided shelter and served as educational institutions. During the war, Armenian children in Cilicia had had a higher chance of survival than their counterparts in historical Armenia. Many had been taken away from their parents just before the deportations and handed over to Turkish families who raised them as Turks. Others were put in special orphanages in Mersin, Urfa, and Aleppo.[128] Therefore, one of the most urgent tasks for repatriating Armenians in 1919 was to locate and liberate Armenian orphans. Swiss and American missionaries buttressed Armenian efforts. Yet it was the London-based Lord Mayor’s Fund, which actually assured the task of providing the orphanages with sums necessary for maintenance. [129] During the first six months of 1919, Armenian orphanages were established in Adana, Sis (Kozan), Hadjin, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, Harouniye, Tarsus, Mersin, Marash, and Aintab. The total number of orphans admitted was more than ten thousand.[130]
Inter-party rivalry within the Armenian community was spreading even in the school system and was causing friction between students in the upper classes. This obliged the Special Educational Committee (formed by the Armenian National Union for the purpose of organizing education in Cilicia) to initiate counter-propaganda in the local Armenian Newspapers to assert that Armenian schools in Cilicia were academic institutions and not podiums for political parties to propagate their ideology or policy positions. [131]
The issue of teacher salaries was one of the major problems the Educational Committee had to face. The minutes of the committee show that complaints presented by teachers and salary related issues in general were a permanent topic on the agenda. During the 1919-20 scholastic years--the last for Armenian students in Cilicia--the seven Armenian schools in Adana operating under the guidance of the Armenian Prelacy hired a total of 65 teachers whose annual salaries ranged from 222 to 1,000 Turkish pounds. The annual budget for teacher pay was estimated at 35,000 Turkish pounds. During the same scholastic year, the operational budget of the committee was estimated at 5,500 Turkish gold coins or 32,250 Turkish pounds (5.5 Turkish pounds = one Turkish gold coin).[132] The Educational Committee had to find other sources--such as sums allocated by the French administration or Armenian benevolent organizations abroad--to balance the deficit, since it was unable to ask for tuition from the 2,176 students admitted to the above mentioned seven schools.
According to official statistics published by the French administration in Cilicia, six Turkish schools operated in Adana alone during 1919-20. There were 49 educators teaching the 687 students attending these schools.[133] The other Christian communities (Greeks, Syrians and Maronites) had six schools operating with twenty teachers and 655 students. The six Missionary schools had forty-seven teachers, most of them missionaries, and a collective student body of 711 students. [134]

Organizations and the Press

The issues of Davros impart the message that there was a conscious effort on the part of Armenians to promote their culture and social life in all ways possible. Numerous theatrical performances, public lectures, and musical recitals highlighted Armenian cultural life. The three reestablished presses in Adana and Mersin published periodicals, newspapers and even books. [135]
It seems though that this tempered renaissance in education, culture, and political awareness was a product of the competition between the Armenian political parties, which tried to win over Armenians through political rallies and lectures that dealt with the political issues of the day such as the French occupation of Cilicia, the possibility of establishing an autonomous Armenian entity under French mandate, or an American mandate. The Armenian parties competed with each other not only in the sphere of politics, but even in the cultural and social realms by establishing their own cultural organizations and Armenian Red Cross committees for social work. The latter was the medium through which Armenian women participated in the reorganization of the community.
Aside from the party-oriented socio-cultural structures, there were at least a dozen other cultural or social organizations operating in Adana that had their branches in other cities as well. [136] Important among these in terms of membership and activity were the Youth Organization of Adana (Adanayi Yeritasartats Miutiun), Young Men’s Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) that organized night adult schools for instruction in French and English, The Union of Armenian Legionaries (Hay Lekeonaganneru Miutiun) which had its organ, Arara.[137] There were also several compatriotic unions functioning in Adana such as those of Hadjin, Sis, Dikranagert, and Gesaria.[138]
Four Armenian political parties had regional central committees in Adana, where regional party organs were published. These were: 1- The Social Democratic Hnchakian Party (Sotsial Demokrat Hunchakian Gusagtsutiun) with branches and committees in the other cities of the plain. Davros, its organ from 1919 to 1920, was first edited by attorney Firuz Khanzadian and then by Antranig Genjian. In 1921, the party started publishing Nor Serunt (New Generation) as its official organ. The party had cultural, athletic, as well as student and youth committees. It initiated the Hunchakian Women Auxiliary (Hunchakian Ganants Miutiun), which acted as the party's Red Cross chapter for social work, especially in the camps and tent cities in Adana; 2- The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Dashnaktsutiun), which expanded in the same pattern as the Hnchakian Party. Giligia, edited by Central Committee member Minas Veradzin, was the official organ of the party. It appeared uninterruptedly from 1919 to 1921; 3- The Reformed Hunchakian Party (Veragazmial Hnchakian Gusagtsutiun) with Giligian Surhantag (Cilician Courier) as its official organ; 4- The Armenian Constitutional Democratic Party (Hay Sahmanatragan Ramgavar Gusagtsutiun) with Hay Tsain (Armenian voice) as its official organ. [139]
The central committees of the four Armenian political parties formed an inter-party council that worked in conjunction with the Armenian National Union. In general, the role of the Armenian political parties in Cilicia during 1919-21 was organizational.[140] All four worked to normalize conditions for a productive Armenian communal life. Party newspapers ran politically oriented editorials, articles in which the idea of Cilician autonomy was strongly defended and the change in French policy emphatically criticized. Yet the political activities of the Armenian parties never passed beyond the limits of the written word, although Turkish sources speak of Armenian Komitajis (revolutionaries) who terrorized Turkish villages. The weakness of Armenian parties in Cilicia must be attributed to the fact that these were organizations that had themselves repatriated to Cilicia in 1919 and had to start anew. Although they had their input in advising Armenians about the political issues of the day and also made them aware of the gradually fermenting idea of an autonomous Cilicia, overall, their role remained marginal in the events that were to shape Cilicia's fate.[141]
Between 1919 and 1921, several non-partisan Armenian newspapers and periodicals were published in Cilicia. Most important among these were: 1- Arara, the organ of the Union of Armenian Legionaries. Haik Mosdikian financed it. Keghard-Shara was its editor; 2- Nor Ashkharh (New World) owned by Matios Yeretsian. Only few issues were published; 3- Adana, which appeared in July 1920. Parsegh Shaljian and Hovhannes Ammikian were the owners and editors. The newspaper offered its readers a Turkish-language supplement written in Armenian characters; 4- Hay Tsav (Armenian Pain) first published in 1920. Setrak Gebenlian was the owner and editor; 5- Lampron, named after the famous medieval Armenian castle, was published in Tarsus. It was the organ of the Armenian Students’ Association of St. Paul’s College, operated by American missionaries and managed by Dr. Christiel. Dr. Nishanian was the editor.
Newspapers with limited circulation appeared for short periods of time in Deort-Yol (Sisvan, published in 1920), Anitab (Sharzhum, the organ of the Hnchakian Student Association in the city), and Marash (Rahvira Mentor, a bilingual published in Armenian and Turkish). Several Turkish newspapers were published in Cilicia during 1919-21 as well.[142]
The Armenian newspapers published in Cilicia devoted their pages to articles dealing with social, political, and cultural aspects of Armenian communal life. Topics ranged from complex political matters such as relations with the French administration or analysis concerning Cilicia's future and the Peace Conference in Paris to statistical reports about schools, social and cultural events, and conditions relating to the Armenian refugee population in Adana and the other cities (especially when thousands of new refugees were brought from Marash and Sis due to the retreat of the French forces to the south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway line as a result of the 28 May, 1920 truce with the Kemalists).
The French administration, however, implemented a strong policy of censorship on Armenian as well as Turkish newspapers in Cilicia during 1919-21.

THE TORNY ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

Armenian, French, and even Turkish sources regard Mihran Damadian, the representative of the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia in Cilicia, as a central figure in Cilician politics between 1919 and 1921. He was dispatched to Cilicia with the dual task of organizing the Armenian community and representing it before the French administration. Damadian arrived in Adana in June 1919. He was a man with extensive political experience and subtle understanding of Armenian matters. Sources agree that he was a perfect choice for the position.

Mihran Damadian

The fifty-five years old Armenian functionary had a long record of achievements as a schoolteacher, revolutionary, and a Hnchakian Party leader. He was involved in revolutionary activities in Sasun (1894) and Constantinople during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and had to flee to Europe to escape imprisonment. He remained in Europe for several years during which he audited university courses and acquired a speaking knowledge of French, English, and Italian. Upon his return, he devoted himself to teaching and also held administrative positions as inspector of education in Cilicia--where he had been a teacher in Adana from 1882 to 1884--and the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.[143]
Boghos Nubar Pasha, one of the two heads of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, wrote to Damadian urging him to accept the position as the representative of the Delegation in Cilicia. Damadian--who had joined the ranks pf the Ramgavar Party after 1908 and had attained a leading position within it--received Nubar Pasha's letter in Alexandria, Egypt, in mid-1918, after having returned from a long tour of duty in Europe and the United states where he had addressed the Armenian communities and had managed to allocate sums needed for transporting Armenian volunteers from the United States and Europe to Egypt, the projected headquarters of the Legion d'Orient. [144]
The first problem that Damadian had to face upon his arrival in Adana was that of the anguished Armenian legionaries who were at a nadir: Some were being discharged by the French against their will, while many others wanted to be discharged willingly because of "irrational French treatment." Damadian brought the matter to the attention of the French authorities and tried to defend the legionary’s viewpoint by stressing the arbitrariness and the prejudice of some of the French officers.[145] His calls went unheard, however, as the French continued to discharge Armenian soldiers. Damadian witnessed the dismantling of the Armenian battalions many of whose members he had personally encouraged and recruited. He mentions this in his memoirs--his diary to be more precise--about how discouraging it was to stand by and to watch helplessly while the French administration reduced Armenian forces to a fraction of their original size. [146]
As the representative of an Armenian delegation with no tangible political power or financial resources, Damadian was assigned the difficult task of creating unity within a community that was divided along religious, political, social, and even compatriotic lines. It was even more difficult to be entrusted with the chores of representing this fragmented community and to defend its rights before the French administration.
French administrators and military commanders such as Colonel Bremond and General Dufieux praise Damadian for his tact, patience, endurance and readiness to cooperate with French authorities in what was beneficial for Armenians in general. It was because of his motivation to secure peace and tranquility in Cilicia that Damadian agreed to meet with several Turkish notables when asked to do so by Col. Bremond. The French administration considered these meetings important and regarded them as a first step towards an Armeno-Turkish dialogue that would, in turn, decrease ethnic tensions and normalize the situation.
On the subject of the envisaged Armeno-Turkish dialogue, Damadian writes that he had several meetings with Turkish notables whose names he fails to mention. “ . . . But aside from a mutual understanding on a personal level,” he concludes, “ . . .a general agreement or a total political solution for Armenian-Turkish relations is not yet feasible," since “ . . .both parties remain attached to their unique political platforms with respect to the future of Cilicia". [147]
In a letter addressed to Damadian, Colonel Bremond urged him not to give up hope and to continue his efforts to find a middle ground with the Turks so that the vali, Jelal Bey, would not be able to win them over to the Kemalist cause. In the same letter, Bremond also underlined the importance of an Armeno-Turkish agreement in Cilicia, since it would:

1. Damage Kemal’s popularity among Turks,
2. Cut an important source of income for Kemal, and
3. Oblige Kemalist forces to abandon their dreams concerning Cilicia.[148]

The importance with which the French followed the issue of an Armeno-Turkish agreement is once again underlined in the same letter, when Bremond asks Damadian not to halt the negotiations and to be present at a meeting to be held in the headquarters of the French administration on April 17, 1920, after which “ . . .a declaration concerning an Armeno-Turkish agreement will be made public by the chief-of-administration.” [149]
Damadian's role in Cilicia was somewhat eclipsed after the independence act of August 5, 1920. He remained in Cilicia for almost a year after the French administration severed all official ties with him. [150] His activities, however, were centered on the Armenian community. He was instrumental in organizing the defense of Adana when the city witnessed severe food shortages in 1921 because of the tight grip of Kemalist forces advancing south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway line.
Perhaps the most important document, which demonstrates Damadian’s organizational abilities, is the extensive report he submitted to the Delegation of Integral Armenia in 1919 concerning the defense of Cilicia against a very probable Kemalist incursion.[151] The report proposed dividing Cilicia into five defense zones: Adana, Mersin-Tarsus, Deort-Yol, Baghche-Hasan Beyli, and Hadjin-Zeitun-Sis. [152] In his report Damadian gave preference to military organization and underlined the importance of the formation of Armenian military units that should act as the nuclei of an envisioned Armenian army. Damadian’s notion of superb military organization meant that special attention should be given to the establishment of:

1. General and regional commands;
2. Military committees to look after the Armenian legionaries;
3. A committee for supplies and means of transportation;
4. A committee for sanitary and health needs;
5. A committee for public relations;
6. A committee for post and communications;
7. A general treasury;
8. A military court. [153]

Obviously, Damadian's report stresses the importance of having a fully equipped occupation army in Cilicia. In his view this could have been achieved only through the concerted efforts of the French administration and the Armenian community. However, since the French sabotaged Franco-Armenian cooperation by discharging the already existing Armenian battalions, hopes of bringing Damadian's defense project to fruition or of creating an Armenian army of ten thousand men -- which was, in Damadian’s view, possible even through local means--were futile.[154] Damadian failure must be attributed to the chaotic state of affairs in Cilicia and the marked change in French policy towards Armenians. [155]

The Armenian National Union

During 1919-21, a new national institution, the Armenian National Union, was growing out of the unique circumstances of Armenian life in Cilicia. After their repatriation, Armenians formed this body to bring a sense of cohesion to their community. Although Armenian national unions were formed in Egypt, Europe, and the United States during the war, their task was limited to collecting contributions for Armenian deportees. [156] In the case of Cilicia, the newly established National Union was entrusted with the task of organizing and governing of the Armenian community. That the National Union was a de facto Armenian government is clearly demonstrated in the bylaws of the union which state that:

Cilicia, as an occupied territory, has no defined governmental system; therefore, until a new decision is reached, the Armenian National Unions will act as national-civil administrations that will govern the Armenian communities in Cilicia.[157]

During the first months of Armenian repatriation to Cilicia, national unions were formed in all the cities where Armenian communities existed. The city chapters were in turn connected to a central executive body that resided in the provincial capital Adana. The chapter unions were formed from representatives of the three Armenian denominations and the four Armenian political parties.[158] According to the bylaws of the central body, the Catholicos (the head of the Armenian church) and the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia (Damadian) were to be voting members as well. [159]
Damadian, who was instrumental in the formulation of the bylaws, managed to create a body that was to be the centre around which all Armenian activities in Cilicia would function. The central body in Adana and its chapters in Mersin, Tarsus, Deort-Yol, Osmaniye, and elsewhere served in the capacity of central and local governments. They looked after the religious, educational, social, cultural, economic, and sanitary affairs of the Armenian communities. Contributions made by Armenian benevolent organizations abroad were deposited in the central treasury in Adana from where sums were allocated to projects in Adana and elsewhere.[160] The French administration accepted the fact that the National Union was acting as a government to regulate Armenian life in Cilicia. On several occasions, Damadian served as liaison between the Union and the French administration.
The central body residing in Adana operated through a system of committees. Aside from the Committee on Education, there were committees for financial resources, cultural activities, and social-religious affairs. [161]
The Committee for Financial resources, for example, created a subcommittee and entrusted it with the task of fining and documenting Armenian properties that were taken over by the Turks after the deportations. It was this subcommittee that accepted, prepared, and brought cases of property repossession before the French Arbitrating Court.
Another subcommittee that the Financial Resources Committee initiated was that of rent control and the maintenance of national-communal properties. This subcommittee worked to regulate and tabulate rents and to enforce its own decisions.[162] As to the maintenance of communal properties, the subcommittee kept an updated list of such properties and, through the Financial Resources Committee, allocated sums for repairs and reconstruction. In 1920, for example, the subcommittee insured fifteen communal properties (schools, churches, and others) with French and Italian companies. For that purpose, it spent no less than two million French francs.[163]
The Committee on Social-Religious Affairs regulated and organized the business of the Armenian Prelacy, the churches under its jurisdiction, and the church properties that were entrusted to the Prelacy. The subcommittee on charity provided food and shelter to widows and orphans living in the camps and tent cities.[164] The activities of this subcommittee were centered on the refugee camps in Adana where almost all Armenian refugees resided.
Although the French administration initially cooperated with the Armenian National Union and through it allocated sums for the needy and, furthermore, allowed it to collect taxes on its behalf, this cooperation did not last for long. By assuming governmental obligations that were in the jurisdiction of the French administration, the Armenian National Union was--from the perspective of the French administration-- intruding on others’ rights. Apparently, the French administration was in no position to tolerate the existence of a government operating within a government. On its part, the Armenian National Union justified its position as filling the administrative gap that the feeble French administration could not.
As was the case with the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, relations between the French administration and the Armenian National Union worsened immediately after the declaration of Cilicia’s independence on August 5, 1920. During the rest of 1920 and throughout 1921 internal problems incapacitated the Armenian National Union. Collective resignations, inter-party intrigues, and ineffective, short-lived central bodies became common. The Union was almost nonexistent during the last months of Armenian presence in Cilicia.
The year 1920 was a crucial one for Armenians in Cilicia. The beginning of that year saw the retreat of the French from Marash and the subsequent death of thousands of Armenians. In March, the Armenian stronghold of Hadjin was put under siege by Kemalist forces. It was to withstand Turkish incursions for eight months only to be occupied and its Armenian inhabitants either killed or exiled.[165]
The May 28 truce resulted in the handing over of Anitab to the Kemalists, the retreat of the French occupation forces south of the Mersin-Osmaniye railway line, and the subsequent evacuation of thousands of Armenians from Sis and its environs. Yet, amazingly, Armenians were still entertained with the idea of an autonomous Cilicia under a French mandate.
The French, on their part, doubted Armenian activities. This doubt originated, to a great extent, from the activities of the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia, which, in its negotiations with the Allies, had on several occasions implied about French or a possible American mandate over Cilicia. The French, who were at the time entertaining the idea of incorporating Cilicia within their Syrian mandate, had enough reasons to doubt such Armenian activities. French doubts were furthered when the King-Crane and Harbord Commissions visited Cilicia and hopes for an American mandate surfaced once more within the Armenian community.[166]

The Peace Negotiations in Paris

By mid-1920, the Peace Conference in Paris had apparently completed its deliberations. The signing of the much awaited peace treaty was very near. It was under these conditions and having in mind the fear of a possible French neglect for Armenian ambitions towards the creation of an autonomous Cilicia that the August 5, 1920 act of the declaration of Cilicia's independence was undertaken. The fact that this act was staged just five days before the signing of the Peace Treaty at Sevres (10 August, 1920) is yet another indication of the desperate situation of Armenians and other Christian peoples in Cilicia.
Christians in Cilicia in general and Armenians in particular were unaware of how negotiations were progressing in Paris. It was in an effort to clarify their position vis-à-vis the future of Cilicia that the representatives of the Christian communities in Cilicia cabled a petition to the Peace Conference on May 21, 1920. [167] The petition stressed that:

1. Geographically, Cilicia belongs neither to Anatolia nor to Syria;[168]
2. Christians in Cilicia constitute the majority of the population;
3. Turks are a minority within the Muslim population of the province.[169]

On the basis of these points, the representatives of the Christian communities urged the Allied powers to use their common sense and, for the sake of Cilicia's 250,000 Christians,[170] not to hand the province over to the Turks, since it was illogical to offer the Turkish minority the privilege of ruling over a Christian majority.[171]
In an effort to show the strategic importance of Cilicia, the petitioners underlined the fact that:

. . . no peace can be achieved in the Near East, and Pan-Islamism can not be contained, unless Turkish and Arab lands are separated by a Christian Cilicia, as the Republic of Armenia is destined to serve as a buffer between the two centers of Pan-Islamism, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. [172]

The fear of a possible return to Turkish rule was not exaggerated. It was in the beginning of May 1920 that Reshad Effendy, the representative of the Ottoman government at the Peace Conference, urged Turks in Cilicia to be calm and not to engage in acts of hostility against the French occupiers, since their departure from Cilicia was only a matter of time.[173] The Turkish vali in Adana approached the Turkish population with similar requests. If anything, Reshad’s message was a bad omen for Christians in Cilicia. Moreover, it seems that at the time there was a certain amount of misunderstanding among the French officials concerning the state of affairs in Cilicia and the possible return of the province to Turkish rule. Several French officials in Beirut, for example, seemed to be dissatisfied with the way their government or the Allies in general were dealing with issues relating to Cilicia. Some sources admit that Damadian orchestrated the act of the declaration of Cilicia's independence on receiving information from a certain Dr. Malezian who was in the employment of the French High Commissioner in Beirut. Bremond states that Malezian had written to Damadian about the real course negotiations in Paris were taking. He also informed the representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia that some high-ranking French officers whose identities remain unknown-- had advised him “It was about time that Armenians make a move in Cilicia." [174] It seems also that Colonel Bremond had, on several occasions, encouraged Damadian that the time was right for Armenians to make their “move.”[175] This “much-advised” Armenian “move” was staged on August 5, 1920. On August 4, the representatives of the Christian denominations in Cilicia issued a proclamation declaring Cilicia independent under a French mandate.

Two Acts of Independence

Actually, there were not one but two acts of declaration of Cilicia’s independence. The first act was staged by Minas Veradzin, a member of the Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the editor of Giligia, the party's organ. On August 2, 1920, Veradzin single handedly declared the area between the Sihun and the Jihun Rivers independent under a French mandate. The declaration of the independence of the “Rupenian Republic” (Rupen being the prince who had founded the medieval Armenian principality of Cilicia]) read as follows:

Today, August 2, 1920, in the presence of our forces [?], I declare the area between the Sihun and Jihun Rivers and stretching until the sea an autonomous republic under French protection. Those are historical moments...We are engaged in battle with enemy forces. Even if Europe would not heed to our call, we will continue to fight the Kemalists with all our force.[176]

Veradzin's declaration complicated matters. It did not, however, stop Armenians from undertaking a more comprehensive move three days later. The French administration sent its forces to Veradzin’s “independent republic” and brought the area under its control.[177] Upon the request of the French administration Veradzin was ousted from the Armenian National Union. The French authorities immediately exiled him.[178]
The Armenian National Union had discussed the idea of an act of independence during a series of meetings held between June and July 1920. These discussions led to the formation of a second body, the Supreme National Council, which was entrusted with the task of preparing a plan of action if such a venture was to be undertaken. Yet not all Armenian factions were in favor of such an act. Many argued that it would surely create friction between Armenians and the French at a time when French friendship was much needed. The Armenian Constitutional Democratic (Ramgavar) Party, for example, during a meeting of its functionaries held on July 31, 1920, passed a resolution in which it considered declaring independence a “premature” act that is “condemned to failure.” [179] The party also stressed that “if the French authorities oppose such an act, the project of the formation of an Armenian military force to aid Hadjin would be seriously jeopardized.”[180]
During a meeting of the Supreme National Council, Veradzin proposed a plan to reoccupy Sis, which the Kemalists had already brought under their control. Veradzin's plan called for the retaking of the city and declaring Cilicia’s independence from there. This was important since by declaring independence in an area other than that which was still under French control would, to a great extent, minimize French antagonism to the concept of Cilicia's independence. [181]
Nevertheless, on August 4, 1920, the representatives of the Christian communities met and issued the statement in which they declared Cilicia independent and under French mandate.[182] The meeting also entrusted Damadian with the task of handing the statement over to the French authorities. In the evening of the same day, Damadian gave an unexpected visit to Colonel Bremond who promised to cable the contents of the statement to Beirut. Bremond also told Damadian that he would have an answer ready for him by next day.[183]
It is not clear whether Bremond's not keeping his word or the excitement within the Armenian National Union and the Supreme National Council led to the events of August 5, 1920. Accompanied by the members of his newly formed cabinet, Damadian occupied the Konak (government building) only to be forced out several hours later by French soldiers acting on orders from the chief-of-administration, Col. Bremond. [184]
Thus ended the short-lived declaration of Cilicia’s independence and the “coup d'etat” that was to secure its implementation. Five days later, on August 10, the Peace Treaty was signed at Sevres. Armenian ambitions for the creation of an autonomous entity in Cilicia were shattered.
The two acts of Cilicia's independence have been the source of much criticism even among Armenians. Amazingly, French sources seem to neglect the issue and consider it unimportant while Turkish sources never even bother to mention it. The critics of the declarations of independence stress that Damadian and the leaders of the Armenian National Union should have realized the shortcomings of such a futile venture. Moreover, the critics argue that Damadian should have known that Armenians were not properly equipped to impose their political will. Even if they possessed such political power, it was very probable that the French would have stopped them anyway.
Defending the act of August 5, 1920, and the subsequent “takeover” of government Damadian wrote:

Every act, political or other, which fails, is doomed to be criticized, since only achievements that are successful have a chance to be praised . . Yet, when it was evident that the course of events was by no means favorable for Armenians, I was convinced that something had to be done, even if that something was to be out of desperation. Moreover, this something was to be accomplished through available local means before the ratification of the peace treaty that surely was to render us incompetent . . . I must reiterate that I never feel sorry in that I participated in the events of August 5 [1920] . . . It must be stated, however, that we were weak, because we did everything out of love and admiration for France and the French people . . . This was the only reason why we did what we did without publicizing it. On that day [5 August, 1920], on the days before that and even today [Damadian wrote this part of his memoirs just before leaving Cilicia in July, 1921] we were the real masters of Adana. It was not hard for us to galvanize public support for the act and thus bring say five thousand people to the streets . . . on the contrary, it was we who advised Armenians to keep their calm and to show respect for the French authorities. [185]

The idea of a greater Armenia (perhaps the amalgamation of the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus with an autonomous Cilicia) which the Paris-based Delegation of Integral Armenia advocated and which was bitterly attacked by the French government and the media-- in fact, the term “l'Empire Arménienne » was frequently used as part of the sarcastic campaign of the French media of the day--was not, as it seems, the focus of the Armenian leadership of Cilicia when the act of independence was staged in the beginning of August 1920. Moreover, the leaders of the Armenian Republic were not receptive to such an idea which, in their opinion, had virtually no chances of materializing. This issue had caused friction between Boghos Nubar Pasha and Avedis Aharonian, the heads of the two Armenian delegations in Paris, which coalesced to form the Delegation of Integral Armenia. In an article titled "Some Thoughts About The Recent Events of Cilicia” Veradzin writes:

Outside Cilicia, the dominant idea [among Armenians] is that we want to unite this land [Cilicia] to [the Republic of] Armenia], and that all our political and military moves entertain this aim. Yet if the truth were said, such an idea had never crossed our minds. Therefore, Armenians in the Diaspora are wrong if they have that impression about us.[186]

There were no hidden reasons behind the two acts of independence. They seem to have been the result of desperation and fear of a gloomy future for Armenian presence in Cilicia. Moreover, the acts of independence were not directed against the French authorities. Yet the French administration acted as if they were by exiling Veradzin and severing all ties with Damadian and the Armenian National Union. [187]
The staging of the two acts also caused changes within the French administration in Cilicia. The Chief-of-Administration, Col. Bremond, was replaced by General Haslere who, upon his arrival in Adana, declared that:

France had occupied Cilicia motivated only by its own interests. Those who were sent here with that objective in mind [the reference is for Colonel Bremond] had failed to accomplish their task or their primary duty of keeping the peace. [188]

The French administration severed all ties with the Armenian National Union and all social and political organizations. After August 5, 1920, it dealt only with the Armenian Church and entrusted it with the task of regulating relations with the French authorities. This procedure continued uninterrupted until the evacuation of Armenians from Cilicia in late 1921 and early 1922. [189]
The last year of Armenian presence in Cilicia was one full of political and social problems. The Treaty of Sevres crushed all hopes of creating an Armenian entity in Cilicia. On the political scene, a Franco-Turkish rapprochement and a subsequent agreement to evacuate Cilicia seemed possible indeed. For months during 1921, Adana was under siege. Conditions worsened even further when the Turkish population of the city left to join the Kemalist forces north of the railway line. The French retreat of May 1920 had brought an influx of new Armenian refugees to Adana. Thus, of the almost one hundred thousand Armenians gathered in Adana the majority were refugees who had abandoned their towns and cities and crowded the provincial capital much to the dismay of the local population. [190] Newspapers urged the people to have patience and if possible to extend help to newcomers. [191]
The siege condition, coupled with acute shortages in supplies, gave way to a strong wave of en masse Armenian emigration. Although the French authorities and the Armenian leadership encouraged Armenians to stay, thousands crowded the port cities of Mersin and Alexandretta waiting for ships to carry them abroad. [192] The emigration problem compelled the Armenian leadership and the media to organize a counter campaign by disclosing the “difficulties and the desperation that emigrating Armenians were subject to in such places as Marseilles." [193]
It was under such desperate conditions that the remaining Armenians continued to defend Adana and its environs. Yet the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 1921 (the Ankara agreement) came as a coup de grace. Although the French authorities assured Armenians that their communal presence in Cilicia was secured by the terms of the agreement with Kemal, no Armenian was willing to take any chances.[194]

CONCLUSION

On October 20, 1921, the French envoy to Ankara, Franklin Bouillon signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mustafa Kemal. By signing the Ankara Accord, France and the Kemalists agreed to halt all military operations against each other and to end the state of war between them. According to the provisions of articles 3 and 8 of the agreement, the French forces were to evacuate all of Cilicia and retreat south of the Payas-Meydan Ekbes-Kilis line.[195] Thus, only the sanjak (county) of Alexandretta was to remain under French control. The rest of Cilicia was consequently traded for economic privileges and new trade possibilities that France needed in order to balance the British gains in the Levant. In any case, it was the Kemalist movement that gained from this agreement. By signing it, the French formally acknowledged the legitimacy of Kemalist Turkey and facilitated the diplomatic overtures that Kemal and his associates desired in order to approach the Allied powers.
From this perspective, the Ankara Agreement was a prelude to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) by which the fledgling Turkish Republic of Kemal gained recognition from the rest of the Allied powers thereby emerging as a strong country out of the dregs of the Ottoman Empire. By signing the Ankara Agreement, France totally neglected the aspirations of thousands of Armenians who had repatriated to Cilicia in 1919-20. By doing so, France not only forgot its previous promises of establishing an autonomous Cilicia, but also literally jettisoned Armenian interests. It was impossible for Armenians to remain in Cilicia, even though in its agreement with Kemal, France had “dictated” an article that was supposed to guarantee the rights of Armenians and other Christians in Cilicia.
When thinking about this Cilician experience, the question that asserts itself is why was it that the French finally chose to hand the province over after defending it for three years and sacrificing a great deal in terms of human resources? It is not easy to find a simple answer to such a complex question. Many factors and events spanning the three years of French occupation in Cilicia had their effect on the decision rendered.
The French administration in Cilicia neither understood the roots of the ethnic tensions between Armenians and Turks, nor the reasons behind Christian dismay of Turkish rule. In their efforts to calm the situation, the French often took measures that offended and alienated both parties thus creating an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion towards the occupiers. In the long run, this policy damaged the initial popularity of the French.
Another crucial mistake that the French committed in the Levant was that they were almost always competing against the British who, in their opinion, worked hard to diminish French gains during the postwar years. Although allegations of British intrigues were not baseless, one should not forget that the victory in the Levant was accomplished mainly through British arms.
The limited number of French forces in the Levant was perhaps the most important factor behind the shortcomings of French policies there. Most of the active French units were stationed in Syria, since France regarded it as its most important possession in the area. Therefore, the very small number of soldiers that France could deploy in Cilicia was not enough to handle the difficult task of defending an area of fifty thousand square kilometers on the boundaries of which a martial enemy driven by nationalistic zeal was consolidating its power.
The French tried to solve this military handicap through diplomatic means, but in the end that worked against them. Not having sufficient forces to assume the role of an occupier, it seems that French politicians concentrated their efforts on establishing friendly relations with the Turkish population of Cilicia. This mood was most probably motivated by Paris, where the official media was advocating friendship and conciliation with the Turks. It was impossible for the bankrupt French treasury to pay for a costly war campaign in Turkey.
This somewhat defeatist French attitude was behind the visit of the French High Commissioner in the Levant, Georges Picot, to Ankara in 1919. Although the French administration in Cilicia had some bitter words for Picot in the aftermath of the visit, the damage was done and the Kemalists understood that a major French offensive was not in the cards. This consequently dwindled French prestige and its ability to exert an unequivocal will on Cilicians.[196]
On the other hand, the inadequate policies that the French administration tried to implement in Cilicia were reasons enough to render it incompetent in maintaining its control over the province. In the case of Syria, as soon as the French took over the administration, trustworthy people replaced all Ottoman officials. The same did not take place in Cilicia. Much to the dismay of Armenians and even some French administrators, the old Ottoman government machinery was kept intact. During 1919-21, Cilicia had two Ottoman governors one of which, Nazim Bey, was a fervent Ittihadist, while the other, Jelal Bey, was an ardent Kemalist. They facilitated the spread of Kemalist propaganda and encouraged the formation of secret Kemalist cells. They did this under the very eyes of the French administration, which practically did nothing to stop their work. Moreover, the French occupation forces were unable to disarm the Turkish bands or even the population when such an order was issued.
Apparently, such mistakes ruined the morale of Armenian and even French soldiers deployed in Cilicia. The Armenian battalions were dismantled and their soldiers discharged. There were insufficient weapons, supplies, communication instruments, and transportation means. The French soldiers and their commanders had more than once acted with gallantry and shown courage in fighting against the Kemalists. This was best witnessed in Aintab where a fistful of soldiers boldly defended the city against Kemalist incursions. Yet all that was lost because of a weak administration that had to act upon the initiatives of the High Commissioner in Beirut.
From the Armenian point of view, these aspects of French policy were hints that France had already forgotten its previous engagements and was pulling out from its commitment to invest in Cilicia and its future. Yet, Armenians never tried hard enough to put a dent in French policy. Aside from the initial repatriation process no further attempts were made to extend and reorganize the repatriation effort once the French stopped financing it.
If Adana had received substantial aid and Armenian capital from abroad was invested there, the province would have been capable of accommodating many more thousands of Armenians. If such a policy was implemented, Armenians would have had a definite majority and, thus, chances of creating an Armenian entity in Cilicia would have been greater.
On the local scene, Armenian communal life in Cilicia had its problems too. Inter-party rivalries, the indifference of some Armenians toward the future of Cilicia, miserable refugee conditions, and economic difficulties weakened the community and the prospects of an autonomous Cilicia.
Compounded, all these mistakes led to the inevitable conclusion of closing the curtain over a three year Armenian experience in Cilicia. The last of the Armenians came out from there with the retreating French forces. Some built their homes in the sanjak (county) of Alexandretta only to move to Syria or Lebanon when it was handed over to Turkey in the late 1930's.[197] Others settled in Syria, Lebanon, and as far away as Europe and the United States.
* For the purpose of this article modern Turkish transliteration is utilized only in the footnotes. Personal, locale, and publications names are reproduced to give, as much as possible, the most exact phonetic rendition and yet make reading the text easier for English speaking people. It must be noted that the essay deals with a period in history where Ottoman rather than Modern Turkish was the language in use. Also, since all Armenian personal, locale, and publications names are Western Armenian, they have been phonetically reproduced as pronounced in that dialect. The Library of Congress Armenian transliteration system (based on Eastern Armenian phonetic values) is utilized in the text and footnotes to refer to names and sources that are Eastern Armenian.
[1]Robert Farrer Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Utah, 1991), pp. 176-185. The French action was aimed at curbing American missionary initiatives to help Armenians resettle. This was crucial for France because of talks about an American mandate for Armenia that might also include Cilicia. With no special funds to be able to resettle Armenians, the French administration in Cilicia resorted to collecting taxes and thus meddling in what Zeidner calls the “internal affairs” of the province, thus alienating the Turkish population there.
[2] R[uben] K. Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere ev Kilikian 1919-1921T[vakannerun] (Turkish-French Relations and Cilicia, 1919-1921) (Yerevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences Press, 1970), p. 40.
[3] Puzant Yeghiaian ed., Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun (History of Adana Armenians) (Antilias: Catholicosate of Cilicia Press, 1970), pp. 433-437. The agreement was initially signed between France, Britain, and Russia. In 1917 the Soviets disclosed its existence and made public the terms of this secret agreement, which stated that in the event of an Allied victory the Levant was to be divided into several zones of influence and occupation. Cilicia was to be incorporated into the French zone. After the October armistice, Britain, whose troops in the Levant far exceeded those of France, occupied Cilicia temporarily by stationing several British battalions there.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 226.
[6] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 132-141. The order to demobilize the Turkish Yildirim Army was entrusted to Mustafa Kemal As soon an he took over control of the army from the German Marshal, Liman Von Snders (whose officers were now on the run for their lives), Kemal started contesting the articles of the armistice, especially indicating to his superiors in Istanbul the general Allenby was adding new requirements to them. Finally, Kemal left for Istanbul and in turn entrusted the evacuation of the army units, officer cadres, and, more importantly, the huge amount of guns and munitions left over by the Germans, to his inferiors who attached some of the units to existing gendarme forces in Cilicia.
[7] Recep Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri (Days of Heroism) (Istanbul: T.T. Postasi matbaasi, 1961), 14. See also:
Paul Du Veou, La Passion De La Cilicie, 1919-1922 (The Passion For Cilicia, 1919-1922) (Paris: Librerie Orientalist, 1954), p. 64.
[8] Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, p. 14.
[9] Edouard Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), p. 345.
[10] Ibid., 345.
[11] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 119.
[12] Dikran H. Boyadjian, Haygagan Lekeone, Badmagan Hushakrutiun (The Armenian Legion: A Historical Memoir) (Watertown: Baykar Press, 1965), pp. 190-191.
[13]Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), p. 365.
[14] Kasim Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali Ve Kurtulus Savasi (Chukurova’s Occupation and Its War of Independence) (Istanbul: Berksoy Matbaasi, 1963), 23; Bremond, “The Bremond Mission,” p. 43.
[15]Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29 (Winter 1976-1977), 346.
[16] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p.120.
[17] Pierre Andre Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman (Cilicia and the Ottoman Problem) (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1921), pp. 76-77.
[18] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 119.
[19] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920, The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 346.
[20] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 119.
[21] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920, The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 348.
[22] Du Veou, La Passion De La Cilicie, , p. 91; Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 122.
23 Sh[mavon] T. Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, 1919-1920 (The National-Liberation Movements of Cilician Armenians, 1919-1920) (Yerevan: 1987), p. 86.
24 Sh[mavon] T. Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, 1919-1920 (The National-Liberation Movements of Cilician Armenians, 1919-1920) (Yerevan: Univ. of Yerevan Press, 1987), p. 86.
25 Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, pp. 21, 41, 64.
26 Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 349.

[27] Ibid, p. 348; Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin, 95. French sources (Bremond, Du Veau, Redan) often speak about economic difficulties that Cilicia encountered and how these were temporarily remedied by payments from the French Exchequer. See also: Robert Farrer Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Utah, 1991), 176-185. This is not what Zeidner tries to convey in his dissertation where he underlines the fact that France practically left Bremond on his own in terms of finding financial resources for Cilicia. It must be noted that the central Ottoman government too had promised to take care of repatriation. However, this could not be expected from an entity that was surviving through loans from the Allied powers and especially Britain.
[28] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920, The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 348.
[29] Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, p. 67.
[30] Ibid., 65-66.
[31] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 438.
[32] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 126.
[33] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problème Ottoman, p. 85.
[34] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 126.
[35] Edouard Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30,
p. 35.
[36] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, p. 78.
[37] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p.43. About the formation of the organization's cells in Cilicia see: Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, pp. 64-65.
[38] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali,, p. 20.
[39] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 214-215.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. 19-20. See also, Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 364.
[42] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 352. See also: Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 113. French and Armenian sources (and to some extent Turkish sources) mention that Hashim Bey, head of the gendarme forces, and Nazim Bey, the vali, were instrumental in planning the uprising in Adana in February 1919. They secretly encouraged Turks to smuggle arms into the city. The French administration, however, uncovered the plot.
[43] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 352. It is interesting to note that Zeidner calls this Armenian gendarme force a “militia.” Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 216.
[44] This had to do with the Armenian demand of the creation of an independent Armenian state incorporating Cilicia as was presented by the Joint Armenian delegation headed by Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha. This demand was severely scrutinized in French political circles and the media. The rubric “l’Empire Arménienne” was often used sarcastically as a reference to an unfathomable Armenian demand.
[45] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, pp. 102-103.
[46] Ibid., pp. 96-97. According to the provisions of the Mudros armistice, the Ottoman government in Constantinople was liable to pay all expenses for Armenian repatriation to Cilicia (See Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 349). It seems, however, that after a marginal initial payment, the Turkish government neglected its duties in this regard. Consequently, the French High Commissariat in Beirut was burdened with the costs of transporting Armenians from Syria to Cilicia. Bremond also states that the repatriation of Armenians to Cilicia was halted in September 1919, when the French High Commissioner stopped paying money for that purpose. It must be assumed then, that Armenian repatriation to Cilicia after September 1919 was accomplished through sums allocated by Armenian and other humanitarian organizations.
[47] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30 (Spring 1977), p. 35.
[48] Ibid., p. 34.
[49] Ibid., p. 35.
[50] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p. 27. Kasim Ener states that after his appointment, and while still in Istanbul, the new vali, Jelal Bey, had already written to Kemalist leaders in Cilicia and informed them of his future moves. Many Kemalists greeted the new vali at the station in Adana when he arrived there by train. According to Colonel Bremond, Jelal Bey, upon his arrival, pretended to be sick for two days during which he held extensive meetings with Turkish notables and Kemalist leaders. Bremond, “The Bremond Mission,” vol. 30, p. 40.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p. 28.
[53] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920, The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 36.
[54] Ibid., p. 38. Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 340-350. The French kept their withdrawal secret even from the American missionaries stationed in the city.
[55] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, p. 250. According to Zeidner 5,000 Armenians were able to flee with the retreating French forces.
[56] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, pp. 38-39. In fact, it was after the fall of Marash; the intense pressure by the Kemalists on Bozanti; the initial skirmishes in Aintab; and the first abandonment of that city that the 20 days truce of May 28 was signed between the French and the Kemalists. The truce was signed to save the French detachment in Bozanti. Bremond, however, argues (Bremond, “The Bremond Mission,” vol. 30, p. 47) that this goal was never achieved since Bozanti fell to the Kemalists anyway. Moreover, the truce alienated those Turks that opposed Kemal who put their faith in the French occupation forces. “Now," states Bremond, "they [the anti-Kemalist Turks] found themselves obliged to rally to Kemalism". Kemal did not honor the truce. In Colonel Bremond's opinion, the twenty days were enough for him to reorganize his forces and start a new offensive. On the other hand, Turkish sources regard the May 28 truce as a tactical move on the part of the French. Kasim Ener, for example, states, that it was because of this truce that the French and Armenians had the time to evacuate Is (Koran) and to organize their defenses in and around Adana. Ener, op. cit., p. 71.
[57] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 44.
[58] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p. 49.
[59] Ibid., p. 37.
[60] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 43.
[61] Ibid., p. 46.
[62] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 226.
[63] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 442.
[64] Dikran Boyadjian, Haygakan Lekeone, Badmagan Hushakrutiun (The Armenian Legion: A Historical Memoir) (Watertown: Baykar Printing, 1965), p. 133.
[65] Guevork Gotikian, “La Legion d’Orient, Le mandate français et l’expulsion des Arméniens,” Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, tom III, numéro special, 1999, pp. 251-324. This lengthy article also introduces the main agreements concerning the formation of the Legion d’Orient. Especially important is the first document in the appendix (pp. 314-318, and p. 256 of the article) titled “Instruction sur l’organisation de la Légion d’Orient,” which contains a point stressing that in accordance to a special instruction soldiers serving in the Legion will have “leurs allocations, qui seront en principe equivalents a celles du soldat français.” Also, instruction No. 7.966-9/11 of November 26, 1916 mandated that besides being treated in an equivalent fashion to French soldiers, soldiers of the legion would also have their monthly salaries, pensions, and family allocations in accordance to what French soldiers were entitled to. Of course these initial agreement points were never implemented,
[66] Ibid., p. 165.
[67] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, pp. 422-423.
[68] Boyadjian, Haykakan Lekeone, p. 133.
[69] Ibid., p. 165.
[70] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 432; Kasbar Menag, Giankis Ughinerov (On The Paths of My Life) (Beirut: Shirag Press, 1968), pp. 33-34; Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus, pp. 141-144. Zeidner tries to present the Armenian legionnaires as rude and rogue soldiers who were only amused by harassing people. He states that they were not welcomed in Beirut because of fights that they instigated with local Muslims.
[71] Boyadjian, Haygagan Lekeone, p. 191.
[72] Ibid., p. 192.
[73] Ibid., pp. 195-196; Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus, pp. 148, 155-158. Once again, Zeidner states that it was the Armenian soldiers who instigated fights with the local Muslims (notice the careful use of the word rather than Turks). However, he admits that one such incident started when Armenian legionnaires were trying to rescue an Armenian girl from a Turkish harem.
[74] Boyadjian, Haykakan Lekeone, pp. 197-198.
[75] Dalkir, Yigitlik Gunleri, pp. 45, 48.
[76] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 110.
[77] Boyadjian Haykakan Lekeone, pp. 202-203.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 65.
[80] Boyadjian, Haykakan Lekeone, p. 204.
[81] Ibid., p. 216.
[82] Ibid.; those were:- Lieutenant John Shishmanian (United States); Lieutenant Vahakn Portukalian (France); Lieutenant Aspiran Vahe Sahatjian; Lieutenant Papazian ( from the French Legion Etranger).
[83] Boyadjian, Haykakan Lekeone, pp. 216-217.
[84] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 565.
[85] Ibid., p. 563.
[86] Ibid., pp. 578-579.
[87] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. V-X. See the preface to Pierre Redan's book written by Rene Pinon.
[88] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, pp. 61-63.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. 115-116. Production figures for 1914 were, according to Yeghiayan, 150,000 bales (about 300,000 tons) of quality Cleveland cotton.
[91] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problem Ottoman, pp. 115-116.
[92] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, pp. 355-356. Also see: Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, p. 153.
[93] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Patmutiun, pp. 154-155. According to pre-war figures, the two ports of Mersin and Alexandretta combined had an annual:
- Export volume of.............................. 1,575,300tons.
- Import volume of............................... 515,800 tons.
- Revenues from customs.................. 1,059,500 Ottoman piasters.
[94] Redan, La Cilicie et le Problème ottoman, p. 15.
[95] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 148-151.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 348.
[98] Ibid., p. 363.
[99] Ibid., p. 355.
[100] “Hamesd Khorhrtadzutiun Oravartski Khntrin Artiv” (A Modest Thought Concerning The Daily Wage Issue), Davros, (Adana, October 15, 1919), p. 3.
[101] Ibid.
[102] “Bashdonagan Zeguyts” (Official Report), Davros, (Adana, October 12, 1919), p. 2.
[103] Ibid.
[104] “Hay Arhestagtsagan Enthanur Miutiun” (General Union of Armenian Workers), Davros, (Adana,
January 25, 1920), p. 1; "Pnagaranneru Hartse Adanayi Mech" (The Housing Issue in Adana), Davros,
(Adana, November 3, 1920), pp. 1-2.
[105] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 355.
[106] “Zeguyts” (Report), Davros (Adana, November 28, 1919), p. 2.
[107] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 355.
[108] Ibid., p. 356.
[109] “Bashdonagan Zeguyts” (Official Report), Davros (Adana, June 11, 1920), p. 2.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun., pp. 157-158.
[112] Ibid., p. 160.
[113] Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[114] Ibid., pp. 721-722.
[115] Ibid., p. 724. During the period under discussion there were three hospitals operating in Adana. Those were: - -The City Hospital...................... 150 beds.
-The Red Cross Hospital............ 50 beds.
-The American Hospital............. 100 beds.
[116] “Katsek ev Desek'” (Go and See), Davros (Adana, December 30, 1919), p. 2.
[117] “Adanan Aroghchabahagan Desagedov” (Adana From a Sanitary Point of View), Davros (Adana, November 20, 1920), p. 1.
[118] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 720-721.
[119] Ibid., p. 722.
[120] Ibid., p. 724.
[121] Ibid., p. 460.
[122] Mihran Damadian, Im Husheres (From My Memoirs) (Beirut: Zartonk Press, 1985), p. 142.
[123] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 650.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 29, p. 354.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Yeghiayan, Zhamanakakits Badmutiun Gatoghigosutian Hayots Giligio, 1914-1972, (Contemporary History of the Catholicosate of Armenians of Cilicia, 1914-1972) (Antilias: Catholicosate of Cilicia Press, , 1975), p. 97.
[129] Ibid., p. 98.
[130] Ibid., pp. 98-99.
[131] Yeghiaian, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 689.
[132] Ibid., pp. 699-706.
[133] Ibid., pp. 654-655.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid., p. 712. Four of the existing six publishing houses belonged to political parties. Two were private (one in Adana and the other in Mersin).
[136] Ibid., p. 710.
[137] Ibid.
[138] “Haydararutiun” (Announcement), Davros (Adana, November 27,1920), p. 2.
[139] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 709-712.
[140] Ibid., p. 712.
[141] Ibid., p. 711.
[142] Damad Arikoglu, Hatiralarim (My Memoirs) (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1961), pp. 172-173. Those were: 1- Ferda (The Future, Tomorrow), owned and edited by Ali Hilmi Bey, an anti-Ittihadist Turkish liberal who was a member of the prewar Turkish I’tilaf (Mutual Agreement) Party: 2- Adana Postasi (The Adana Post) owned by Huseyin Ilham Pasha: 3- Rehber (The Guide) owned and edited by Istanbullizadeh Yusuf. When pro-Kemalist Turkish notables and agitators left Adana for Bozanti after it was taken over by Kemal, a Turkish press was established and the newspaper Yeni Adana (New Adana) was published. This Kemalist pamphlet was secretly distributed among Turks in Adana. It ran articles and news items that described imaginary Kemalist victories. The militant editors of Yeni Adana wrote in a distinct nationalistic tone, often inciting Turks against the French and Armenians. Le Courier d'Adana, on the other hand, was the only French newspaper published in Cilicia during 1919-1921.
[143] Damadian, Im Husheres, p. 8. See part I of Damadian's memoirs for information about his early revolutionary activities, his teaching positions, and membership in Armenian revolutionary/political parties first as a Hnchakist, then Reformist Hnchakist, and finally as a Sahmanatragan Ramgavar (Constitutional Populist).
[144] Ibid., pp. 112-120.
[145] Ibid., p. 147.
[146] Bedros Depoian, Mihran Damadian, 1863-1945 (Beirut: Zartonk Press, 1964), p.186.
[147] Mikayel Natanian, "Kilikian Husher, Badmagan Kani Me Pasdatughter," (Cilician Memoirs, Some Historical Documents), Hasg, No. 18 (October 1949), p. 293.
[148] Ibid., pp.293-294.
[149] Ibid., p. 295; Depoian, Mihran Damadian, pp. 192-194. It seems that Damadian was enthusiastic about an Armeno-Turkish agreement. He negotiated with Turkish notables under the political platform “Cilicia to Cilicians” be they Armenians, Turks or others. Damadian knew that such an agreement would benefit Cilician Armenians. For that reason he welcomed Col. Bremond's suggestion to meet and to negotiate with Turkish notables.
[150] Depoian, Mihran Damadian, p. 185. Damadian remained in Cilicia until July 18, 1921.
[151] Ibid., p. 196.
[152] Ibid., p. 197.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid., p. 198.
[155] Ibid., p. 168.
[156] Mikayel Natanian, “Kilikian Husher, Varchagan Marminneru Gazmagerbchakan Ganonakirnere,” (Cilician Memoirs, The Organizational Bylaws Of The Governing Bodies), Hasg, No. 19: 299 (July-August 1950), 208-209.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid., p. 210.
[159] Ibid., p. 211. Damadian presided over the meetings.
[160] Ibid., p. 212.
[161] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 235; Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, pp. 690, 693.
[162] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 691.
[163] Ibid., p. 692.
[164] Ibid., pp. 695-696.
[165] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 177-212. In presenting the eight-month long siege and the subsequent takeover of Hadjin by the Kemalist forces Torossian relies on the memoirs of H. Terzian, published in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1956. Terzian was one of the leaders of the self-defense of Hadjin and an eyewitness to the events he relates. According to him only several hundred inhabitants out of a population totaling 6,000 to 8,000 were able to flee after the Kemalist takeover. Terzian blames Damadian for Armenian losses in Hadjin. According to Torossian Terzian is motivated by inter-party rivalry, since he was a member of the ARF.
[166] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, pp. 254, 279. The issue of an American mandate for Cilicia alone, or in a format whereby it is incorporated within a greater Armenian state was worrying French authorities since April 1919. Moreover, French contention to place Cilicia within their Syrian mandate was the highlight of French military thought in Beirut and Adana. However, high-ranking French military personnel in Constantinople were against the idea. They favored Picot’s idea of returning Cilicia to Turkey in exchange for future economic privileges. It was in this perspective that the issue of the Armenian Legion became a thorny one, since Kemal had communicated his hostility toward the idea of an Armenian army under French supervision.
[167] For the complete text of the petition see: Depoian, Mihran Damadian, pp. 188-192.
[168] This is yet another indication of the validity of the proposal of annexing Cilicia to France’s Syrian mandate.
[169] Ibid., p. 189.
[170] Ibid., p. 191.
[171] Ibid., p. 189.
[172] Ibid., pp. 190-191. Depoian maintains that this statement is exaggerated, since the two ideologies (i.e. Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist) are not comparable. For a more detailed analysis on the difference between the two ideologies see also: Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), pp. 8, 14, 17-19.
[173] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 235.
[174] Ener, Cukurova'nin Isgali, p. 91; Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 467.
[175] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun, p. 492. See also: Depoian, Mihran Damadian, p. 213.
[176] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, pp. 225-226.
[177] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 244.
[178] Damadian, Im Husheres, p. 175. Damadian was even asked by French authorities to issue a statement criticizing Veradzin's act. Veradzin settled in Boston and for a time was the editor of the ARF organ, Hayrenik.
[179] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, pp. 242.
[180] Ibid..
[181] Ibid., p. 243.
[182] Ibid., pp. 209-213.
[183] Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, pp. 224-225.
[184] Yeghiayan, Adanayi Hayots Badmutiun , p. 493; Sahakian, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 225. The cabinet was formed as follows:-
- Mihran Damadian, Prime Minister.
- Vahram ZhamGochian, Minister of War & Gendarmerie (Hnchakist).
- Garabed Nalbandian, Minister of Agriculture (Hnchakist).
- Antranig Genjian, Minister of Economy (Hnchakist).
- Dr. Mnatsaganian, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Dashnakist).
- Dr. Bezirjian, Minister of Interior Affairs (Ramgavar).
- Lient Jeane, Minister of Education (Assyrian).
[185] Damadian, Im Husheres, pp. 171-181.
[186] Torossyan, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, pp. 238-239.
[187] Bremond, “The Bremond Mission, Cilicia in 1919-1920,” The Armenian Review, vol. 30, p. 61.
[188] Depoian, Mihran Damadian, p. 198.
[189] Torossian, Kilikiayi Hayeri Azgayin-Azatagrakan Sharzhumnere, p. 253.
[190] "Dkegh Yerevuytner" (Ugly Occurrences), Davros (Adana, November 13, 1920), pp. 1-2.
[191] Ibid., p. 2.
[192] "Mi Kaghtek" (Do Not Emigrate), Davros (Adana, October 3, 1920), p. 2.
[193] "Kaghtaganneru Hosanke" (The Stream of Emigrants), Davros (Adana, October 3, 1920), p. 2.
[194] The exception being some Armenian Catholic families who remained behind, alongside Syrian Orthodox and Maronite families, in Mersin and Adana only to be driven out in 1924-25. See: Vahe Tachjian, “Le sort de minorities de Cilicie et de ses environs sous le regime kémaliste dans les années 1920,” Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, tom III, numéro special, 1999, pp. 351-375.
[195] Sahakyan, Turk Fransiakan Haraberutyunnere, p. 235.
[196] Zeidner, The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922, p. 284. According to Zeidner Ali Fu’ad (Cebesoy) was present during at least one of the meetings between Picot and Kemal in Sivas. It was during this meeting that Picot told Kemal that Armenian forces were temporary in Cilicia and were to be withdrawn. Moreover, Picot confided in Kemal that George Clemenceau was not to win the elections in France and that Aristide Briand will replace him and cause French policy to come to a rapprochement with Turkey.
[197] The sanjak of Alexandretta is a point of contention between Turkey and Syria even today.