FIVE DECADES OF ISLAMICRESURGENCE IN EGYPT ‎

FIVE DECADES OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN EGYPT, 1930 –1980:
PORTRAITS OF CHARISMATICLEADERS


GARABET K. MOUMDJIAN




I. Introduction

For the past two decades, the terms Islamic Resurgence and Muslim Fundamentalism have become a permanent feature of American and more generally Western lexicon. So much so, that they are frequently used in the mass media and television broadcasts. The terms are presented within news items, but never as concepts that need deep analysis. In a sense they are constantly chewed but never digested. Even academic ventures in this regard – whatever caliber of honesty and objectivity they may possess – have yet been unable to bring forth an acceptable level of understanding and insight toward an issue, which has induced radical change within the Islamic and international political spheres. Stereotyping Muslim fundamentalists as vengeful enemies of the West continues to be the prevailing policy of consecutive American administrations. No real effort was, is, or will be made, it seems, to acquire a thorough understanding of what Muslim Fundamentalism is about.
Generally speaking, Westerners, and Americans in particular, have been in one way or another familiarized with the terms Muslim Fundamentalism or Extremism, and they had acquired a marginal knowledge about what it entails. Nevertheless, the totality of this fundamentalist ideology and the leaders who had shaped and propagated it throughout the decades remain almost alien to western culture and politics.
It is with the intention of shedding some light on this subject that writing this essay is undertaken. It tries to find some basic facts about Muslim Fundamentalist leaders. Who are those people? From what background did they emerge and evolve? What ideological factors and popular underpinnings influenced them? These are only few of the questions that impose themselves upon us, especially if we believe that such movements possess direct correlation with the very leaders and intellectuals who shaped them.
The narrative, however, never assumes to be a complete analysis of the broader subject of Muslim Fundamentalism. Nor is it an attempt of semantic rationalization of the subject under discussion. What it really intends to be is no more than a compilation of biographical data and a preliminary analysis of the ideologies of the Islamicist leaders in Egypt from the formation of the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam’iyat al Ikhwan al Muslimin). The approach and the methodology used in researching the essay are a blend of the historical and the psychoanalytical domains. The chronological approach in sequencing the leaders and their respective social, political, and ideological frameworks is intentional. It is geared toward enhancing the periodic development of these elements.
Finally, one must admit that the greatest difficulty of the research is that the subject is not an historical one. It does not yet belong to the realm of the past. It is still lived and discussed. Therefore, no final evaluations of it can yet be possibly derived. What can be expected, however, from this retrograde probe is a raw appraisal of Islamic charismatic leadership and its importance in the path that Muslim Fundamentalism has traversed. A lot can be learned from this. If we subscribe to the universal notion that history moves forward in an upward mobile, cyclical, pattern while regenerating and recreating the elements of the past, it follows, then, that by unfolding and dissecting the patterns of Muslim Fundamentalism, we can find remedies for present and future dangers emanating from it.



II. Islamic Resurgence: A Centuries-Old “Tradition”

In his book titled “Islam in Revolution” H.R. Dekmejian stresses that “…an outstanding character of Islamic Fundamentalism is its cyclic propensity and that
“…Manifestations of religious resurgence correspond to periods of intense spiritual, social, and political crisis.” It must be stated that his “cyclic propensity” is not something peculiar only to Islam. . As a matter of fact, “…Manifestations of religious resurgence” can also be traced in almost all other religions. Otherwise, what other explanation can one give to reformist Christian movements that continue to emerge in different forms even today? However, what is interesting here is that each religion reacts in a certain way to social, political, and/or economic crisis that strikes its respective society.
Dekmejian’s theoretical interpretation is derived from a thorough examination and observation of fourteen centuries of Islamic history. As in the case of reformist styles in other religions, it seems that Islam too has devised a certain inner dynamics in response to “periods of crisis,” the first and oldest of which can be considered the “succession crisis,” following the death of the prophet Mohammed. The same “dynamic response” is also apparent in the decline of the Ummayad dynasty, propagated by the teachings of the Imams Abu Hanifa and Malik; the Abbasid degeneration and subsequent demise through the writings of Ibn Taamiya, Ibn al Qayyim, and Ibn Khatir; and finally, the Ottoman decline that gave rise to militant fundamentalist Islamic movements such as the Wahabiya (in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula), and the Mahdiya (In the Sudan), both on the peripheries of the Ottoman Empire. 2
The inability of the Ottomans in facing western colonial penetration and the economic instability of their empire gave rise on the one hand to the secularist “Young Ottomans” and “Young Turks” movements (operating according to a Turkish nationalist agenda formulated by some émigré reformists such as Midhat Pasha in the 1850’s and Ahmed Riza in the 890’s), and, on the other hand to a new wave of Islamic reformist movements. The most important catalyst for the latter was the Muslim mujtahid (intellectual, researcher) Jamal ul Din al Afghani (1838-1897). Through his writings, al Afghani advocated a new Pan-Islamic ideology. The Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II adopted al Afghani’s ideas. The sultan even welcomed him into his palace as a consultant. Abdul Hamid tried to rescue the empire by uniting and strengthening the sultanate as was predicted by al Afghani. His attempts, however, were too little too late.
Meanwhile, al Afghani’s teachings had their profound effect on his Egyptian disciple Muhammad ‘Abdo, who constructed the Salafiya (from the Arabic Salaf, forefather) Movement on the premise of reestablishing the Islamic ‘Umma (nation, Society) as constituted by the prophet. However, what Abdo was trying to accomplish was to invigorate his Salafiya Movement in a modernized setting, which was ready to absorb technological advances and developments from the West, yet was also capable of implementing them in a reformulated form for the benefit of his envisioned Umma.
The teachings of Abdo and his Syrian disciple Rashid Rida paved the way for the formation of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Abdo’s Salafiya Movement gained many adherents in al Azhar, Egypt’s unique institution for the study of Islamic theology and law. These reformists, however, were criticized and opposed by the more conservative, traditionalist ‘ulemas (learned persons) who condemned Abdo’s theories of modernization. On the other hand, the Salafists were also chastised by western educated, modernized intellectuals who were striving to forge a secular society and eventually a state, based on the western notions of democracy and nationalism. This “dual front” fighting obliged Abdu, Rida, and their followers to take a stance that was closer to the conservative, traditionalist ‘ulemas whom they despised. However, Rida was not to give in so easily. By retaining most of the qualities and fervor of a Muslim modernist and revivalist, he even went as far as to formulate a new philosophy, the “Defensive Jihad,” which stipulated that, if and when persecuted, modernist Muslims had the right to defend themselves against conservatives.3
The sociopolitical atmosphere in Egypt at the turn of the century was a complex one. Society in general was bombarded with ideas of nationalism, egalitarianism, democracy and secularism. The writings of westernized “enlightened” intellectuals such as Taha Husain, Salama Musa, Nkula Haddad, Farah Antun, Shibli Shamil, Kasim Amin, Walieddin Yakun, and others perpetuated these notions. There was a fledgling literary movement, and many newspapers offered their readers article written by the above mentioned intellectuals. This almost dominant nationalistic tone culminated in the Arabi Revolution of 1919, where massive demonstrations and several attacks against British colonialists were recorded. Urabi’s revolution was eventually overwhelmed by superior British military power. Yet, the effect it had on the masses was profound. The people abandoned the loyalty to the puppet king Fu’ad and his administration, which were under direct British control.
Legally, Egypt was still a part of the decaying Ottoman Empire, whose new leaders, the Young Turks, hastened the destruction of the Empire by joining World War One on the side of Germany and its allies. They embarked on a Pan-Turanic (Pan-Turkic) venture, which led to the genocide of Armenians in the Empire. For millions of Muslim Arabs, the Ottoman sultan had for centuries been accepted as the highest religious and secular authority that amalgamated the Muslims of the empire under the banner of Islam. The disintegration of the Ottoman State and the rise of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) created a severe identity crisis for Arabs. Kemal soon abolished the Caliphate and founded a secular state constructed along milli (national) lines. Kemal’s work alienated devoted Muslims. Religious reformists considered his actions deviations from the true Islamic path and an obvious return to jahiliyya (pre-Islamic paganism).4 Kemal has been regarded ever since as an enemy of Islam.
In Egypt, which was dominated by Britain since 1881, colonialists had already expanded their sphere of activity into the Sudan. The British pressured the palace. They practically had the king under their control. While Islamicist and nationalist ideas were then spreading within the populace, Britain was implementing a policy of divide and rule to further strengthen its control. Moreover, Egypt was flooded with thousands of Englishmen who held preponderance on the country’s economy. As is the case in every classic colonial rule, England had dominated almost every aspect of Egyptian life. Its missionary movements had opened schools. A generation already was being educated in those institutions. Their presence and support of Christian Egyptians complicated the situation even further. “The Anglican hierarchy in particular annoyed the British residency by demanding that the latter impose certain changes in Egyptian law or policy on behalf of all Egyptian Christians.”
The activities of the missionaries sparked an anti-missionary sentiment within the predominantly Muslim society, and especially within the circles of nationalist intellectuals. Soon, political parties such as Hisb al Islah ‘ala al Mabadi al Wataniya all Dasturiyya (Party of Reform along National Constitutional Principles), al Hisb al Watani (Nationalist Party) al Hisb al Watani al Hurr (Free National Party), Hisb al Makasid al Mushtaraka (Party of Common Aims), and others emerged.
It was in this saturated atmosphere of colonial oppression, nationalistic drive, and Islamicist fervor that Hasan al Banna, the founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers was born and raised. Al Banna founded the Society in 1928 at a time when anti-British sentiment had reached its zenith and an intellectual ferment about the future of Islamic society and its role had almost saturated.






III. Hasan al Banna: Organizer, Politician, and Charismatic Leader.

The organization which al Banna founded, Jam’iyyat al Ikhwan al Muslimin (The Society of Muslim Brothers), “more than any other organization, has been the ideological epicenter of fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and Islamic world.” 5
Hasan Ahmad Abd al Rahman al Banna was born in October 1906, in the town of Tir’at al Ahmadiyya, in the Buheyra province of Egypt, to a religious family of the traditional Hanbali line.6 His father, Ahmad all Banna was a graduate of al Azhar, where he had studied under the guidance of the Islamic activist Muhammad ‘Abdu. The father was the local M’azun (marriage judge), Imam (Muslim clergy) and teacher. Al Banna was thus raised in a strictly religious environment.7 Having been exposed to this Islamic, religious milieu, al Banna developed an attitude that was diametrically opposed to those who advocated the formation of a secularized, modernized state in Egypt. In his memoirs (that were later printed under the title Muzakkarat al Da’wa wa al Da’iya ( Memoirs of the Mission and the Missionary, al Banna writes about the frustration which he felt during his youth because of the secularization drive that engulfed Egyptian society:

“I think that my people have diverted from the aims of their faith as a result of the political periods through which it passed, and the new social themes to which it was exposed under the spell of European civilization, materialistic philosophy and western traditions.”8

A huge biographic literature exists about al Banna’s life and work. What is more interesting and deserves to be noted, however, is that most of his biographers are either ardent followers or bitter enemies. The former tend to create an aura of mysticism around his character, like the story of the snake who was unable to bite the infant al Banna which was witnessed by the father or that of the 12-year-old al Banna destroying the statue of a half naked woman situated in the Ter'aa (waterway) of his hometown, while the latter, mostly Nassirists attack him and his ideology, but are unable to objectively deconstruct his mystic aura.9
Al Banna’s early studies were conducted at the Kuttab (Qur’anic) school of his birthplace. As a twelve year old, he participated in the Jama’at al Suluk al Ijtimiyya (Society of Social Behavior) which directed its members, and through them, the society, to behave piously in accordance with the Qur’an and the teachings of the prophet. Three years later, al Banna was elected president of the society. Despite his very young age, he proved to be a brilliant leader and manager. He continued his studies at the Kuttab School, where he became competent in reciting Qur’anic verses and conducting interesting and intelligent arguments about the holy writings with the mature and educated people of his town.11
Before relocating to Damanhour to continue his education, al Banna became a member of the Jama’at al Nahi ‘an ‘al Munkar (Society of Diversion from the Forbidden, i.e. alcohol). He also inspired the creation of the Hasafiya Benevolent Organization, which was primarily oriented toward charity. This organization was formed “with a two-fold aim: to fight for the preservation of Islamic morality, and to resist the work of the Christian missionaries in town.”12
As an active religious teenager, al Banna lived through and even participated in the massive demonstrations of the Urabi Revolution, a spontaneous reaction to British colonial occupation. The nationalist mood of the Revolution engulfed Egyptian youth. Al Banna was not an exception. The young Islamicist occupied himself with the study of medieval Islamic Sufism. He became a true believer in the teachings of the contemporary Hamid al Ghazali. He was especially fond of al Ghazali’s book Ihya’ ‘Ulum al Din (Regenerating the Religious Sciences). Al Ghazali advocated and stressed the importance of religious higher education instead of a secular one. Even though he truly adhered to the idea of propagating higher education, al Banna transferred to Cairo and entered the Teachers Preparatory School. Upon graduation, he registered at the Dar al ‘Ulum (Faculty of Sciences), the highest institution of secular education, established in 1873.13 As a student in his institution, al Banna was in the center of the social and political transformations that were developing in the Egyptian capital. Soon he himself became a participant.
It was While he was in Cairo that al Banna frequented the Salafiyya library (al Maktaba al Salafiyya) where he established a close friendship with the librarian, Muhib El Din al Khatib. Under the latter’s guidance and tutelage, al Banna read extensively. He literally delved into the old and new Islamicist literature. It was Al Khatib who introduced al Banna to the reformist Rashid Rida.14
Al Banna was also active in the religious societies operating in Cairo such as Jamiyyat al Shubban al Muslimin (Society of Muslim Youth), However, he was disappointed by the elitist attitude of its leadership, He exposed his dissatisfaction with a series of articles in al Manar, where he advocated the creation of a popular Islamic organization that would appeal to the masses and not only to a certain segment. Al Banna also wrote about reform within the society along Islamic traditions.15
In 1927, al Banna accepted a teaching position in al Isma’iliyya. One year later, he initiated the society that he had envisioned. The creation of the Jam’iyyat al Ikhwan al Muslimin (Society of Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood for short) was announced during a meeting that al Banna held with six workers from the Suez Canal Company operating in al Isma’iliyya.16 Even though at the time of its formation the Society was based on workers based on the Canal and peasants in nearly towns, in the following years, many of the new cadres were recruited from amongst middle class professionals. There were even some members with very high social status. The bulk of the membership (the lower echelons) constituted of industrial workers (city branches) and peasants (rural branches).17
H.R. Dekmejian personifies al Banna as the avatar of 20th century Sunni revivalism. He was the unique embodiment of the Sufi spiritualist, Islamic scholar, and activist leader who possesses a rare ability to evoke mass support by translating doctrinal complexities into social action....It [al Banna’s movement] succeeded in galvanizing and organizing a mass following as no other Islamic movement had done in recent centuries.... The Brotherhood constituted the organizational extension of al Banna’s charismatic personality. Al Banna’s emergence typifies Weber’s charismatic leader who appears in times of crisis with a message of social, spiritual salvation.”18
From the day he initiated the Muslim Brotherhood until his assassination, and even afterwards, al Banna attained (and continues to attain) the image of an extremely charismatic leader and politician who is always able to mobilize huge numbers of people towards his cause. On one hand, he had to share political power with a king who held the Egyptian army under tight control, but was a mere puppet of the British and, on the other hand, with an opposition formulated along nationalist-secularist lines. Many blame al Banna as a traditional Islamicist who sided with the ‘Ameel (conspirator) king against the nationalist front. Some authors, (especially those whose works appeared during the Nassirist era when the Brotherhood was banned) go a far as labeling him an accomplice of the ‘Abidin Palace (the king’s residence) and consequently of the British colonialists. Although there might be a kernel of truth in these accusations, it is certain they are simple exaggerations. Others try to be more objective by explaining that al Banna’s cordial approach towards the king was not a sign of “treason” since it entertained two important objectives: 1) The new king, Farouk, enjoyed a good degree of popularity and he was regarded as a true Egyptian striving to free his country from foreign rule. Therefore, al Banna tried to approach him and to become an instrument for the implementation of Islamist reforms (by announcing the king as the Khalifa [Caliph] of all Muslims); 2) Al Banna approached the king and his prime minister through a series of letters underlining hi concern about the missionary movement and demanded from them “to seek reform in the name, and within the spirit and letter of Islam,”19 to rid Islamic society from this malicious ailment.
The main question that asserts is: What was the reason or what were the reasons behind al Banna’s success? What tools, political, social or other, did he use to secure the fruition of his efforts?
A quick look at al Banna’s two-decades long political career reveals some very important, and at the same time interesting, characteristics that might at this point, be brought to focus.
The first observation is that al Banna was a hard worker. This is especially true during the first years following the formation of the Society. He used to tour hundreds of villages where he preached about the true light and agitated the peasantry. Later, when the Society’s headquarters relocated to Cairo, he was a permanent presence there leading prayers, illiteracy classes, and Qur’anic interpretation sessions. Al Banna’s extensive travels and at the same time his presence at the Cairo headquarters brought him in contact with thousands of members, who boasted that they personal acquaintances with the al Murshid al ‘Am (The Supreme Guide), a title that al Banna assumed for himself.
Secondly, it follows that the numerous travels and the personal relations with the members of the lower echelons of the Society led to the establishment of a tight yet enormous network around the leader. This enhanced al Banna’s charismatic appeal, especially when the Society expanded into some 1500 branches totaling some one million members.20
Thirdly, al Banna’s charismatic character was his extensive usage of adjectives, which show grandeur. Aside from his new title of al Murshid al ‘Am, appellations such as Rajul ul sa’a (the Man of the Hour), al Ka’id al Islami (the Islamic Leader), al Akh al Ruhi (the Spiritual Brother), Mu’min al Kawi (the Strong Believer), and others were frequently attached to his name in the media and at gatherings. Such rubrics must have had profound effects on the membership. Most probably, they were behind the creation of a mystical al Banna, since “the control al Banna had on his followers was extremely strong, almost absolute, almost magical.21
Fourthly, al Banna always spoke to “educate” his followers about leaders and leadership. He stressed that “A leader should be a person who is raised to be a leader and not someone who is created out of necessity, since the latter form of leadership is transitory and cannot endure.22
Two governing bodies operated at the highest levels of the Society of Muslim Brothers. The first was Majlis at Irshad (Guidance Council) and the second Majlis al Shura (Consultative Body). Theoretically, policies were formulated in Majlis al Irshad, which arrived at its decisions after considering the input of Majlis al Shura. Although both bodies were responsive to and reflecting the will of the membership, “however, as the description of the history and activities of the organization has shown, the leader (Supreme Guide), Hasan al Banna, was the center of power.”23 By centralizing all power in his hands and being extremely oppressive in some instances in the case of both internal and external opponents, as will be shown below, al Banna transformed the society into a one-man-show. He frequently bypassed and even disregarded the initiatives and policies set forth Maktab al Irshad, whose twelve-members had become his cronies. During the 1940’s the Guidance Council had lost most of its influence. It was rendered incompetent due to the frequent replacement of its members. The nominal collective leadership gave way to a more rigid, and to some extent despotic, individual rule, adding the element of fear to al Banna’s already developed charismatic attributes.
Fifthly, this concentrated power gave al Banna a free hand in dealing with his ideological and political opponents both inside and outside the Society. Some of the leaders (who were members in the Guidance and Consultative bodies) became the victims of internal purge. The silencing of both internal and external rivals became more organized and systematic after the creation of the Secret Apparatus (al Jihaz al Sirri), the military arm of the Society, which was developed from the initial Firak al Rahalat (scouting groups.)24 Al Banna kept the existence of al Jihaz al Sirri a secret even from the closest of his associates. He devised a system by which all militia leaders reported directly to him.
Recruiting the most devoted and militant of the Egyptian youth enriched the Secret Apparatus. Al Kumsan al Khadra’, The Green Shirts (as the youth of the Secret Apparatus were called during the anti-palace demonstrations) took part in these spectacles as a pro-government force. As such they were in direct opposition to al Kumsan al Zirk, The Blue Shirts, the youth of the anti-government nationalist al Wafa Party.
However efficient the Secret Apparatus was in the beginning, the very recruitment of thousands of energetic and devoted young militants into the Society eventually proved to be one of al Banna’s fatal mistakes, since the government soon uncovered this clandestine outfit which, although for the moment on its side, could prove potential danger in the future. The leaders of Jihaz al Sirri were put under secret surveillance. It was the Hadisat al Jeep (The Jeep Incident) that created friction between the Apparatus and the government forces. Huge amounts of weapons and ammunition were confiscated and several members of the Secret Apparatus were arrested. This gave the government enough reason to oppress the Brotherhood.25
Sixthly, in Islam, using force against aggressive enemies of the faith is tolerated, even encouraged Defensive Jihad. However, on what grounds is force to be used against fellow Muslims? This needed novelty in thought. Al Banna created the explanation necessary for such a task. He denounced Muslim opponents as Khawarij (heretics), and Wasani (pagans who lived just like the days of Jahiliyya, the pre-Islamic pagan society.26 Since these Muslim opponents had deviated from the true path, then it was possible - not to say permissible - to use force against them, and, if necessary, annihilate them for the propagation of the true faith. This explanation was later formulated into an ideological framework and theorized by the ideology of the Society, Sayyid Qutb. The “Jahiliyya” theory later became the basis for the formation of several radical Islamist groups who advocated al ‘uzla (exclusion) from the deviant Jahiliyya society, and in some instances to even physically attack it.
Seventhly, mastering persuasive oratorical and rhetorical abilities was yet another component of al Banna’s charismatic character. His deep knowledge of the Arabic language (designated as al Balagha in Arabic), his vast cognizance of the Qur’an and other important Islamic texts and treatises had acknowledged him in the eyes of the rank and file as “The Unmistakable Leader” (al Kaid Allazi la Yukht’i), 27 who expresses only rational ideas. It follows that if there was a mistake in the policies formulated it was surely the other, secondary leaders who were blamed. This demagogic characterization of al Banna was one of the most repeatedly used accusations by authors opposing al Banna. They attributed this blind belief of members of the Society as a result of ignorance, which, in turn, gave rise to “the Cult of al Banna.”28
Nevertheless, the fact remains that al Banna was truly a unique, convincing orator. This can be illustrated by the following passage from one of his numerous speeches to his members:

My brothers, you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an; you are a new light which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God; and you are the strange voice which rises to recall the message of the prophet.... You should feel yourself the bearer of the burden, which all others have refused. When asked what it is for which you call, reply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains within it government, and has [as] one of its obligations, freedom. If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say “we are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice....”29

Eighthly, there remains the direct quotation from the medieval and contemporary Islamic mujtahids that al Banna incorporated within his written and impromptu speeches. His excessive readings in the Salafia Library must have been an important factor in this regard. Quoting the medieval masters granted him the security he needed in legitimizing his ideas. He frequently quoted the medieval Ibn Taimiyya and the contemporary Pakistani mujtahid al Maududi. This trend was emulated and further developed by almost all Islamicist leaders who followed al Banna.
Ninthly, some authors point out that in spite of his strict rule, al Banna always sought to legitimize his reign by what in the Khaldunian theory is coined as Mubaya’a. The oath that each candidate took before being admitted to the Society (i.e., In the name of God Almighty, I promise to firmly advocate the mission of the Muslim Brethren, to fight [jihad] for its sake and have full confidence in its leadership, whose initiatives I will obey unquestionably.”30 By accepting the mission and having full confidence in the leadership, whose work he is not to question, the member was in reality unquestionably investing in the leadership of al Banna, whose name became a synonym to leadership, since he was the central figure in the Society and, as the annals of the several conferences that the Society held, show, it was to him that all policy-making and organizational tasks were entrusted.31
Al Banna’s organizational genius needs to be meticulously researched and studied in detail. He not only created a tight, well-organized political organization, but also surpassed that goal and widened the scope of the Society by integrating benevolent, social welfare, educational, media, and fund-raising units into it. Fund-raising activities were later enhanced by a sound financial structure that consisted of factories, businesses, and shops in which thousands of brothers were employed. The finances of the Society grew enormously. By the time the government put its hands on them after persecuting the Society in the late 1940’s, its assets were valued at several million Egyptian pounds.
When al Banna was assassinated on February 12, 1949, he had built a mammoth organization with almost a million members in Egypt and with branches scattered in several Arab states.32 Al Banna developed the necessary political and ideological platforms on which future Islamicist leaders were to operate.


IV - Hasan al Hudaybi: The Institutional Man

The repression to which the Brotherhood and its Secret Apparatus were exposed in between 1948 and 1952 - the same year during which the “free officers” ascended to power through a military coup - weakened the organization both politically and militarily. The assassination of al Banna in February 1949 complicated the situation even further. As a Supreme Guide, al Banna had centralized all power in his hands. His sudden absence created an atmosphere of confusion within the leadership as well as the rank and file of the Society.
It was during the initial stages of this repression, and, in an attempt to remedy the situation, that some prominent members of the Society initiated a search for a new Supreme Guide. Several notable leaders were considered. However, none possessed al Banna’s charismatic abilities and organizational qualifications. Leaders like Abdel Aziz Atiyyah, Mukhtar Abdel Alim, Abdel Kader Audah, Yusuf Tal’at and Abdel Aziz Kamel frequently visited one Hasan al Hudaybi, an ex-judge of the Court of Denials and a man known for his traditionalist attitudes in defense of Islam and the application of the Shari’ a (the legal ethical code of Islam). After tedious negotiations, they finally convinced him of assuming the leadership of the organization.33
The reluctance that al Hudaybi showed in accepting the highest position in the Society had some legitimate reasons. First of all, he was not a member of the Society. Therefore, he knew but little about its mission and activities. It was through Yusuf Talaat’s convincing words and urgent appeals that Hudaybi finally accepted the offer.34
As an old member of the judiciary system and a figure well trained within the bureaucracy of the constitutional monarchy, Hudaybi was in several ways diametrically different from al Banna. Until now, it is not clear why the elders of the Society chose him, a man of the institution, to lead an organization that had acquired a more or less revolutionary character. Some argue that the choice was made in order to bring about a rapprochement (compromise) even through highly priced with the Palace and the ruling colonial power. It might also have been that the shortcomings of al Banna’s policies (which led to his arrest and temporary imprisonment sometime before his assassination) necessitated the appointment of a “moderate” figure.
Nevertheless, as soon as Hudaybi acquired his new post, serious questions about his experience as a political and social leader, his previous participation in the Society and his adherence to its causes, and his ability to provide a sound and balanced leadership began to surface.35
Hudaybi’s social and political character too, was also the product of the same intense nationalistic atmosphere in which al Banna was raised. However, Hudaybi differed in that his education was a strictly secular one. The only religious education he was exposed to was that of his family.
The new Supreme Guide was a graduate of the secular educational system which was established by the Khedive Abbas Hilmi. The schools where he studied had in time transformed into centers of nationalistic agitation. Soon, the young Hudaybi was approached by some classmates and made a member of a secret organization which aimed at overthrowing the British colonialists.36
The assassination of then Prime Minister Boutros Ghali by one of Hudaybi’s compatriots (most probably because o the minister’s compliance with the British in the “dual governing” of the Sudan), was a turning point for the revolutionary Hudaybi, who continued to work for the secret organization under the disguise of being a simple law student who had no interest in politics whatsoever. During the Arabi Revolution of 1919, however, Hudaybi dropped his disguise and participated in the demonstration with his law school colleagues. Later, as a member of Jam’iyyat al Shubban al Muslimin (Society of Muslim Youth) Hudaybi met al Banna who frequented the headquarters of the Jam’iyya.
Hudaybi, however, was not recruited by al Banna to become a member of the Society. The prominent members who brought Hudaybi in as the new Supreme Guide, tried to convince and persuade those who thought of Hudaybi as a non-member of the Society that every pious Muslim striving for the same goals as that of the Society is to be considered a member.37 However, the fact remains, that at the time of his appointment, Hudaybi was considered an outsider to al Banna’s organization. Many members in the lower echelons went as far as to consider him an intruder.
The period during which Hudaybi governed the Society (1949 to almost the middle of 1953) is considered to be one of mediocrity, as opposed to the heyday during al Banna’s time. Hudaybi drastically lacked the strength and fervor of the charismatic al Banna. He was not an eloquent orator and he never tried to be one even at the critical state when the Society was badly in need of one. He retained almost all the characteristics of what might be defined as “the Man of the Institution” (the product of working for decades within the established bureaucracy and favoring to work through accepted political channels, thus rendering the once energetic and popular Society into a static one). For example, Hudaybi was offended when he found out that the remnants of what was once the Secret Apparatus were still operating under his nose and without his knowledge. He tried hard to dismantle this military arm. He initiated an ill-fated campaign based on the notions of working as an established opposition party instead. Moreover, as one author puts it:

The designation of Hudaybi as a Supreme Guide... created an ideological vacuum which in turn gave free reign to the expression of tendencies.... The new Supreme Guide, who lacked great intellectual authority, was unable to do more than bestow or withhold the organizational imprimatur. 38

If such was the situation on the political level, there was, however, a new boom of intellectual ferment which brought forth a proliferation of works by Muslim brethren and their fellow travelers. Abdel Kadir ‘Audah, Muhammad al Ghazali, Sayyid Qutb, al Bahi al Khuli and Muhammad Taha Badawi all sought to continue al Banna’s tradition in their writings.39 It is important to note that the proliferation of works about the mission of the Society was a direct response to the political vacuum that prevailed because of Hudaybi’s incompetence. A point in fact is that these new writings were, in turn, the direct reason behind the strengthening of new tendencies within the Society. It was the new tendencies that later nurtured the formation of the more radical offshoots which will be considered below.
Moreover, these writings, and especially those of Sayyid Qutb, were to have a profound influence in shaping a new, more radical anti-government Islamist ideology after 1953, when the newly established government of the free officers banned all political parties and literally dumped thousands of their leaders and members into prison camps. The Society of Muslim Brothers was no exception. After a short honeymoon with the government, which lasted from 1952 to 1954, and during which Nasser and his comrades utilized the popularity of the Society when themselves came forth with Islamic slogans to consolidate their power, a wide scale persecution of the Brethren was initiated. On December 9, 1954, six prominent members of the Society mounted the gallows while the Supreme Guide, Hasan al Hudaybi, and thousands of brothers were arrested and thrown into the Tura and other prison camps. As one source writes, “...Never in the quarter century since the founding of the society by Hasan al Banna in 1928 had the Brethren suffered such a violent repression.40
It could be easily argued that the shortsightedness of Hudaybi and his ineffective political methods led to this tragedy. Although this argument contains some truth, it seems, however, that this could be considered a superficial, naive explanation, Some author argue cleverly that the new social and political situation on the Egyptian scene made the repression against the Brethren (and the other parties as well) inevitable. The Young Officers who had ascended to power needed no rivals. They were not ready at all to share the government with anybody else. Since the Brotherhood demanded the implementation of the Shari ‘a together with some ministerial posts to supervise the implementation of Islamic law, they posed a serious danger to the new government and especially to Nasser and his new ideas. Nasser first gave in because of his struggle with Nagib within the Free Officers Group (hence the short honeymoon period). However, as soon as he pushed Nagib aside, the repression of the Brotherhood and the other parties went ahead.
Instead of adhering to his previous Islamist slogans, the charismatic Nasser rallied to consolidate his power and legitimacy by instigating class differences and by bringing the workers and the “poor” to his cause and shoving them into opposition to the previously popular Brotherhood.41
Hudaybi’s mistakes and the subsequent disintegration of the Society’s power, coupled with Nasserite repression, caused its alienation from the masses. As a result of Nasser’s socio-nationalistic policies and his consolidation of power after signing the July 1954 treaty with Britain to end the fighting in the Suez Canal zone a “crisis period” started within the Society. An opposition to Nasser in the ranks of the more militant young leaders and members of the Society who were imprisoned in the tightly controlled camps gave way to the reawakening of such military ideas as al ‘Uzla (seclusion), Takfir (excommunication) and Hijra (emigration) from the Jahilliyya society by Nasser and his accomplices. This became the new basis of a new ideology within the Nasserite prison camp. The writings of another exponent of the Islamist mission, Sayyid Qutb were essential in the formulation of this new, militant and extremely radical ideology.
It was in rebuttal to Qutb’s views and to denounce this new wave of revivalist militancy, and also to justify his mild traditionalist ideas that in 1969 (while still in prison) Hudaybi composed his treatise Du’at la Kudat and published it through the efforts of Zeynab al Ghazali, the passionaria of the Brotherhood. In his narrative:

The Supreme Guide [Hudaybi] himself intended to correct the errors of “certain” brothers. Du’at la Kudat was written in one of the concentration camps in which the Brethren were imprisoned.... The tortures that they suffered here nurtured the idea of Takfir...among the youngest of the prisoners.... Hudaybi wrote his book in an effort to lead errant young Islam cists back to the straight and narrow. It contains explicit criticism of Mawdudi’s “The Four Technical Terms of the Qur’an,” but reading between the lines, it is not difficult to detect a refutation of certain passages of signposts [milestones, Qutb’s radical treatise].42

Criticizing al Mawdudi was a direct deviation from al Banna, who had often quoted the contemporary Islamist mujtahid. By doing so, Hudaybi ascertained his traditionalist views and antagonized the imprisoned militants even further.
While the imprisoned Brothers were being tortured, and at the same time were entering into intellectual polemics regarding their movement, the social and political atmosphere in Egypt was changing rapidly. After he consolidated his power by ridding himself from his opponents, Nasser inspired the masses with his unmatched charismatic appeal. By taking advantage of his new popularity, he tried to alter the social fabric of the country. While it was true that he came into power by equally basing his cause on the support of the rural and urban masses, he soon initiated “a policy of transforming the spirit of village Egypt to the seat of power in Cairo.43
In this regard, Wanburg argues that “while the interests of the peasants [who had been the real backbone of the Islamist movement] were continuously put forward as the regime’s main concern, their predominantly Islamic roots were not seriously taken into account when Nasser formulated his Pan-Arab, socialistic policies.44
Nasser’s Pan-Arab ideology was devised to counter and eventually to defeat new militant Islamist resurgence. The important element in this policy is that Nasser was able to acquire the cooperation of al Azhar, whose ‘ulemas published one Fatwa (position paper) after another denouncing the imprisoned yet militant Brethren as people who have sold their souls to the devil.
The Nasser era witnessed the birth of a Pan-Arabic literature. Ardent Nasserites like Mahmud Shalabi and Mustafa al Siba’i defended the new socialist regime with their writings. The campaign went as far as to compose some absurd narratives with even more absurd titles such as “The Socialism of Muhammad and “The Socialism of Uthman,” attempting to prove the legitimacy of Nasser by advocating that “he was in fact following in the footsteps of the prophet and his successors, the Rashidun (Elders) Caliphs. More importantly, however, is the fact that some Ash'arites became prominent figures in this new literary movement.45
The defeat of 1967, however, was a major blow to Nasser and his Pan-Arabic socialist policies. Nasser never recovered from the blow and died three years later, leaving behind him a vast ideological emptiness even within his ardent followers, who were shocked by the disastrous defeat in 1967 and the untimely death of their leader in 1970.
What was the effect of all these events on the Islamist movement in Egypt? With the ascendance of Anwar al Sadat to the presidency, a new era was ushered. Most of the leaders and the members were released from their prolonged incarceration. The old vanguard of the Society gathered around Umar al Talmasani with the objective of propagating the traditionalist ideas of Hudaybi as formulated in Du’at La Kudat. Talmasani acquired the editorship of al Daawa, the central organ of the Society and published it in a new format which expressed and defended the views of the traditionalist Brothers to a more complex and polarized society, where many militant Islam cists formed their own offshoot groups based on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb.
Hudaybi had retained a nominal leadership in prison, and upon his release in 1971, he did not assume the title of al Murshid al ‘Am again. His short reign (1949-1953), followed by his imprisonment and his leadership of the Society from within his cell, proved to be extremely unproductive. It was not the fault of the man as much as the social and political atmosphere during which he operated. Hudaybi’s opponents accused him not only of being inactive and mom influential, but also of not being able to formulate an anti-British policy when all of Egypt (and many of the Brethren themselves) were fighting the colonialists in the Canal Zone.
Hudaybi’s utmost mistake was that even after the repression to which the Brothers were exposed, he never agreed to the newly developed revivalist current and even opposed it by refuting Qutb’s writings. He gave the impression of being a compromiser with the corrupt Jahiliyya government.
His traditionalist ideas, however, were formulated into an ideological framework. They prevail even to our day, yet with no tangible organized power attached to it. The rapprochement between the Islam cists and President Mubarak and the subsequent participation of the Islamists in the parliamentary elections in 1986, together with the declaration of their traditionalist leaders that they will work within the established political system, proves that Hudaybi’s ideas still carry some weight today.46
Hudaybi died in 1973, the same year during which a new Islamist movement spread within the universities, giving birth to the al Jama’aat Islamiyya (Islamic groups) which soon gained popularity through its adherence to Islamic traditions and their propagation in the masses. With their relatively moderate militancy, the Jama’at strengthened the influence of the new al Daawa group and, through it, Hudaybi’s ideas.


V- Sayyid Qutb: The Ideologue and Theoretician

Sayyid Qutb’s charismatic character was different from al Banna’s. Instead of developing keen organizational abilities and eloquent oratory skills, Sayyid Qutb’s attributes were those of a man of letters. Through the written word, he accomplished what al Banna had really missed: He constructed, almost from scratch, a rigid militant and innovative ideological framework that served many Islam cists as a model to emulate and to theorize about.
Sayyid Qutb’s teachings bring him nearer to the Islamist youth of today than those of al Banna or Hudaybi. His treatises are widely ready throughout the Arab world. However, unlike al Banna and Hudaybi, he never achieved the position of Supreme Guide in the Society of Muslim Brothers. Instead, he became a member of Maktab al Irshad for two years before his arrest with Hudaybi in 1954.
Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of twentieth century Muslim revivalism, was a late comer to the Islamist cause. The main events of his life “illustrate the typical trajectory of a twentieth century Egyptian, who decided to join the Muslim Brotherhood, but it also highlights the originality of his work compared to the doctrinal productions of the Brotherhood’s other militants.47
He was born in the town of Musha in the governorate of Asyut in 1906 to a family of rural notables who had fallen into hard times. His father, al Hajj Qutb Ibrahim was a member of Mustafa Kamil’s National Party (al Hizb al Watani), As a child, Sayyid studied at public and secondary schools, while reading the journal of the National Party, al Hiwa at home. Not much is written about the early years of Sayyid Qutb’s life, except that, in 1925, at the age of nineteen, he enrolled in a teachers’ training college from which he graduated in 1929. He later attended some preparatory classes at Dar al ‘Ulum.
From 1929 to 1945, Sayyid Qutb was employed by the Ministry of Education as a teacher in the provinces. In the beginning of the 1940’s, he was transferred to Hilwan, where he decided to settle down after he acquired the position of educational inspector. He drafted many reform projects for the public educational system all of which were “invariable consigned to the wastebasket by his superiors, one of whom was the great author, Taha Husain.48
As a man of letters, Sayyid Qutb was greatly influenced by the self-taught Egyptian writer Mahmud Abbas al ‘Aqqad. According to Kepel, “Sayyid’s evolution was similar to al ‘Aqqad’s. Qutb began as a member of the Wafd Party and later abandoned it. He wrote for the newspapers as a literary critic and journalist, and even published three biographical novels, the last of which, Ashwak, was a veiled account of a deep disappointment in love.”49 As a result of this romantic disillusionment, Qutb decided to remain an eternal bachelor and to join “those in the path of God,” and become a member of the Society of Muslim Brothers.”50
In time, the principal subject of Sayyid’s articles shifted from literature to nationalism (1940-1948) and then to Islamist ideas (1952-1964). In the late 1940’s, some of his anti-government writings brought him face to face with King Farouk. In order to escape the latter’s revenge and with the help of some of his Wafdist friends, Qutb went into a de facto exile. In 1948, he arrived to the United States.
Sayyid Qutb remained in America until the summer of 1951. He was “repeatedly embarrassed by a sexual promiscuity that disgusted him in this country, so unforgiving to the disinherited, devoted to the worship of the dollar, and devoid of any values that made sense to him. He witnessed outburst of joy at the assassination of al Banna” [1949].51
Qutb’s stay in America and his experiences there could easily be the topic of a separate paper, which is outside the scope of this narrative. What is interesting, however, is that upon his return to Egypt, he denounced American society, when everybody expected him to do the opposite. He started to frequent the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood and was eventually recruited by Salim ‘Ashaawi (editor of Al-Daawa) in later 1951.
In July 1954, he was appointed editor in chief of al Ikhwan al Muslimin, Hudaybi’s periodical in response to militant critics within the Society.
On October 26, 1954, on the pretext that a Muslim brother Mahmud ‘Abd al-Lateef, had tried to assassinate Nasser, a great purge ensued. Sayyid and hundreds of the “Brethren” were arrested. He was sentenced to 25 years of hard labor and was sent to the famous Tura concentration camp. Sayyid Qutb was released from prison for a short period in 1964-65. Nasser, however, announced a second conspiracy by the Brethren to overthrow his government. Qutb was arrested once again. In 1966, but to the dismay of many Arab leaders who tried to intervene on his behalf, Nasser executed Qutb and several members of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood.
Sayyid Qutb’s ideology can be analyzed through his writings in prison from 1954 to 1964. Most important is a voluminous Qur’anic commentary Fi Zilaal al Qur’an (under the aegis of the Qur’an) and a radical Islamist treatise, Ma’alim ‘Ala al Tariq (Milestones or Signposts) about which Zeynab al Ghazali said: “If you want to know why Sayyid Qutb was sentenced to death, read Signposts.”52 These two books comprise the Bible of modern militant Islamic resurgence. “Signposts” in particular is still widely read by young militant Islamists. Almost all authors agree that the teaching of “Signposts” were the direct reason for the formation of such militant underground offshoots of the Society such as al Takfir Wa al Hijra, Qutbiyyin Samawiyyah, Shabab Muhammad, and others, who attain a high degree of militancy and underground charismatic leadership aiming at overthrowing the existing government, or else separating (‘uzla) from the existing society.
In his commentary on the Qur’an, Qutb tends to sharpen the distinction between “...those who strive for the establishment of God’s order and those who oppose them... a sharp distinction between the forces of truth and falsehood...the party of God and the party of Satan.”53
It is clear from the beginning that Qutb stresses the fight between the Islamists (the forces of good) and the ruling government (the forces of evil). The arena of this battle is in the spirit of every human being.54 Humanity today is on the brink of destroying itself, “because of bankruptcy in the domain of values. In short, unless human beings stop from going astray and the righteous win, the human race is forever lost.55
The western world is a good example of this dialectic. “Western democracy has become something that presents all the features of bankruptcy.”56 The communist world, on the other hand, is also devoid of happiness and Marxist theory has become a state ideology of repression.
The East, according to Qutb, is mimicking the West and the communists. The leaders of the Islamic countries are agents of either western or communist governments. With their westernizing, modernizing policies, they are pushing the Islamic ‘umma back to Jahiliyya.
Yet there remains the issue of al Hakimiyya (governance). According to Sayyid Qutb, the leaders of Egypt and most Islamic countries are self-appointed tyrants who have instituted their rule not with the consent of the people (the Khaldunian Mubaya’a theory), but to oppress them and drive them unwillingly into the avenues of modernization and eventual destruction.
What is the solution, then? It is a return to Islam and the reinstitution of the reign of the Islamic ‘umma, which is “a continuity (jammaa') of people whose entire lives -- their intellectual, social, existential, political, moral, and practical aspects -- are based on Islamic ethics (minhaj).”57 Moreover, it is the duty of devoted Muslims to strive for this goal. This fundamental duty of reinstituting the ‘umma that the prophet had established is not a reactionary movement by any means. According to Ayyubi, “one should use the term fundamentalism with great care: the so-called fundamentalists are often modernizers and are not as much interested in going back into history as they are in dealing with contemporary social, economic, and political problems.”58.
After clarifying the illness, Sayyid Qutb then speaks about the remedy. How is this Jahiliyya Society to be changed? “A vanguard must come forward.” That vanguard must be able to decide when to withdraw from and when to seek contact with the Jahiliyya that surrounds it.”59
Sayyid Qutb culminates his theory by stating that in their Jihad (Holy War) such a vanguard will “need signposts to point toward the commencement of its long road, to tell it what role it has to play to attain its goal, to inform it of its real function....”60 Hence, he puts his book in the service of the vanguard that he envisions will be formed.
Qutb’s rejection of the West is an important factor of his ideological framework. It can be argued that almost all of today’s radical militant Islamists base their anti-west policies on a direct or indirect interpretation of Qutb’s rejection theory. One must be careful, however, that the West is not singled out as a target. There is an equivalent rejection of the Jahiliyya Society as well. One must note that a single and comprehensive definition of what “West” means does not exist. It could be Europe, the United States of America, Israel, the Christian communities of the Middle East, or a combination of the above. Moreover, Qutb bases his legitimate enmity against the West on Qur’anic verses which he incorporates into his book Fi Zilaal al Qur’an:

“Neither the Jews nor the Christians will find you [Muslims] acceptable. Cease from speaking what pleases them and what they would agree with. Seek the acceptance of God.”61
or,
“It behooves us today to hear this voice of warning, as with unprecedented stupidity we seek the opinions of the Orientalists 0Of Jews, Christians, and unbelieving Communists. We learn our history from them, trusting their statements about our heritage, hearing what they interpolate of doubts in their studies of our Qur’an, the Hadees of our prophet. We send them delegations of our students to study from their teachings of Islam. They thus graduate from their universities and return to us diseased in intellect and conscience.”62

This “enmity” toward the West in general is not a spontaneous one, but it has its historical roots. According to Ayyubi, there are: The Historical memories of the Crusades and the religious wars; 2) the Contradictions between a glorious Islamic past and a miserable present that is diametrically in contrast with the rich West; 3) the Impact of colonial experience followed by an American imperialistic phase; 4) The Support given by the West and by the United States in particular to the state of Israel, the direct enemy of Islam; and 5) the Alliance of the Western powers and the United States with the oppressive and exploitative regimes of the Middle East.63
Sayyid Qutb formulated his ideology while an inmate at the Tura Concentration Camp. It is evident that his writings, with their militancy and the advocacy of Jihad (Holy War), surpass the writings of those who came before him. It can be argued that Qutb’s writings are extremely fundamental, vengeful and antagonistic. Yet one must always bear in mind that the man formulated his ideology as an inmate in a prison cell, cut off from the world and under the direct suppression of a regime whose existence was the negation of the ‘umma as envisioned by Sayyid Qutb.
As Hrayr Dekmejian states:

In retrospect, Sayyid Qutb stands out as the indispensable line between the Brotherhood, the Shabab Muhammad, al-Takfir, and al-Jihad. As a militant ideologue, Qutb presided over the generational transition from the Brotherhood’s atrophied fundamentalism to the youthful extremism of the 1970’s. Three attributes characterize Qutb’s pivotal role and influence on the new militants: 1) as a theoretician, Qutb exercised a powerful influence on the regeneration and redirection of Islamic ideology; 2) as a notable member of the old Brotherhood, Qutb provided organizational continuity between the Brotherhood and the recalcitrant offshoots; 3) as an activist, Qutb’s defiance of the state and his death provided the young militants with a model of martyrdom to emulate.64

In his intellectual creativity and ideological depth, Qutb emulated not the modern character of the Islamist leader, but that of the historical mujtahid (researcher, interpreter). He based his militant interpretations of Islam on the teachings of Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taamiyya and on the ideas of al Mawdudi. By doing so, he was in a direct conflict with the Supreme Guide Hasan al Hudaybi and his followers, the editors of al-Daawa in the 1970’s.
Finally, Qutb’s teachings brought about a fragmentation within the Islamist camp. In the 1970’s, new militant offshoots with more radical ideologies emerged on the scene.


VI - New Strata of Leadership

The 1970’s marked a new era for the Islamist cause in Egypt. The 1967 defeat; the subsequent death of Nasser on September 28, 1970; the ascendance of Anwar al Sadat to the presidency; and his freeing of the imprisoned Brethren revived the fundamentalist movement once again. Sadat relied on the fundamentalists to: 1) counterbalance the predominantly Nasserite bureaucracy; and 2) to secure the friendship and support of the masses against socialists and communists.65
The partial success that the Egyptian army achieved in the 1973 Badr enhanced Sadat’s image even further. Sadat’s quest for legitimacy and his implementation of the 1971 “Rectification Revolution (al Haraka al Tashihiyya) was suddenly interrupted in 1974, when a group of Islamist militants took over the Technical Military Academy of Heliopolis (al Iskandariyya) in an abortive move to bring down the government. The incident alarmed Sadat and his associates who had thus far followed a policy of strengthening the traditionalists’ line of the old Brethren and suppressing the more militant, radical Islamic groups.66
In 1977, the Brotherhood joined other political groups to create a pro-government majority in the People’s Assembly. Sadat’s policy of Infitah (openness towards the West), his journey to Jerusalem and his signing of the Camp David accord for Egyptian-Israeli peace, brewed an atmosphere of unrest in Egypt. Sadat had to use force to control the anti-government riots perpetrated by his previous allies, the Muslim Brethren.
Although Sadat tried to accommodate the Islamist camp by introducing laws based on the Shari ‘a, he was unable, however, to win them over completely to his side, since their primary demand was the Mu’min (believer) president was to make the Shari ‘a The major source of Egyptian law rather than A major source as Sadat was trying to bargain for.
The Islamists’ opposition to the Infitah policy and peace with Israel rested on a legitimate, ideological foundation. These policies were the negation of Qutb’s teachings. Moreover, they were being introduced through the blessings of al Azhar whose religious ulemas had been sapped by Sadat. As a result, the militant underground groups emphasized Jihad (Holy War) as a “Sixth Pillar” of the Islamic faith. (Islam has only five Pillars. This was a rhetorical addition.) The Nasserite era was reevaluated. Many militant leaders preached that the 1967 defeat was God’s punishment because of the repression of the righteous Muslims, which should not be repeated.67
On another level, Islamist ideology revived once again inside the universities, even though student bodies were still dominated by Nasserites and communists. Those were pushed aside and the nuclei of what later became known as the Jama’at Islamiyya gained momentum.
The rise of Islamist propaganda in the universities coincided with an increase of Muslim-Christian clashes and riots which culminated in the events of al Sawiyya al Hamraa', (the Red Corner), a suburb of Cairo. These obliged the government to suppress the Islamists and the Copts (Egypt’s Christians). Their patriarch, Baba Shnouda, was put under house arrest for allegedly “instigating sectarian strife.”68
The more Sadat ventured into modernization, economic “recovery” and the implementation of peace with Israel, the more the Islamist opposition against him and his policy of “Infitah” grew. This proved to be a vicious circle. Compelled to calm the internal situation, Sadat initiated a repression policy against his militant opponents. As a result, hundreds and even thousands of Islamic fundamentalists were arrested and put into prison. It was the brother of an imprisoned fundamentalist that, in coordination with the head of the Jihad organization, of which he was a member, assassinated Sadat during a military show on October 6, 1981.69
The 1970’s witnessed the birth and development of several militant and radical Islamist groups whose ideological background dotted a broad spectrum of Islamic thought. Three of these movements and their leaders will be studied: These are: 1) Shabab Muhammad (The Youth of Muhammad, also known as al Tahrir al Islami): 2) al Takfir Wa al Hijra (Excommunication and emigration); and 3) the Jihad organization. The Jamaat Islamiyya and some militant mosque preachers will also be briefly discussed. Most famous of these preachers were Sheik Salama and Sheik Kishk whose Friday sermons were listened to by thousands of Muslims. The sermons were reproduced on cassette tapes and distributed throughout the Arab world and even Arab immigrant communities in Europe and the United States.

A. Shabab Muhammad or ‘al Tahrir ‘al Islami:

The armed attack of 1974 on the Technical Military Academy led to the uncovering of the society known as Shabab Muhammad (also called al Tahrir al Islami), The leader of this group, Salih Siriyya, was a Palestinian born in Ijzim, near Haifa. While still in Palestine, he was a member of al-Nabahani’s Islamic Liberation Party, which advocated an Islamist coup d’etat from above.70 Siriyya was forced to go to Egypt after Jordan’s King Husayn ordered his army and Bedouins (desert dwellers) to massacre Palestinian freedom fighters that had until then operated uninterruptedly in Jordan, thus creating a government within a government. The episode was nicknamed “Black September.”71 In Egypt, Siriyya, who held a Ph.D. in education, worked for the Arab League, frequented Hudaybi’s office, and became a member of the Muslim Brethren. Although fascinated by Qutb’s teachings, Siriyya did not believe in the “Jahiliyya” and “Hijra” concepts. Instead, he formulated his own theory of the “iniquitous prince” (i.e., president Anwar al Sadat) who must be fought by all means.72 Thus, his disciples, mostly students from Cairo and Alexandria, lived like ordinary people and did not attract attention. Siriyya chose April 18, 1974 for his “show.” On that day, a group of his followers, inspired by their underground charismatic leader, attacked the Military Academy of Heliopolis. The abortive coup resulted in the arrest of Siriyya and many of his followers.
Sariyya’s “iniquitous prince” theory was based on condemning the ruler as the basis of corruption and ineffectiveness rather than the society at large. He thus diverged from other militant leaders, who based their ideology on excommunicating from the corrupt society (the ‘uzla theory).
Another aspect of Sirriya’s ideology that needs to be explored is the role that Muslim women should play in the society. Some of his imprisoned disciples argued in an interview that “the Shari’ a in essence gives them [women] balanced rights and obligations. The militants concede that men have neglected women’s rights and been excessive in extracting obligations. They think, however, that women’s rightful place is the home. Women can work outside their house if....the interest of the community (Maslahat al ‘Umma) calls for it.”73
The militants of Shabab Muhammad also “conceded social differentiation as an accepted pillar of Muslim social order. The only tolerated mechanism of differentiation is man’s labor - not his race, color, tribal or family origin. The concepts of Social Justice (‘Adaala) and Equity (al Qistas) are central in the envisioned Muslim society.”74
Siriyya is yet another example of the underground Islamic militant charismatic leader, who developed his theories and operated in Sadat’s Egypt. His charisma appealed to university students and new graduates, but mostly to young middle and lower middle-class worshippers of the Ahli (popular) mosques.75

B. Al Takfir Wa al Hijra

Shukri Mustafa, the leader of the underground militant al Takfir Wa al Hijra organization, was probably the most charismatic underground militant of the 1970’s. He was announced a dajjal (charlatan) by al Azhar and the government, but to thousands of his followers, who left family and friends preferring to live in groups assigned by the leader, he was the new Amir al Mu’mineen, (the Prince of the Believers), a title given to Umar, the second of the Rashidun Caliphs, those immediately following the prophet. (Also elders).
Unlike Siriyya, Mustafa was not a newcomer to the Brotherhood. He was arrested in 1965. While in incarceration, he detached himself from the “old” vanguard. He was an educated person (he held a B.S. in Agriculture). According to Dekmejian, he “possesses great charisma, religious knowledge, fearlessness and piety.”76 The innovation that he brought after his release in 1971 was the implementation of “excommunication” (literally exterminating deserters after branding them as Kafirs (infidels), of Qutb which had until then remained a theoretical concept.
Taking advantage of the relatively more lenient Sadat regime (something which he himself admitted), Mustafa embarked on building a new society within the existing one. His neophytes were assigned to existing groups and wen to live with them in communal flats provided by the leader.77
Like other militant leaders, Shukri Mustafa built his ideology on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. He adhered to the concepts of vanguard and exclusion (‘uzla”) at a time, when many Azharite figures were denouncing Qutb as a heretic, whose writings were based on (munharif) deviated texts, rather than the Qur’an. In fact, Qutb’s brother, Muhammad, in a long article published in al Shihab, the organ of the Lebanese branch of the Brotherhood, defended the views of his “martyred” brother and refuted all allegations made by the Azharites.78
After his release in 1971, Shukri gained a reputation in his home town of Asyut, in Middle Egypt, were “every Friday he and his first disciples would roam the environs, preaching in the hamlets and villages and gathering young men who would join their group.”79
The kidnapping and the subsequent killing of the ex-minister of Awqaf (Religious Affairs) Sheikh al Zahabi was the culmination of Takfir’s activities. Not giving in to the demands that Mustafa put in return for al Zahabi’s safe return, Sadat compelled the group to go ahead with al Zahabi’s murder. The result was that Shukri Mustafa and his accomplices were arrested and executed.
Mustafa explained his doctrine to the court while on trial. He attacked all the new mujtahids and stressed that “everything that came after the Book [Qur’an] and the accounts of the tradition of the prophet [Sunna] is excluded from the domain of legitimate knowledge.”80 He then declared the teachings of the legal schools of the four Sunni Imams (Abu Haneefa), Ibn Hanbal, Malik and Shafi’i null and void. This extremely reformist mode is the direct interpretation of Qutb’s teachings. Moreover, it also clarifies why Shukri Mustafa was able to gather a strong constituency around him. What better tool than building one’s charismatic appeal on what simple people want to hear; an uncomplicated and rather plain understanding of their own religion by directly reading the Book and interpreting it themselves.
Shukri’s charismatic leadership was also enhanced by his philanthropy towards young couples whom he helped to get married and start a new life in a city where renting an apartment, furnishing it, and paying the key money (Khlu Rigl) was almost impossible.
Mustafa himself conducted the marriage ceremony.81 He spends on the couple through the donations collected from other members who he had sent to the Gulf countries for work.82 One could see that this was a simple, yet an elaborate, complete and almost perfect system. Indeed, a state within a state.
Shukri Mustafa’s followers adhered to their leader’s ideology even during their imprisonment. According to them, the leader was right in developing his system, since “the righteous Muslim cannot exist individually, but must strive to build and maintain a righteous community of the faithful.”83

C. The Al Jihad Organization

Abdel Salam Faraj, the leader of the Jihad (Holy War) group, was an amalgam of charismatic leader and a radical militant. His organization was uncovered in 1978 as a consequence of its involvement in anti-Coptic activities.84
Like the Takfir group, its base was in Asyut from where it spread into Cairo and other cities. The climax of the group’s activities was its successful assassination of President Anwar al Sadat during a military parade in October 1981. The assassin, Khalid al Islambuli, was a lieutenant in the Egyptian army. This shows, if anything, that the organization had infiltrated the army. This also meant, that is was more dangerous than the other militant groups. The assassination resulted in the rounding up and arrest of some 3,000 “bearded people,” mostly members of al Jihad and al Takfir Wa al-Hijra.85
It was later revealed that the assassination was not an isolated event. It was to be accompanied by a series of uprisings in different localities. The Jihad organization was able to inspire one such armed uprising in its center, Asyut, where the police station was occupied and several members of the gendarmerie executed. The “coup,” however, did not materialize. After the initial shock, the government, under the leadership of Vice-President, later President Husni Mubarak, arrested Faraj and thousands of his followers, who were charged and sentenced to death during a show trial televised throughout Egypt.
The organization that Faraj had developed tends to be one of the more organized movements that mushroomed during the 1970’s. Faraj, although retaining a great charismatic zeal, preferred to lead his organization through a collective leadership, which provided more flexibility in the decision-making process and the implementation of projects.86
Faraj, however, had himself formulated the ideological background of the organization. “The ideology and motions of the Jihad group mark a shift in the line followed by the Islamist movement since the publication of Milestones. “The Hidden Imperative” (al ‘Amr al Mukhti) presents the groups theory and practice in the form of a negative assessment of the various defeats of the Islamist movement. Jihad, Faraj explains, is seeking to overcome this record of failure.87
Faraj’s doctrine is based on a brief text by the great medieval thinker Ibn Taamiyya entitled Al Siyasa al Shar’iyya (Legitimate Politics) and devoted to the concept of Jihad. According to Faraj’s interpretation of the text (some opponents prefer to use the term “distortion” of the text), the mass of the people are Muslims, but the rulers are corrupt princes who govern in contravention to the principles revealed in the Qur’an. This model of governing is that of the Tartars, and, as Ibn Taamiyya issued a fatwa to fight the Tartar-Mongol princes, so did Faraj by instigating Jihad (Holy War) against the corrupt rulers. This Jihad against the leaders of the country, in Faraj’s view, has a priority over the Jihad against the West.88 Moreover, the westernized leaders must be declared apostates (Murtad) and Jihad against them must not be pursued through rhetoric (references to the activities of the Society of Muslim Brethren), or emigration (Hijra, reference to al Takfir Wa al Hijra), but through armed struggle.89
Faraj’s ideological framework is summed up in his book Al Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar. As to the novelty of the Hidden Imperative, some authors argue that there is nothing new in it. It is rather a recompilation of the Islamist ideas based on an extensive reading of Qutb and Al Mawdudi.90
What is striking is that Faraj’s radical militancy surpasses those of other militant organizations. It foments a bloody overthrow of the existing governments at a time when “the process of re-socialization is undertaken by groups like the Society of Muslims and the Jama’at Islamiyya.... During Sadat’s presidency, mosques were being constructed everywhere. the codification of the Shari’ a was under discussion in the People’s Assembly, and veiled women are bearded young men had become common features of the Egyptian landscape.”91

D. Talmasani and the Neo-Brethren

While Egypt’s prisons were being filled almost beyond capacity with arrested members of radical militant organizations, the old, traditional line of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood was gaining impetus. Backed by Hudaybi’s refutation of Qutb’s militant and conspiratorial doctrine, this “old vanguard” advocated a more democratic opposition to the government and propagated this understanding through its editorials in al Daawa, which was published in a new format under the editorship of Umar Talmasani.
Talmasani became the central figure of this Neo-Brethren movement. Like Qutb, he was never appointed Supreme Guide (al Murshid al ‘Am), a position that remained empty since Hudaybi’s death in 1973.
al Daawa was gradually transformed into a propaganda machine for new generation of Islamists that was developing inside Egypt’s universities. The periodical advocated and defended the activities of the Jama’at Islamiyya, the umbrella organization under which Islamist students and their organs operated within the universities.
The editorials of al Daawa constantly attacked what Talmasani and his group called the “Triad” or 1) world Jewry (and their state, Israel), 2) Capitalism (West), 3) Communism (Soviet Union) as the direct reason behind the ills of the Muslim world.
Al Daawa initiated a full fledged campaign against the “Richard Document” under the pretext of opposing all orientalist scholars and their work. The basis of this campaign was that this document was directed against the Islamist Movement and, moreover, Richard himself had been an American secret agent and had instigated the Christians (Copts) against Muslims (the events of al Zawiya al Hamraa and Minya in 1981), Kepel illustrates that “the Richard in question is Richard P. Mitchell, an American orientalist and author of a major treatise on the Muslim Brotherhood, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, published in 1969.”92 It must be noted, however, that when the book first appeared, al Daawa recommended it to its readers and admitted that the movement was happy that such a study about it was published in the West.
Talmasani and his group here assumed the role of the reformists who tried to work from within the system. To achieve this objective they had developed their case by criticizing Sayyid Qutb and his radical teachings.93 Talmasani’s activities clarify that the “old vanguard” had compromised some of its previous zeal and attained a rapprochement with the government. It seems, however, that by attaining this moderate reformist character, Talmasani and the al Daawa group hoped to benefit by working as a legitimate opposition party and making their voice heard instead of propagating the Islamist mission the hard way around, as the militant groups were doing.


E. Sheikh Kishk: A “Radical” Imam

The leaders and organizations of the 1970’s worked within a definite field of activity. Shukri Mustafa advocated retreat from society. Faraj worked to overthrow the government. The Neo-Muslim Brethren (al-Daawa group) had the pages of the magazine to propagate their cause, and the Jama’at Islamiyya worked within the universities. There was, however, another kind of popular charismatic leadership which, although devoid of any organizational machine at its disposal, was omnipresent. Sheikh Kishk belonged to this category of “leader.” His popular Friday sermons was heard through cassette tapes not only in Egypt, but in many other Arab countries, as well as Arab communities in the West.
Sheikh Kishk was “a sensation of contemporary Egyptian Islam. His popular, down-marked eloquence won him considerable success, but since he had tasted the Nasserite concentration camps earlier in life, he never placed his talent at the government’s disposal, and cast himself instead as the censor of mores and attitudes in social and political life which ran counter to Islam as he understood it.”94
Sheikh Kishk delivered his Friday sermons in the Life Mosque at the edge of Cairo’s Qubba district. Thousands of people would gather inside and outside the mosque to hear the eloquent charismatic preacher. His charismatic appeal lied in the fact that his sermons were listened to time and again. Kishk used the themes formulated by Banna, Qutb, and others. His importance, however, lies in the fact that he explicitly admitted the un-Islamic character and attitude of the regime. Kishk possessed all the tools that make the charismatic leader: good command of Arabic; high oratorical abilities; broad knowledge of social facts; and a popular dialect that is adored by the people.
The ultimate goal that Kishk advocated in his sermons was the overthrow of the existing governments. He, however, did not say so explicitly. As Kepel puts it: “He [Kishk] stakes out a path without charting it through to its destination.”95
Kishk was arrested with other popular sheiks in September 1981, during the suppression campaign that Sadat initiated before his assassination. He was released in January 1982. He was assigned to author a column in the mass circulation Islamic weekly al Liwa’ al Islami where he was obliged to denounce extremism through his writings.


VII- Conclusion

From the reading of the narrative it might seem that the Islamist movement in Egypt is rendered incompetent since almost all of the radical charismatic leaders are either executed, confined to silence, or have chosen to work within the system after having entered into a compromise with the existing secular government. This is only partially true. Islamic resurgence in its two forms - moderate and radical - is still an important component of Egyptian politics.
Furthermore, during the 1980’s, Islamic resurgence even boasted of having accomplished its goal in Iran by overthrowing the monarchy and instituting an Islamic state based on the teachings of fundamental Shiism. As difficult as the Iranian experiment was, Egypt’s Islamists looked upon it a raw model to emulate and as a source to nurture its Egyptian counterparts.
As to the central issue of the application of the Shari’ a, it can be said that since the ascendance of Sadat, numerous Islamic laws have found their place in the Egyptian penal code. Although this accomplishment is viewed as a partial success by the more radical Islamists, the Neo-Brethren continue to further it by entering the Majlis al ‘Umma (the people’s assembly, i.e. parliament) and making their voice heard there.
The election drive with which the officially banned Brotherhood tried to gain a foot hold in the Majlis al ‘Umma was a serious one since it was a new experiment in moderate Islamist activity.
As one journalist put it in a colorful way:

Posters and streamers throughout Cairo proclaim: Islam is the solution, so let’s get to work. The election campaign [April 1987] slogans seem incongruous in Egypt, where basing a political party on religion is illegal. But it sums up the program of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood....”96

Most analysts would agree that a lot depended on the result of this new experiment. If it succeeded, a new phase of rapprochement between the Islamists and the government would have been possible. If it failed, it might have resulted in the creation of a new wave of radical resurgence, since most of the elements of a “crisis period” (i.e. Intifada policy, economic and military dependence) still existed, and might have instigated a new wave of radical response to it.



End Notes


1 . R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, (New York, 1985), p. 9.
2 . Ibid, p. 11.
3 . Rif’at al Sa’id, Hasan al Banna, Mata Kayf Wa Limaza, (Cairo, Egypt, 1973), p. 29.
4. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 28.
5 . Ibid, p. 79.
6 . Abd al-Moneim Sa'id Ali and W. Wenner, “Model Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim
Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” The Middle East Journal, 37 (Winter 1983): 337.
7 . Al Sa’id, op. cit., p. 38.
also see
Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, (London, 1969), p. 6.
8. Al Said, op. cit., p. 38.
9 . Ahmed Al Banna et al., al Imam al Shaheed Hasan al Banna: Waladi al Shaheed, (Beirut,) pp.7-8. [Here
it is the father who speaks about his son’s childhood and how the serpent was unable to poison the
sleeping al Banna. Almost all the writings of this type (many in number) create an aura of mysticism
around Hasan al Banna.
10 . al Said, op. cit., p. 36.
11 . al Said, loc. cit.
12 . Mitchell, op. cit., p. 2.
13 . al Said, op. cit., p. 37.
14 . al Said. loc. cit.
15 . Abd al Moniem and Wenner, loc. cit.
16 . Mitchell, op. cit., pp.8-9.
17. al Said, op. cit., p. 65.
18. Dekmejian, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
19. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 15.
also see:
Judith Tucker’s interview with Mohammed Sid Ahmed, an Egyptian journalist and left opposition
leader, conducted in Cambridge, Massachusetts on October 19, 1981. Merip Reports, #102 (January
1982), pp. 18-23.
20 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 82.
21 . al Said, op. cit., p. 48.
22 . Ibid, p. 49.
23 . Mitchell, op. cit., p. 295.
24 . al Said, op. cit., p. 49.
25 . Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 306-307. The direct reason behind the persecution of the Brotherhood and
especially the Secret Apparatus (al Jihaz al Sirri) was the assassination of Prime Minister al
Nakrashi Basha.
26 . al Said, loc. cit.
27 . Ibid, p. 55.
28 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 82.
29 . Mitchell, op. cit., p. 30.
30 . al Said, op, cit., p. 52.
31 . Ibid, p. 53.
32 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 32.
33 . Mahmud Abdel Halim, al Ikhwan al Muslimun, Ahdas Sana’at al Tarikh, Vol. I, (Cairo), p. 452.
34 . Ibid, p. 453.
35 . Ibid, p. 455.
36 . Ibid, p. 457.
37 . Ibid, p. 462.
38 . Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and Pharaoh, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. by John Rothschild,
California, 1986, p. 36.
39 . Kepel, loc. cit.
40 . Ibid, p. 26
also see:
Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 141-143. The leaders of the Brotherhood were participating in a conference in
Damascus when the Egyptian government accused them of publishing and distributing anti-
government literature.
41 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 83.
42 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 61.
43 . Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm, Chicago, 1978, p. 376.
44 . Gabriel R. Warburg, “Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-1980,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, #2,
(April, 1982), p. 135.
45 . Ibid, p. 137.
46 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 106.
47 . Ibid, p. 38.
48 . Ibid, p. 39.
49 . Ibid, p. 40.
50 . Ibid, p. 41.
also see
Yvonne Yazbek Haddad, “The Qur’anic Justification For an Islamic Revolution: The View of
Sayyid Qutb,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, # 1 (Winter 1983), p. 18.
51 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 41. He was sent there by the ministry of Education to study the American educational system.
52 . Dekmejian, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
53 . Haddad, loc. cit.
54 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 43.
55 . Kepel, loc. cit.
56 . Kepel, loc. cit.
57 . Ibid, p. 44.
58 . Nazih N. M. Ayyubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” IJMES, Vol. 12, # 4
(December 1980), p. 487.
59 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 45.
60 . Kepel, loc. cit.
61 . Haddad, op. cit., p. 24.
62 . Ibid, p. 25.
63 . Ayyubi, op. cit., p. 486.
64 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 90.
65 . Ibid, p. 86.
also see:
Abd al Moniem and Wenner, op. cit., p. 348
66 . Dekmejian, loc. cit.
67 . Abdul al Moniem and Wenner, op. cit., p. 345.

69 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 171
70 . Ibid, p. 92.
71 . Ibid, p. 93.
72 . Ibid, p. 93.
also see Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 95.
73 . Saad E Din Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants,” Merip Reports, # 103 (February 1982), p. 8.
74 . Ibid, p. 6.
75 . Dekmejian, loc. cit.
76 . Dekmejian, loc. cit.
77 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 77.
78 . Ibid, p. 61.
79 . Ibid, p. 76.
80 . Ibid, p. 79.
81 . Ibid, p. 89.
82 . Kepel, loc. cit.
83 . Saad El Din Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 7.
84 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 97.
85 . Erick Rouleau, “Who Killed Sadat?” Merip Reports, # 103 (February 1982), p. 3.
86 . Dekmejian, loc. cit.
87 . Kepel, op. cit., p. 193.
88 . Ibid, p. 194.
89 . Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 100.
90 . Kepel, loc. cit.
91 . Ibid, p. 193.
92 . Ibid, p. 118.
93 . Ibid, p. 126.
94 . Ibid, p. 173.
95 . Ibid, p. 190.
96 . Najla Sammakiyya, “Outlawed Fundamentalists Campaign in Bid For Islamic State, “ Associated Press,
March 31, 1987.




Bibliography


Books


Abdel Halim Mahmud. al Ikhwan al Muslimun: Ahdas Sana’at al Tarikh. 3 Volumes. Alexandria: al Daawa Press.

Al Banna, Ahmed, et. al., al Imam al Shaheed Hasan al Banna, Beirut, Maatuk Press.

Binder, Leonard, In a Moment of Enthusiasm, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1978.

Dekmejian, Hrair R., Islam in Revolution, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1985.

Gerth, H.H. and Mills Wright, From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1958.

Kepel, Gilles, The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans by John Rothschild, University of California Press, California, 1986.

Meiring, Desmond, Fire of Islam, Wildwood House, London, 1982.

Mitchell, Richard P., The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford University Press, London, 1969.

Ramadan, ‘Abdel ‘Azim, al Ikhwan al Muslimun Wa al Tanzim al Sirri, Rose al Yusuf Press, Cairo, 1977.

Al Sa’id, Rif’at, Hasan al Banna Mata, Kayf, Wa Limaza. Rose al Yusuf Press, Cairo, 1977.


Articles


Altman, Israel, “Islamic Movements in Egypt,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 10 (Winter 1979), pp.87-105.

Aulas, Marie-Christine, “Egypt Confronts Peace,” MERIP Reports, # 72, pp. 6-11.

______, “Sadat’s Egypt: A Balanced Sheet,” MERIP Reports, # 6 (July-August 1982) pp. 6-14.

Ayyubi, Nazih N.M., “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” IJMES, Vol. 12, #4 (December 1980), pp. 481-499.

Carter, B.L., “On Spreading the Gospel to Egyptians Sitting in Darkness: The Political Problems of Missionaries in Egypt in the 1930’s,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 1984), pp. 18-36.

Haddad, Yazbek, Yvonne, “The Qur’anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, #1 (Winter 1983), pp. 14-29.

Ibrahim, Saad El Din, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants,” MERIP Reports, # 103 (February 1982), pp.5-14.

_______,”Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,” IJMES, Vol. 12, #4 (December 1980), pp. 423-453.
Owen, Rogers, “Egypt Gropes for Political Direction,” MERIP Reports, # 116 (July -August 1983), pp. 25-26.

Rouleau, Eric, “Who Killed Sadat?,” MERIP Reports, #103 (February 1982, pp. 3-5.

Said Ali, Abdel Moniem and Wenner Manfred W., “Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, #3 (Summer 1982), pp. 336-361.

Sammakiyya, Najla, “Outlawed Fundamentalists Campaign in Bid for Islamic State,” Associated Press (News Agency), March 31, 1987.

Si Ahmed, Mohamed, “Sadat’s Alter Ego,” MERIP Reports, # 64, pp. 3-16.

Tucker Judith, Stork Joe, Johnson Penny, Interview with Mohamed Sid Ahmed, MERIP Reports, # 103 (January 1982), pp. 18-23.

Warburg, Gabriel R., “Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-1980,” Middle East Studies, Vol. 18 # 2 (April 1982), pp. 132-157.
2
3